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Introduction
This dissertation covers a broad range of topics related to the behavior of firms and
their reactions to their environment. The use of microeconomic data has contributed
substantially to economic knowledge, and an important empirical regularity detected
by the field of applied microeconomics is the diversity and heterogeneity of behavior
(Heckman, 2001). Firm-level data by now has become an important tool among
academics to analyze economic issues in various fields and also policy makers are
increasingly aware of the importance of this type of data in understanding the impact
of policy on the economy. The focus of this dissertation is on applying econometrical
techniques to firm-level data in order to generate new insights in relevant economic
issues concerning firms, ranging from international trade to investment. More
specifically, the dissertation covers the role of intermediary firms in trade (chapter
1), the importance of unit labor costs for export competitiveness (chapter 2), the
impact of outward foreign direct investment on the productivity evolution of domestic
plants (chapter 3) and the effect of Flemish investment subsidies on firm growth and
productivity (chapter 4).
The first chapter documents the role of intermediary firms in Belgian trade.
Bernard and Jensen (1995) were the first to appreciate the importance of firm-
level trade data to understand export behavior. Since then, numerous papers have
empirically investigated the trade behavior of firms, see Bernard, Jensen, Redding,
and Schott (2007) for an overview. However, most papers focus on trade by firms
that produce the products they export, i.e. on the manufacturing sector. Much
less attention has been devoted to the firms trading products that they did not
produce themselves, i.e. intermediary firms such as wholesalers and retailers. The
empirical papers in this small but growing literature have found a sizable share
of intermediary firms in the export value of a country (see among others Bernard,
Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2010; Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei, 2011; Crozet, Lalanne,
and Poncet, 2013). We investigate the role of intermediaries in trade for the small
open economy of Belgium, and more specifically check how their observed behavior
is different from producing firms in trade. To this end, we use highly disaggregated
trade data with information on the firm, the product and the destination or source
country and merge this with accounting data of the firms. The results show that a
large fraction of Belgian trade is created by wholesalers and retailers, rather than
producing firms. Almost 40 percent of exports and over 55 percent of imports can
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be attributed to such intermediaries in trade. They are smaller than direct exporters
and tend to charge higher export prices, but also pay higher import prices when they
trade in homogeneous products. Interestingly, almost half of their exports concerns
products that they previously imported. The common view in the literature until
now was that intermediaries serve as an export vehicle for domestic firms that cannot
export themselves because they are not productive enough, as in the model Ahn,
Khandelwal, and Wei (2011). Our results suggest that this view should be adjusted.
Intermediaries instead engage heavily in import activities themselves, and therefore
not only fulfill the role of intermediary for domestic firms, but also for foreign firms.
Also for the policy maker this chapter is interesting: it questions the usefulness of
looking at changes in the country-level aggregate exports number. It is important
to understand the micro drivers behind these changes, i.e. which firms lose or gain
and how this occurred. E.g., if a drop in aggregate exports is caused by a decline in
exports of products that were previously imported, it is not necessarily informative
about the competitive position of the manufacturing sector.
The second chapter is more policy oriented. Policy institutions such as the
European Commission, the ECB and the OECD often use unit labor costs as a
measure of international competitiveness (see e.g. European Commission, 2012). The
focus on unit labor costs as a measure for competitiveness rests on the idea that
increases in unit labor costs are passed on into higher export prices, and consequently
hurt exports. The goal of this chapter is to examine how well this measure is related
to export performance at the firm level. The seminal paper of Melitz (2003) offers a
theoretical framework to guide our analysis, showing that under certain assumptions,
only the most cost-efficient firms export, and that exports increase with cost-efficiency.
We use Belgian firm-level data for the period 1999-2010. Our results show a negative
relation between unit labor costs and exports at the firm level: an increase of unit
labor costs with 10 percent, implies a drop in exports between 2 and 4 percent. We
find that this elasticity varies between sectors and firms, notably that labor intensive
firms have a higher elasticity of exports with respect to unit labor costs. The micro
data also allow us to analyze the impact of unit labor costs on the extensive margin
of exit and entry into export markets. The evidence shows that higher unit labor
costs decrease the probability of starting to export for non-exporters and increase
the probability of stopping to export for exporters. While our results show that unit
labor costs have an impact on the intensive margin and extensive margin of firm-level
exports, the effect is rather limited, suggesting that pass-through of costs into prices
is limited or that demand for exported products is not elastic. The latter is consistent
with recent trade models emphasizing that not only relative costs, but also demand
factors, such as quality and taste, matter for explaining firm-level exports (Di Comite,
Thisse, and Vandenbussche, 2014).
The third chapter investigates another aspect of international economics: foreign
direct investment (FDI). More specifically, we analyze whether firms that engage in
an investment abroad, experience productivity gains in their domestic plants using
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Slovenian data from 1994 to 2002. Productivity differences between exporters and
non-exporters have been investigated extensively since the ‘discovery’ of firm-level
trade data by Bernard and Jensen (1995). Since then, a robust fact with only a
few exceptions has emerged: exporters are more productive than purely domestic
firms. Many papers find evidence that this is purely driven by selection: productive
firms self-select into export markets (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Clerides, Lach, and
Tybout, 1998). This type of empirical studies actually were a source of inspiration for
the seminal theoretical Melitz (2003) paper, where a firm’s productivity is assumed
to be fixed over time. Some papers however find evidence for productivity gains after
entry into export markets, notably for less developed economies (Van Biesebroeck,
2005; De Loecker, 2007) but not exclusively (Lileeva and Trefler, 2010). Papers
investigating the relation between outward FDI and productivity have found that
firms engaging in outward FDI are even more productive than exporters (Helpman,
Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004). Studies using panel data to investigate whether this is
purely self-selection are far less common than for exports, probably because of the lack
of data availability. Our methodology uses production function estimation techniques
to estimate productivity, building on the classical productivity literature (Olley
and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer, 2006)
and their extensions for productivity gains from exporting (Van Biesebroeck, 2005;
De Loecker, 2013). As an advanced transition country subject to many structural
economic changes in the period we investigate,1 Slovenia offers an interesting setting
to look for productivity gains from the internationalization of firms. Our findings
indicate that firms that invested abroad outside former Yugoslavia, experience a
higher productivity growth than firms that did not, controlling for many relevant
variables such as past productivity, export status and industry of the firm. These
results provide an argument for the claim that policy makers should foster the ‘stars’
among the domestic firms and facilitate their expansion abroad where possible, as
this is a possible source of productivity gains for the domestic plants.
The fourth and final chapter analyzes the effect of a subsidy program for small
and medium sized enterprises in Flanders (the program was called ’de groeipremie’
in Dutch). Despite the high amounts of state aid spent to support private business
initiatives,2 the evaluations of the effectiveness of state aid are relatively rare. There is
no consensus among academics on whether state aid is a suitable tool to fuel economic
activity. The basic evaluation problem is that government programs might simply
finance activities that firms would have undertaken in the absence of industrial policy
(Criscuolo, Martin, Overman, and Van Reenen, 2012; Aghion, Boulanger, and Cohen,
2011). The difficulty to credibly estimate the counter-factual of what would have
1After the country became independent from former Yugoslavia in 1991, the economy converted
from a semi-market economy to a full market economy. The subsequent period was characterized by
rapid economic growth, structural changes and a further increasing international exposure, which
likely contributed to the productivity gains from exports, as shown in De Loecker (2007)
2According to the ’State Aid Scoreboard’ of the European Commission, the total non-crisis state
aid in the EU27 member states was AC67B in 2012, or 0.52% of GDP.
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happened in the absence of state aid, often impedes an evaluation of its effectiveness.
However, the set-up of the program we investigate creates a quasi-experimental
setting where we can estimate a causal treatment effect. The subsidies were awarded
according to a ranking system that favored young, growing and productive firms with
a strong cash flow, granting subsidies to the highest scoring firms until the depletion
of funds. The nature of this allocation system creates a sharp cut off in granting the
subsidy according to the score: only firms above the cut off score are granted the
subsidy. This setting allows to estimate a local average treatment effect around this
cut off, making use of ’regression discontinuity design’ (RDD) methodologies (Lee
and Lemieux, 2010; Cerqua and Pellegrini, 2014). The main assumption is that firms
just below the cut off score, who did not get the subsidy, are a good counter-factual
for firms just above this cut off. We find a sizable positive effect on investment,
employment, output and productivity, but only for the very small firms, e.g. firms
with less than 10 employees. We do not find an effect for larger firms. The larger
firms do experience higher profits when awarded the subsidy. This suggests that
these firms use the subsidy to finance investments that they would have undertaken
anyway. If the goal of the policy maker was to support firm growth, our results
suggest that the subsidy program has not been successful, apart from the effect on
the very small firms. Possible explanations include the low subsidy amount3 and
the fact that the subsidy favors firms that are likely able to finance the investment
themselves.
3The subsidy amount as a percentage of the corresponding investment was lower than 12% for
90% of the applications.
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Chapter 1
Intermediaries in trade: evidence
from Belgium
Summary This chapter documents that a large fraction of Belgian trade is created
by wholesalers and retailers, rather than producing firms. Almost 40 percent of
exports and over 55 percent of imports can be attributed to such intermediaries
in trade. They are smaller than direct exporters and tend to charge higher export
prices, but also pay higher import prices when they trade in homogeneous products.
Interestingly, almost half of their exports concerns products which they imported.
This confirms their role as intermediaries in trade, not only for domestic firms, but
also for foreign based ones.
This chapter is joint work with Jozef Konings and Hylke Vandenbussche.
7
8 1.1. Introduction
1.1 Introduction
A large literature exists on why some firms export and others do not, see e.g. Bernard,
Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007) for an overview. However, only recently the role
of intermediating firms in trade has received more attention. The empirical papers
in this small but growing literature all found a sizable share of intermediary firms in
the export value of a country. This paper investigates the role of wholesalers and
retailers in Belgian trade. We find that intermediaries represent an important share
of trade in Belgium, a share that is substantially higher than in other countries. The
value share of intermediary exports in total exports is almost 40% for Belgium in
20101, which is much higher than the shares mentioned in the literature, e.g. 15%
for Sweden (Akerman (2009)), 11% for Italy(Bernard, Grazzi, and Tomasi (2013)),
20% for France (Crozet, Lalanne, and Poncet (2013)), 10% for the US (Bernard,
Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2010)) and 22% for China (Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei
(2011)).2 For imports, we find a value share of over 55% for intermediaries. Also this
is high, e.g. compared to Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2010) who find
a share of just over 20% for the US. These facts illustrate that intermediaries are
an important aspect of Belgian trade. The goal of the paper is to document the
differences between intermediaries and producing firms that trade directly.
As theoretical background for the role of intermediaries in trade, Ahn, Khandelwal,
and Wei (2011) develop an intuitive sorting model, extending the model of Melitz
(2003). The basic principle of the model is that heterogeneous firms self-select their
export channel. Firms face a fixed cost when exporting, leading to productivity
sorting: the most productive firms export on their own, and the least productive
firms do not export. Intermediaries offer an additional exporting channel. They
may help to overcome fixed costs of exporting such as setting up a distribution
network, learning about the foreign market, and also branding costs as in Dhingra
(2013), who models the trade off between product variety and cost reduction in
a trade context. Firms that export through intermediaries have to pay a lower
fixed cost, but are charged an extra marginal cost. Therefore only firms with an
intermediate level of productivity will export through intermediaries: the firms that
are not productive enough to be able to pay the high fixed cost of exporting, but
1We excluded multinational enterprises from the analysis, because MNEs are ambiguous in this
context, as they might be classified as intermediaries in Belgium, while having production plants
in other countries, or vice versa. If we include them, the share of intermediaries drops to 28% for
exports and 43% for imports, which is still high compared to previous studies for other countries.
2Intermediaries are not always defined in the same way as we do. Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei
(2011) use Chinese characters in the name of the firm to classify it as intermediary, Akerman
(2009) uses the main activity of the firm and included both wholesalers and retailers as we do,
Crozet, Lalanne, and Poncet (2013) also use the main activity, but drop retailers from the analysis,
while Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2010) distinguish between pure wholesalers, pure
retailers and mixes between intermediary firms and producing firms. However, for our sample,
’pure’ wholesalers, that is firms classified within nace rev2 sector 46 ’wholesale trade, except of
motor vehicles and motorcycles’, are responsible for more than 80% of the intermediary exports,
and their export share would still be significantly higher than the listed results.
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still productive enough to profitably export through intermediaries. In this model, a
lower productivity means a higher marginal cost. This leads to a first prediction of
their model: products exported through intermediaries will have a higher price. The
model also implies that intermediaries will facilitate trade to countries where the
fixed costs and variable costs are higher. They confirm their theoretical predictions
using Chinese firm-level export data for the year 2005. Akerman (2009) builds on a
similar theoretical model, and confirms his predictions for Swedish exporting firms.
Bernard, Grazzi, and Tomasi (2013) do an empirical analysis for Italy, and highlight
that intermediaries typically provide solutions to country-specific fixed costs. An
alternative theoretical approach is developed by Crozet, Lalanne, and Poncet (2013),
underlining the importance of quality sorting in addition to productivity sorting.
If quality sorting is dominant, firms with the highest product quality will export
directly, firms with low quality products will not export. Firms with intermediate
product quality will export through intermediaries. In their model, a lower quality
implies a lower marginal cost. Therefore they predict that when quality sorting
is dominant, the products exported by intermediaries will have a lower price than
products exported directly. They confirm their predictions with French firm-level
export data for the year 2007.
The presence of intermediaries might also be rationalized in other ways than done
by these theoretical models. In particular, there could be a role of accompanying
services, such as retail services, offered by intermediaries. However, as we do not
have data on the services offered, we do not explore this in our analysis.
On the more general topic of internationalization modes of firms, Be´ke´s and
Murako¨zy (2012) use survey data on French, Italian and Spanish exports. The survey
data allows them to distinguish between direct and indirect exports at the firm level.
They find that only 13.2% of the exporting firms use intermediaries, and less than
half of them exclusively use intermediaries to export. Abel-Koch (2013) show with
Turkish data that larger producing firms tend to make less use of intermediaries for
their exports.
It is interesting to mention that some papers shed light on trade intermediation
in a different way. Bernard, Blanchard, Van Beveren, and Vandenbussche (2012)
investigate a different phenomena of intermediation, which they call ’carry along
trade’. This refers to manufacturing firms that export products that they did not
produce themselves. They find that for a vast majority of Belgian manufacturing
exporters, a part of their exports consists of products that they do not produce.
Both demand side factors, notably product range complementarities, and supply
side factors, such as distribution network efficiency, can rationalize their findings.
Damijan, Konings, and Polanec (2013) investigate a related phenomena which they
call ’pass on trade’: they find that for manufacturing firms, a substantial fraction of
trade flows at the firm level consists of simultaneous imports and exports in identical
products, narrowly defined at the 8-digit product classification. Blum, Claro, and
Horstmann (2010) match data on Argentine exporters with data on Chilean importers
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to create a dataset with bilateral trade. They find that small exporting firms typically
match with large importing firms. Felbermayr and Jung (2011) emphasize the role of
enforceable contracts in the decision of the firm to choose between unaffiliated foreign
trade intermediaries or own foreign trade subsidiaries. Rauch (1999) emphasizes the
role of networks in international trade. Finally, Antra`s and Costinot (2010) and
Antra`s and Costinot (2011) build a theoretical matching model to investigate under
which assumptions the integration of intermediary markets is beneficial for the less
developed countries.
In the current paper however, we focus on the difference between trade by firms
that produce and trade directly and trade by intermediary firms. We contribute
to the existing literature in three ways. The first contribution is that we analyze
Belgian firm-level exports. We check if we can confirm the stylized facts found for
the other countries. As a minor extension, we distinguish between homogeneous and
differentiated goods when analyzing import and export prices. To our knowledge,
this is the first paper to analyze a small, open economy in this context. Ex ante it
is difficult to predict whether trade intermediaries will play a large role in Belgian
trade. Intermediaries could have a higher presence, because firms that want to
grow are often obliged to search for profit opportunities abroad due to the small
size of the Belgian domestic market. However, because of the free trade within
the EU, the threshold to start exporting is low, possibly making intermediaries
redundant for the most important trade partners. Our second contribution is that
we analyze the imports as well as the exports. To our knowledge, only Bernard,
Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2010) have presented results for imports, for the US.
The third and most novel part of our paper is that we link imports and exports: we
check to what extent intermediaries are involved in pass on trade. For a small, open
economy, intermediaries are less likely to source the products they export only from
the domestic market. We would therefore expect a substantial share of imports that
are re-exported, and we expect this share to be higher for intermediaries.
Our analysis shows that intermediaries are much smaller in terms of size, i.e.
export value, import value and sales, than producing firms that export directly.
Conditional on total export value of the firm, intermediaries export more products
to less countries, have less employees, lower tangible fixed assets, a lower capital
intensity, and pay a higher average wage. Almost the same holds on the import side,
with the only difference that intermediaries import, conditional on total import value
of the firm, less products from less source countries, although they still import more
products per source country.
In the gravity analysis, we find evidence that trade barriers such as a smaller
market size, proxies for fixed costs provided by the World Bank, such as cost to
import and number of documents required to import, and higher tariffs are, as
expected, associated with a higher export value share of intermediaries compared
to producing firms. For imports, we only find a statistically significant correlation
between higher tariffs and a higher import value share of intermediaries. We do not
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find a systematic relation with distance.
Intermediaries charge on average a higher price for their exported products
compared to producing firms, but the price premium is only statistically significant
for homogeneous goods. Overall and for differentiated goods, we find a small positive,
but not statistically significant coefficient. On the import side, intermediaries pay
a higher price for homogeneous goods but a lower price for differentiated goods. A
possible explanation for the latter is that intermediary firms import products of a
lower quality and hence lower price. The higher price for imported and exported
homogeneous goods could be driven by productivity sorting as in the model of Ahn,
Khandelwal, and Wei (2011), where intermediaries are used by less productive firms
that charge a higher price, see the theoretical background section for more details.
Note that the link of the evidence with these general theoretical models is limited,
as they try to explain a common behavior across all industries and markets. Going
further and model demand and supply in a detailed way for specific markets would
be interesting and insightful, but is beyond the scope of the current paper.
A novel finding of this paper is that, when linking imports and exports, we find
that almost half of the export value by intermediaries coincide with narrowly defined
CN 8 digit product categories: 45% of the intermediary export value is pass on
trade, compared to 19% for manufacturing firms. The maintained assumption in the
literature until now is that intermediaries ’help’ those domestic producing firms that
cannot export themselves because they are not productive enough. But our findings
show that (in addition?) something else is going on, with intermediaries engaging in
import activities themselves. This suggests that the view that intermediaries solely
serve as an export vehicle for domestic firms should be adjusted.
Our results are not driven by the presence of multinational enterprises, which
we exclude from the analysis in our main results as they might be classified as
intermediaries in Belgium, but have production plants in other countries. We also
ran the results including MNEs, but the qualitative differences are very limited.3
The importance of the link between imports and exports is in line with recent
evidence in a different context by Konings and Vandenbussche (2013), who show that
anti-dumping measures, while beneficial for purely domestic firms, hurts exporters
through an increased cost of imports.
The structure of the current paper is as follows: in section 1.2 we discuss the
theoretical framework that we will use to guide our analysis. In section 1.3, we
describe the data and present overview tables on the share of intermediaries in
trade. Next, we present stylized facts on differences between intermediaries in trade
and producing firms that trade directly in section 1.4. Section 1.5 focuses on the
correlation between country-level or country-product level characteristics and the
share of intermediaries in trade with that country. The next section focuses on
the price difference for intermediary exports and imports compared to exports and
3The results including MNEs and a discussion on how they differ from our main results, can be
found in appendix 1.C.
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imports by producing firms. Section 1.7 shows the most novel results of this paper,
i.e. the results for ’pass on trade’. The overall conclusion can be found in section 1.8.
1.2 Theoretical background
This section provides a short discussion of the most commonly used theoretical
frameworks for intermediaries in international trade. The model of Akerman (2009)
and Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011) are very similar. The models are based on a
Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004)-type of productivity sorting. Direct exporters
face a destination-specific fixed cost of exporting, denoted fxd. Firms can also choose
to export through an intermediation sector. To access this sector, firms need to
pay a fixed cost fxi to access the foreign market, that is lower than the fixed cost
for accessing the market directly. For the model to make sense, the variable cost
of indirect exporting should be higher than the variable cost of direct exporting.
Otherwise all firms would only export through intermediaries. In the model of
Akerman (2009), the intermediary firm sets an extra markup above the price charged
by the producing firms. Only the most productive firms find it more profitable to
export directly and pay the destination-specific fixed cost of direct exporting. The
least productive firms cannot afford either type of fixed cost, and do not export.
Firms with an intermediate level of productivity cannot afford the fixed cost to export
directly, but can profitably export through the intermediation sector because of the
lower fixed cost per destination market. We follow Bernard, Grazzi, and Tomasi
(2013)4 in making a graphical representation of this process of productivity sorting
analogous to Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), see figure 1.1. All firms with a
productivity higher than φd are able to overcome the fixed cost fd of being active
in the domestic market. Firms with a productivity higher than φxi are productive
enough to generate positive profits from exporting through intermediaries. For firms
with a productivity level above φxd, it becomes more profitable to export directly.
The main predictions of the model of Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011) are that
1) the most productive firms export, while the firms with an intermediate level of
productivity use intermediaries to access foreign markets, 2) exports by intermediaries
will have a higher price, and 3) there will be a higher share of intermediated trade for
countries with more difficult access because of higher trade cost or smaller market
size.
Crozet, Lalanne, and Poncet (2013) build a more general model that incorporates
quality into the demand function, based on the models in Melitz (2003) and Baldwin
and Harrigan (2011). We discuss the model briefly, for the details we refer to the
Crozet, Lalanne, and Poncet (2013) paper itself. They assume a continuum of
producing firms in this industry, each producing a single differentiated variety. As
in Melitz (2003), firms have heterogeneous costs. Wages and aggregate income are
4This graph appeared in an earlier draft version, but is no longer included in the most recent
version.
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Figure 1.1: Productivity sorting
The graph shows profit pi as a function of productivity ϕ for domestic producers (dotted line, index
d), producers that export directly (dashed line, index xd) and indirectly (full line, index xi)
exogenously determined in all countries. Assuming a CES utility function, they
derive the following expression for demand for variety k in destination country j:
qkj = αjs
σ−1
k (p
CIF
kj )
−σ, (1.1)
where σ > 1 the elasticity of substitution between varieties and αj stands for country-
product specific factors such as the expenditure share in destination country j on
the good considered, and the price index. pCIFkj is the trade-cost inclusive proce
(CIF) of variety k in market j, which is an increasing function of firm k’s marginal
cost, which will be denoted ck. Demand increases in the quality quality of variety k,
captured by the parameter sk. Assuming a power-function relation between marginal
cost and quality, sk = c
b
k, they consider two polar cases: productivity sorting and
quality sorting. In the productivity sorting setting, which can be interpreted as
consumers not valuing more quality or firms unable to differentiate in quality, the
quantity sold will depend purely on the price, and thus on the firm’s marginal cost.
Therefore profits are declining with increasing marginal cost. Producers can choose
to export directly or export through an intermediary. When exporting through an
intermediary, the firms pay a lower fixed cost, but because intermediaries charge an
additional markup, the variable profits are lower as well. This leads to productivity
14 1.2. Theoretical background
sorting for the producing firms as shown in figure 1.2: firms with a marginal cost of
cxd or lower will export directly, while firms with a marginal cost between cxd and cxi
will export through intermediaries. Firms that produce at a marginal cost above cxi
will not export because there is insufficient demand for their highly priced product
to recover the fixed costs.
Figure 1.2: Productivity sorting Crozet, Lalanne, and Poncet (2013)
The graph shows profit pi as a function of marginal costs c for producers that export directly
(dashed line) and indirectly (full line)
In the quality sorting setting, consumers do value quality and firms are able to
differentiate in quality of their products, but incur a higher marginal cost with higher
quality. Thus, profits are rising with increasing marginal cost. This leads to quality
sorting for the producing firms as shown in figure 1.3: firms with a marginal cost
of cxd or higher will export directly, while firms with a marginal cost between cxd
and cxi will export through intermediaries. Firms that produce at a marginal cost
below cxi will not export, because there is insufficient demand abroad for their low
quality product to recover their fixed costs. The prediction about the price premium
of products exported by intermediaries therefore depends on whether the product
exhibits productivity or quality sorting. For both types of sorting, price is strictly
increasing in marginal cost. In the case of products for which sorting into export
markets is driven by productivity, the varieties exported by the intermediaries should
exhibit a positive price premium over the direct export prices, because only the less
productive firms with higher marginal costs will export through intermediaries. The
premium should be lower or even negative in the case of quality-sorting products,
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Figure 1.3: Quality sorting Crozet, Lalanne, and Poncet (2013)
The graph shows profit pi as a function of marginal costs c for producers that export directly
(dashed line) and indirectly (full line)
because firms with lower quality and thus lower marginal costs will export through
intermediaries. Note that this way of modeling quality differs from alternative
widespread models in industrial organization, where a marginal cost does not depend
on quality. Instead a higher product quality is achieved through prior firm choices,
such as a sunk fixed cost investment in R&D or advertising, see e.g. Sutton (2007)
or the text books Belleflamme and Peitz (2010) and Sutton (2012). When quality
predominantly comes from fixed cost outlays, it does not affect marginal costs, so
the exact mechanism presented before would no longer hold. However, these models
also typically yield a positive correlation between quality, profits and price, but
originating from market power due to consumer preferences, not from a positive
correlation between marginal cost and price. It is the positive correlation between
quality and profits that drives the quality sorting mechanism, so this mechanism
would continue to hold in these type of models.
1.3 Data description
1.3.1 Firm data
Our main data source for the firm data is the National Bank of Belgium (NBB). It
provides a comprehensive panel of Belgian trade flows, by firm, product (CN 8-digit
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level) and country. The data contains the universe of international transactions
(above certain thresholds5) for the years 2005 to 2010. We merge these data, using
a unique firm identifier, with the firm-level balance sheet and income statement
information, also provided by the NBB. Because not all firms are obliged to file
accounting statements, we additionally use the sector classification data from the
’Enterprices & Self-employed’ database of the Federal Public Service, Economy
department, commercialized by Bureau van Dijk. This allows us to retrieve the sector
classification (NACE rev2 code) of approximately 98% of the trading firms, so we
have almost full coverage. We exclude non-resident firms, as they have only a limited
link with the Belgian economy. In addition, we exclude MNEs from the analysis.
MNEs are ambiguous in this context, as they might be classified as intermediaries
in Belgium, while having production plants in other countries, or vice versa. To
identify multinationals, we use the data from the annual Survey on Foreign Direct
Investment of the National Bank of Belgium.
The empirical strategy we follow to distinguish intermediaries from direct traders,
is to use the NACE revision 2 classification of the firms. We define the various types
of firms in the current paper as follows:
• Intermediaries: the sectors 45, 46 & 47 in the NACE revision 2 classification
(combination of wholesale en retail)6
• Producing firms: the sectors 1-33 in the NACE revision 2 classification (agri-
culture, materials and manufacturing)
• Other: the sectors not mentioned above, i.e. mainly services sectors different
from wholesale and retail
Our analysis will mainly focus on the difference between intermediary firms and
producing firms. Table 1.1 to 1.4 give an aggregate overview of the importance of
intermediaries in Belgian trade. The % column in these tables indicates the relative
importance of intermediaries relative to the total. In table 1.1 you can find an
overview of the value shares of both types of firms, for the years 2005 until 2010.
The value share of intermediaries does not fluctuate a lot, and is always between
25% and 28% over the time period considered. In terms of number of firms, their
presence is even higher: more than 50% of the exporting firms is an intermediary
(see table 1.2). For imports, the value share for intermediaries is between 41% and
45%, while their share in number of firms drops from 60% in 2005 to 49% in 2010.
5see appendix 1.A
6The descriptions of these codes, according to Eurostat (the statistical office of the European
Union), are the following:
45: Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
46: Wholesale trade, except motor vehicles and motorcycles
47: Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
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Table 1.1: Export value (in billion euro) by firm type
Exports value Prod. Interm. Other Interm. %
2005 23 23 18 36%
2006 24 24 18 36%
2007 26 27 19 37%
2008 27 28 17 40%
2009 23 24 13 40%
2010 38 35 22 37%
a Producers: industry codes 1 - 33 (NACE rev2)
Intermediaries: industry codes 45, 46 & 47 (NACE rev2)
Other: industry codes not mentioned above
b The last column indicates the % share of intermediaries in
the total export value
c Exports by MNEs are excluded
Table 1.2: Number of exporting firms by firm type
Exporting firms producers intermediaries other intermediaries %
2005 5,500 12,689 3,685 58%
2006 4,725 11,614 3,582 58%
2007 4,637 11,608 3,546 59%
2008 4,807 11,837 3,930 58%
2009 4,621 11,111 3,744 57%
2010 4,613 10,774 3,658 57%
a Producers: industry codes 1 - 33 (NACE rev2)
Intermediaries: industry codes 45, 46 & 47 (NACE rev2)
Other: industry codes not mentioned above
b The last column indicates the % share of intermediaries in the total number of
exporting firms
c MNEs are excluded
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Table 1.3: Import value (in billion euro) by firm type
Import value producers intermediaries other intermediaries %
2005 15 33 17 51%
2006 15 35 16 53%
2007 16 39 18 53%
2008 17 41 17 54%
2009 14 36 14 56%
2010 26 48 22 50%
a Producers: industry codes 1 - 33 (NACE rev2)
Intermediaries: industry codes 45, 46 & 47 (NACE rev2)
Other: industry codes not mentioned above
b The last column indicates the% share of intermediaries in the total import
value
c Imports by MNEs are excluded
Table 1.4: Number of importing firms by firm type
Importing firms producers intermediaries other intermediaries %
2005 5,534 17,221 5,182 62%
2006 5,250 15,948 5,157 61%
2007 5,640 17,129 7,065 57%
2008 6,283 19,067 10,576 53%
2009 6,444 19,569 11,873 52%
2010 6,144 18,572 12,264 50%
a Producers: industry codes 1 - 33 (NACE rev2)
Intermediaries: industry codes 45, 46 & 47 (NACE rev2)
Other: industry codes not mentioned above
b The last column indicates the % share of intermediaries in the total number of
importing firms
c MNEs are excluded
We focus on the difference between intermediaries and producing firms, so we
drop firms classified as ’other’ from the analysis in the remainder of the paper.
1.3.2 Country and product data
We also analyze if the differences between intermediaries and producing firms depends
on certain country or product characteristics. To this end, we use several additional
data sources.
The country-level variables are taken from the following sources: country GDP
data from the UN Statistics Division (complemented with World Bank data for
Liechtenstein & Faeroe Islands) and bilateral distances from the CEPII geodist
database.7 In addition, we use World Bank indicators such as cost to import/export
and the number of documents required to import/export as a proxy for fixed cost
7as in Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010)
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trade barriers. We also HS6 product-country import tariffs, taken from World
Integrated Trade System (WITS).8
To distinguish between homogeneous and differentiated products, we use the
Rauch classification9, see Rauch (1999). The Rauch classification groups goods
by the Standard International Trade Classication (SITC), Revision 2 (four-digit
classification), into three categories: differentiated, reference priced or traded on
organized exchanges. We combine the latter two into ’homogeneous goods’.
1.4 Firm-level differences
This section zooms in on the stylized differences between intermediaries and producing
firms that trade directly. For reasons of clarity, we only present the results for the
most recent year in our dataset: 2010. The goal of this section is to check whether
the differences found in previous papers also hold for Belgium. We start by discussing
the export side. Figure 1.4 illustrates that producing firms and intermediaries are
distributed differently in terms of total export value: the fraction of small exporters
is much higher for intermediaries. The summary statistics for exporting firms can
be found in tables 1.5. The table shows that the average and median intermediary
exports less in terms of export value than the firms that export directly. The
summary statistics also show that the median intermediary exports less products
and has fewer destination markets. Intermediaries also have lower sales, number
of employees and tangible fixed assets (’TFA’) than producers. The average and
median wage are higher for intermediaries. The mean capital intensity (TFA/FTE)
is higher, but the median is lower for intermediaries.10 However, most of these
differences simply illustrate a difference in size. Therefore, we also condition on size
in the subsequent analysis. Figures 1.5 and 1.6 illustrate that, conditional on size,
intermediaries actually export clearly more products. They still export to fewer
destination markets, but this is only so for the firms with a high export value.
8WITS does not provide tariffs for all product-country combinations, but we have tariffs for
close to 90% of the none EU country-product combinations. See appendix 1.A for more details.
9Because of ambiguities that could affect the classification, he made both a ‘conservative’ and a
‘liberal’ classification, the former minimizing and the latter maximizing the number of goods classified
as homogeneous. We drop ambiguous observations by only including goods in the regressions that
are classified as homogeneous in the ’conservative’ classification or goods that are classified as
differentiated in the ’liberal’ classification.
10This might suggest a presence of a few large firms capital intensive firms, e.g. specialized
in transportation, among the intermediaries, that are fundamentally different from the ’pure’
intermediaries. However, we do not find this pattern in the data. The difference in means is more
likely driven by outliers. See appendix 1.B for a more elaborate discussion.
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Figure 1.4: Exports - density producers & intermediaries
Table 1.5: Summary statistics for exporting firms by firm
type
intermediaries producers
export value mean 3,300,000 8,200,000
median 35,000 870,000
# products mean 12.2 10.9
median 3 4
# countries mean 5.5 10.9
median 2 4
sales mean 3,900,000 19,000,000
median 4,100,000 5,100,000
Employees (FTE) mean 24 52
median 7 22
average wage mean 51,100 47,300
median 45,700 44,300
TFA mean 990,000 2,900,000
median 230,000 760,000
TFA/FTE mean 99,800 85,400
median 28,700 37,200
a Definition producers and intermediaries: see data section
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Figure 1.5: Exports - number of products
Figure 1.6: Exports - number of countries
22 1.4. Firm-level differences
We repeat the analysis more thoroughly by conducting a formal econometric
analysis. We run the following regression:
log(yj) = d
I
j + d
size
j + d
p
j + j, (1.2)
where y stands for the variable of interest, index j stands for the firm and superscript
p for the main product. The dependent variable can be the firm export value, the
number of exported products, or number of export destination countries. We will
also check the differences in sales, employment, fixed assets, wages and capital-labor
ratio. The variable dI stands for the intermediary dummy, taking the value of ’1’ if
the firm is an intermediary and ’0’ if the firm is a producing firm. It is important to
control for firm size, otherwise the fact that intermediaries are substantially smaller
will dominate all regressions. The regression controls for firm size by export value
decile dummies.11 In addition, we control for the type of products exported by the
firm by including a dummy for the main HS 4 digit export product of the firm.
The results of the regressions for export value, number of products, number of
destination markets and the number of products per destination market, are shown
in the first five columns of table 1.6 (export value is regressed with and without
controlling for product dummies). Intermediaries are on average much smaller than
producing firms, whether controlling for the main export product or not. Belgian
intermediaries export, controlling for size and type of products, on average more
products to on average less countries. These stylized fact confirms the findings of other
papers.12 The columns (6) to (10) show the results for the other variables of interest:
sales13, number of employees, average wage (defined as total wage bill divided by the
number of employees), tangible fixed assets (’TFA’) and capital intensity (defined as
the ratio of fixed assets and number of employees). Intermediaries have on average
far lower sales, less employees, a higher average wage, less tangible fixed assets and a
lower capital to labor ratio. The lower sales confirm that intermediaries are indeed
smaller on average. That intermediaries need less employees conditional on size
seems intuitive, as they focus only on selling activities and do not have a production
process. The higher average wage could be the result of a different composition of
their labor force. The tangible fixed assets and capital intensity are lower, which is
intuitive as intermediaries do not need production equipment.
If we now do the same for the import side, we find to a large extent qualitatively
similar results. The density plot in figure 1.7 illustrates that intermediaries are on
average importing less than firms that trade directly, although it is less pronounced
than on the export side. The summary statistics can be found in table 1.7, they are
qualitatively very similar to the summary statistics on the export side. Also on the
import side, intermediaries are substantially smaller according to the average and
11We also experimented by including a polynomial of log export value, the results are very similar
12E.g. Bernard, Grazzi, and Tomasi (2013) and Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011)
13We did not use export value decile dummies here to control for size. Exports are part of sales,
so controlling for export value would make the coefficient difficult to interpret.
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Table 1.6: Exports - premia for intermediaries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
exp val exp val # cou # prod pr/c sales emp wage TFA k/l
dI -1.79∗∗∗ -1.43∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.066) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.040) (0.033) (0.010) (0.048) (0.041)
Pr. d. no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Size d. no no yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes
Obs. 15387 15387 15387 15387 15387 11111 9700 9700 11409 9540
R2 0.059 0.274 0.650 0.580 0.215 0.229 0.373 0.295 0.307 0.160
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a Definition producers and intermediaries: see data section
b The columns respectively give the premium for exporting intermediaries compared to firms that
export directly, for the following variables: export value (twice), the number of destination
countries, the number of products, the number of products per destination country, sales,
employment, average wage (defined as the ratio of the total wage bill and number of employees),
tangible fixed assets, and capital intensity (defined as the ratio of fixed assets and number of
employees). All dependent variables are in logs.
c Product dummies (’Pr. d.’) control for the main HS 4 digit product. Size dummies are deciles
for the total import value of the firm. Using other measures of firm size, such as sales, yields
very similar results.
median import value.
We now use the same empirical specification (1.2), with import decile dummies
to control for size. Columns 1 of table 1.8 shows that the import value is lower
for intermediaries, however the coefficient becomes positive when controlling for
product dummies, see column 2. This suggests that the difference in import value
can be largely explained by differences in type of products the intermediaries import.
Intermediaries import from less source countries (column 3), but contrary to the
export side, they also import a lower number of products (column 4). However, they
still import more products per country (column 5). The rest of table 1.8 for imports
is fully in line with the table on the export side: intermediaries have on average lower
sales (column 6), less employees (colum, 7), a higher average wage (column 8), lower
tangible fixed assets (column 9) and a lower capital to labor ratio (column 10).14
In summary, we see that intermediaries in trade are different from producing
firms. They are smaller along various dimensions. In addition, they adopt more of a
country focus: they trade more products per country. This is in line with the general
view in the literature that intermediaries are used to overcome country-specific fixed
costs.
14If we do the analysis using only exports and imports to and from non-EU countries, we find
largely the same results. Only the coefficient in column 1 of table 1.8 becomes much smaller in
absolute value and is no longer statistically significant.
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Figure 1.7: Imports - density producers & intermediaries
Table 1.7: Summary statistics for importing firms by firm
type
intermediaries producers
import value mean 2,600,000 4,200,000
median 63,000 130,000
# products mean 21.8 21.4
median 5 6
# countries mean 3.7 5.1
median 2 3
sales mean 4,400,000 17,000,000
median 2,900,000 4,500,000
Employees (FTE) mean 18.5 47.3
median 5.8 19.4
average wage mean 50,000 46,800
median 44,300 44,000
TFA mean 770,000 2,600,000
median 190,000 690,000
TFA/FTE mean 100,000 92,000
median 29,100 36,200
a Definition producers and intermediaries: see data section
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Table 1.8: Imports - premia for intermediaries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
imp val imp val # cou # prod pr/c sales emp wage TFA k/l
dI -0.31∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ -1.11∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ -1.37∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.053) (0.010) (0.016) (0.013) (0.033) (0.026) (0.008) (0.040) (0.035)
Pr. d. no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Size d. no no yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes
Obs. 24716 24716 24716 24716 24716 16513 14190 14190 17253 13920
R2 0.001 0.275 0.575 0.614 0.335 0.262 0.459 0.281 0.320 0.123
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a Definition producers and intermediaries: see data section
b The columns respectively give the premium for importing intermediaries compared to firms that
import directly, for the following variables: import value (twice), the number of source countries,
the number of products, the number of products per source country, sales, employment, average
wage (defined as the ratio of the total wage bill and number of employees), tangible fixed assets,
and capital intensity (defined as the ratio of fixed assets and number of employees). All dependent
variables are in logs.
c Product dummies (’Pr. d.’) control for the main HS 4 digit product. Size dummies are deciles for
the total import value of the firm. Using other measures of firm size, such as sales, yields very
similar results.
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1.5 Gravity analysis
In this section we discuss how the exports (or imports) by intermediaries vary in
function of export destination (or import origin) country characteristics. On the
export side, we check if the results found for other papers also hold for Belgium. On
the import side, the literature is far less extensive, to our knowledge only Bernard,
Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2010) estimate gravity regressions for the import side,
using US data. We extend their results by, apart from GDP and distance, also
including additional measures of trade barriers on the import side.
Remember that the model of Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011) predicts that
there will be a higher share of intermediated trade for countries with more difficult
access because of higher trade cost or smaller market size. In order to test this,
we follow their empirical approach: we regress the share of intermediary exports
within a product (CN8) -destination combination on the GDP of that destination,
the bilateral distance to that destination and additional variables capturing the
regulatory environment, proxied by the cost of import procedures measure of the
World Bank15 (for imports, we use the cost of export procedures of the source
country), and variable trade costs, captured by product-destination-level tariffs. To
this end, we aggregate the firm-product-destination country level data to data at
the product-destination country level, eliminating the firm dimension. We construct
the dependent variable shareint as the value share of intermediary exports (imports)
for a certain product to a certain export destination (from a certain source country)
in the sum of intermediary exports (imports) and exports (imports) by producing
firms, ranging between 0 and 1. The regression model is the following:
shareintpc = dp + β1 · log(GDPc) + β2 · log(Distc) + β3 · log(CostImportc)+
β4 · log(Tarcp) + pc, (1.3)
where index p stands for the product (defined at the CN 8 digit level) and c stands
for the destination country (exports) or source country (imports). All regressions
include product dummies to capture differences in the amount of intermediation
required.
The results for exports are shown in table 1.9, distinguishing between the full
sample and a sample only including the non-EU27 countries, as in Crozet, Lalanne,
and Poncet (2013). For the EU27 countries, we set the log of the tariff and cost
measures to 0, as the EU is a free trade zone.16 The coefficient on GDP is negative
for exports, indicating that a higher GDP implies on a average a lower intermediary
15See Djankov, Freund, and Pham (2010) for a detailed description of the World Bank variables.
16We set the log to 0 instead of the variable itself, as in the latter case we would lose the
observations that are 0 after the log transformation. In practice, we first add 1 to the variable, and
then do the log transformation. The non-zero tariffs range between 2 (5th percentile) and 30 (95th
percentile), while the cost to import (expressed in US$/container) ranges from 657 (5th percentile)
to 4030 (95th percentile).
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share, while the coefficient on distance is negative and statistically significant overall,
but positive and not statistically significant for the non-EU destinations only. The
negative relation between GDP and intermediary share seems intuitive if entry into
export markets requires fixed costs: if the market size (proxied by GDP) is small
relative to the fixed cost of entry, less firms will be able to enter this market directly,
but will instead export through an intermediary. Using another proxy for fixed cost
to export to a market, such as the ’cost of import’ World Bank variable, we also
find the expected positive correlation, but only for non-EU destinations. We also
experimented with an alternative measure, namely the number of days required to
import, and found that it yields very similar results (not shown here). Using tariffs
as a regressor, a measure for variable costs, yields the expected positive coefficient.
The results for non-EU destinations are in line with Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei
(2011) and Crozet, Lalanne, and Poncet (2013), apart for distance, as they find
a statistically significant positive relation between intermediary share and higher
distance. Bernard, Grazzi, and Tomasi (2013) on the other hand, also do not find
a relation between intermediary share and distance, they only do the analysis for
non-EU destinations.
Table 1.9: Export share - correlation intermediary share and gravity variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
all all all all non-EU non-EU
GDP -0.0303∗∗ -0.0311∗∗ -0.0298∗∗ -0.0298∗∗ -0.0345∗∗ -0.0298∗∗
(0.00320) (0.00318) (0.00309) (0.00311) (0.00370) (0.00344)
Distance -0.0120∗ -0.0149∗ -0.0211∗∗ -0.0191∗∗ 0.00356 0.000660
(0.00508) (0.00667) (0.00532) (0.00609) (0.00618) (0.00608)
CostImport 0.00153 -0.00156 0.0599∗∗
(0.00212) (0.00189) (0.0108)
Tariff 0.0178∗∗ 0.0198∗∗ 0.0107∗
(0.00476) (0.00495) (0.00441)
Product dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 191564 189142 181094 180248 98247 86931
R2 0.452 0.454 0.461 0.461 0.436 0.449
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a First 4 colums are for all countries, last 2 columns only for non-EU countries
b All regressors are in logs. All regressions include product (CN 8 digit) dummies.
The results for imports are shown in table 1.10. The share of intermediaries
does not show a statistically significant correlation with GDP or distance. The
cost of export procedures do not show a statistically significant relation with the
intermediary export share. We also experimented with an alternative measure,
namely the number of days required to export, and found that it yields very similar
results (not shown here). Finally, also here, we find a find a systematic positive
relation between the import share of intermediaries and tariffs. So for imports, we
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find no systemic relation of the intermediary share with GDP, distance and cost of
export; only trade barriers such as a worse regulatory environment and higher tariffs,
are associated with a higher intermediary share in imports.
Summarizing, we find evidence that intermediaries are used to overcome trade
barriers on the export side, but on the import side the evidence is rather limited.
Table 1.10: Import share - correlation intermediary import share and gravity
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
all all all all non-EU non-EU
GDP 0.00238 0.00232 0.0000389 -0.000104 0.000115 -0.00515
(0.00371) (0.00363) (0.00359) (0.00350) (0.00494) (0.00537)
Distance 0.000948 0.00490 -0.00485 0.0000512 0.0174 0.00759
(0.00358) (0.00574) (0.00377) (0.00572) (0.0136) (0.0141)
CostExport -0.00219 -0.00319 0.00968
(0.00280) (0.00298) (0.0217)
Tariff 0.0188∗∗ 0.0215∗∗ 0.0309∗∗
(0.00706) (0.00706) (0.0112)
Product dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 104294 104055 103213 103066 41484 40256
R2 0.320 0.320 0.321 0.321 0.351 0.353
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a First 4 colums are for all countries, last 2 columns only for non-EU countries
b All regressors are in logs. All regressions include product (CN 8 digit) dummies.
1.6 Price premia for intermediaries
This section investigates if intermediaries charge a different price for exported goods
(or pay a different price for imported goods) compared to producing firms. We check
if the results of earlier papers also hold for Belgium, and extend the literature by
distinguishing between homogeneous and differentiated goods.
The theoretical models in Akerman (2009) and Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011)
both predict that intermediaries will charge a higher price than direct exporters.
There are three channels through which the price is increased: intermediaries export
goods from less cost-efficient producers (in both models), intermediaries charge an
extra markup (only in the model of Akerman (2009)) or the intermediaries incur an
extra marginal cost (only in the model of Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011)). Previous
evidence is mixed. Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011) find a positive premium, while
Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2010) find a negative premium.
To test if intermediaries indeed charge a higher price for exports (or pay a lower
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price for imports), we regress the unit value (total value/quantity)17 of the firm-
product-country export (import) combination on an intermediary dummy dI . We
control for product-destination specific characteristics by including fixed effects for
each product-destination combination, and control for firm size by decile dummies of
total firm export (import) value.18 The regression can be represented as follows:
log(pricejpc) = d
I
j + dpc + dsize + jpc, (1.4)
where index j stands for the firm, index p for the CN 8 digit product and c for the
destination (exports) or source (imports) country.
The results for exports are presented in the first column of table 1.11. Intermedi-
aries indeed charge a higher price for exports, confirming the results found for other
countries as in Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011). The second column illustrates
that these results are robust to including a multinational dummy.19 We further
decompose the products in homogenous and differentiated goods, to see if we find an
impact of quality. For homogeneous goods, it seems reasonable to state that quality
sorting will not play a role. For these goods, the price premia are exactly what we
would expect based on the productivity sorting model (column 3): intermediaries
have a positive price premium for these goods. The differentiated goods will likely
be a mix of quality sorting and productivity sorting, so the sign is not clear ex
ante. If quality sorting is dominant, we would expect a negative price premium for
intermediaries, while if productivity sorting is dominant, we would expect a positive
price premium. The results show that the coefficients for both categories of goods
are significantly different. For 2010, the differentiated goods still have a positive
price premium (column 4), but for other years this is insignificant or even negative.20
This suggests that it is a mix of productivity sorting and quality sorting.
For imports however, intermediaries pay on average a lower price, see column 1
and 2 of table 1.12. This does not seem in line with idea of productivity sorting. If
the productivity sorting model holds, we would expect that the most productive (and
therefore lower priced) firms abroad would tend to export to Belgium directly, and
therefore not use Belgian intermediaries. So we would expect a higher price for imports
by intermediaries. When distinguishing between homogenous and differentiated goods
(column 3 and 4), we see that the lower price is fully driven by the differentiated goods,
while intermediaries actually have on average a higher price for the homogenous
17We filtered for outliers in the following way: we set prices above the 95th percentile of the
destination country - product (CN8) combination to the value of that 95th percentile. Similarly, we
set prices below the 5th percentile to the value of the 5th percentile. The results are very robust
to the exact filtering rule used, e.g. we also experimented with dropping the observations if an
observed price is 20 times larger of smaller than the median price for the product (defined on CN 8
digit level) within the destination/origin, and the results are almost exactly the same.
18Constructing unit prices as the ratio of export revenues to export quantities does not restrict
the sign of the correlation between price and revenue, as illustrated in Manova and Zhang (2012).
19Based on NBB data on inward and outward foreign direct investment
20The coefficient ranges between -0.0258 and 0.00438 for the previous years.
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goods. The higher price for the homogenous goods can be explained by productivity
sorting, while the negative price premium for differentiated goods suggests that
quality sorting dominates.
Note that the coefficients can also be explained in other ways, reasoning outside
of the model. E.g., the markups could be different between intermediaries and
producers. A linear price regression as done here, has its limitations in confirming
or rejecting the model. A deeper understanding in these premia could be achieved
by taking a rigorous Industrial Organisation approach, modeling market structure,
demand and costs in a detailed way for each product market and geographical market.
However, this is beyond the scope of the current paper.
Table 1.11: Price (unit value) premium for intermedi-
aries - exports
all hom diff
dI 0.0290 0.126
∗∗ 0.0104
(0.0414) (0.0314) (0.0485)
Product-country dummies yes yes yes
Size dummies yes yes yes
Observations 582001 91549 404241
R2 0.845 0.865 0.819
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a All specifications include product (CN8) × destination
country interaction dummies. They also contain size
dummies, i.e. decile dummies for the total export value of
the firm.
Table 1.12: Price (unit value) premium for intermedi-
aries - imports
all hom diff
dI -0.113
∗∗ 0.0671∗∗ -0.161∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0165) (0.0164)
Product-country dummies yes yes yes
Size dummies yes yes yes
Observations 745572 106548 533784
R2 0.772 0.831 0.728
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a All specifications include product (CN8) × source country
interaction dummies. They also contain size dummies, i.e.
decile dummies for the total import value of the firm.
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1.7 Differences in ’pass on trade’
This section investigates a novel aspect of trade by intermediaries: to what extent
do intermediaries and direct producers engage in simultaneous imports and exports
in identical products, narrowly defined at the 8-digit product classification? To what
extent do they exhibit a different behavior in this aspect of trade? Damijan, Konings,
and Polanec (2013) use the term ’pass on trade’ (POT) for this phenomena.21
Note that for manufacturing firms, POT is a part of what Bernard, Blanchard,
Van Beveren, and Vandenbussche (2012) call ’carry-along trade’ (CAT). CAT refers
to manufacturing firms that export products which they did not produce themselves.
These products can be sourced from other countries (imported) or from the domestic
market. In contrast, POT only refers to exports that are imported simultaneously, not
taking into account products that are sourced from the domestic market. Also note
that CAT would be 100% of the exports for a pure intermediary, as intermediaries
do not produce themselves the products they sell.
We find that the POT share in exports for intermediaries is 45% and 19% for
producing firms. The share is different according to size, but always substantially
higher for intermediaries, see figure 1.8. It makes sense intuitively that intermediaries
have a higher POT share: as they do not produce themselves, they are more likely
to import a larger part of their exports. However, the POT share is very high: on
average, almost half of their exports are actually sourced from abroad. Therefore,
this analysis suggests that the view in this literature that Belgian intermediaries
only serve as export vehicle for Belgian domestic firms, should be adjusted.
We check to what extent firms prices for imports and exports are different for
pass on trade. To this end, we calculate the unit values for imports and exports
(both across all destinations), and we regress, for the firm-product combinations
where POT occurs, the unit values on an export dummy, controlling for firm-product
dummies in the following way:
log(pricejfp) = df=EX + djp + jfp, (1.5)
where index j, f and p refer respectively to the firm, the flow (exports or imports)
and the product (CN 8 digit). The coefficient on the dummy df=EX , taking the
value 1 for exports and 0 for imports, reflects the average price premium of exports
compared to imports, controlling for firm-product specific differences through djp.
The results are shown in the first column of table 1.13, indicating that exports are
on average about 20% higher in price than imports of the same product by the same
firm. In the second column, we show the results of a specification where we interact
df=EX with a dummy dI indicating whether the firm is an intermediary or not. This
interaction shows whether the price premium of exports compared to imports is
higher for intermediaries with regards to producing firms. The coefficient is positive,
21Their definition of POT differs slightly from the one used in this paper, but the concept is the
same.
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Figure 1.8: Share of pass on trade (POT) in exports
but not statistically significant. A possible interpretation is that producing firms
engaging in POT, do this also for intermediation reasons, and are in this way very
similar to ’pure’ intermediaries. In the final two columns, we distinguish between
homogenous and differentiated goods. We find that for both categories, exports are
higher in price than imports of the same product by the same firm. On average,
this price premium is higher for intermediaries for both categories, but it is only
statistically significant for homogenous goods.
Finally, we check whether firms use POT mainly to overcome the EU frontier.
As the EU is an integrated market, firms might source their products within the
EU, and then sell these products on non-EU markets or vice versa. To this end, we
calculate the following ratio: ∑
s→d POTjp∑
all POTjp
, (1.6)
where j stands for the firm and p for the product (CN 8 digit). We take the sum over
a specific source country category to a specific destination country category s→ d.
We define three categories: EU, non-EU and mixed, the latter referring to a mix
between EU and non EU countries. E.g., the POT value of a firm j that sources POT
product p in France, Spain and Luxembourg, and exports the product to Germany
and China, would fall under source countries ’EU’ and destination countries ’mixed’.
The results are shown in tables 1.14 for intermediaries and 1.15 for producing firms.
The results suggest that the main focus of POT is not to source products within
the EU and sell outside the EU or vice virsa. The tables show that POT mainly
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Table 1.13: Price (unit value) premium for pass on exports compared
to imports by the same firm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Int prem Hom Diff
df=EX 0.193
∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.0883∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0178) (0.0226) (0.0243)
dI × df=EX 0.0299 0.0566∗ 0.0249
(0.0257) (0.0271) (0.0339)
Firm × product dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 164919 164919 31859 108460
R2 0.922 0.922 0.923 0.911
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a All specifications include firm × product (CN8) interaction dummies.
b Column 1, pooled regression producers and intermediaries. Column 2,
intermediary dummy interaction. Column 3 & 4, split sample regressions
for homogeneous and differentiated goods.
occurs from a mix of source countries and destination countries inside and outside
the EU. Also, a substantial fraction of POT occurs simply within the EU, i.e. 18%
for intermediaries and 12% for producers. Sourcing exclusively in the EU to sell
exclusively outside the EU or vice versa does not occur much, and presents less than
10% of the POT for both categories.
Table 1.14: POT country combinations intermediaries
destination countries
EU mixed non-EU
Source EU 18% 10% 1%
countries mixed 11% 43% 0%
non-EU 8% 8% 0%
a The percentages refer to the relative share of total pass on trade by
intermediaries of each category
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Table 1.15: POT country combinations producers
destination countries
EU mixed non-EU
Source EU 12% 15% 1%
countries mixed 4% 60% 1%
non-EU 2% 5% 1%
a The percentages refer to the relative share of total pass on trade by
intermediaries of each category
1.8 Conclusion
This paper documents empirical facts on intermediary firms in Belgian trade for the
year 2010. We use firm-level data with disaggregated information on exports and
imports per destination and product. We find that intermediaries are responsible for
a substantial share of Belgian trade: they account for almost 40% of total export
value and over 55% of total import value. In terms of number of firms, the share of
intermediaries is even higher.
The results can be summarized as follows. The analysis shows that intermediaries
are different from producing firms that export directly. They are smaller and trade
more products per country. We find evidence that they are used to overcome trade
barriers, notably on the export side. They charge higher prices for homogenous goods
exports than producing firms, but also pay higher prices for imports of homogenous
goods. For differentiated goods, they pay lower prices.
A novel result presented in this paper, is that intermediaries are heavily involved in
’pass on trade’, i.e. exporting and importing the same products, defined at the narrow
CN 8 digit level. The common view in the literature until now was that intermediaries
serve as an export vehicle for domestic firms that cannot export themselves because
they are not productive enough, as in the models of Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei
(2011) or Akerman (2009). Our results suggest that this view should be adjusted.
Intermediaries instead engage heavily in import activities themselves, and therefore
not only fulfill the role of intermediary for domestic firms, but also for foreign firms.
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1.A Appendix: detailed data description
1.A.1 Firm-level trade data: further details and thresholds
The data distinguish between intra-EU and extra-EU data and between different
types of transactions. We only use transactions with transfer of ownership and
compensation, not other types such as transactions involving repairs and return of
goods etc.
Whether firms have to report their export transactions, depends on the value
and destination of exports. For intra-EU trade, from 1998 to 2005, firms needed to
report their trade flows if they are exporting or importing more than AC250,000 per
year. From 2006 onwards, these thresholds were raised to, respectively to AC1,000,000
for exports and to AC400,000 for imports. For extra-EU trade, all transactions whose
value is higher than AC1,000 or whose weight is bigger than 1,000 kg are recorded.
1.A.2 Concordance
For the calculation of the margins, we have to take into account that the product codes
change (very slightly) over time at the CN8 level. Therefore, we use concordance
tables from the Eurostat - Ramon website. The codes needing concordance are very
limited: of a total of almost 13,000 different CN8 codes, only 273 need a concordance,
so about than 2%. Of these code, more than 85% can be concorded in a direct way,
i.e. having a ’1 to 1’ matching: a single 2008 code is matched to an new single 2009
code. The remainder of the codes require ’1 to many’, ’many to 1’ or ’many to many’
concordances. The latter is a bit more complicated, but can be done by creating a
new more aggregated code, grouping the many to many codes in a single code.
1.A.3 Tariff data
The tariff data is obtained from the WITS/TRAINS database.
Downloading the tariffs for Belgium as exporting country only yielded only a
coverage of about 54% in 2009 and 37% in 2010 of the export trade flows in our
dataset. Therefore, we also downloaded the tariffs reported for other European
countries (Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and UK), as EU countries face
the same tariffs. This increase the coverage to respectively 77% and 55%. To get
a higher coverage, we use tariffs of the previous year or the subsequent year when
tariffs are not reported, increasing the coverage to over 85% in each year.
The tariffs for Belgium as importing country are obtained by downloading the
EU tariff rates for imports. We get a coverage of over 90% immediately. To get
a higher coverage, we use tariffs of the previous year or the subsequent year when
tariffs are not reported, increasing the coverage with a few % in each year.
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1.B Appendix: discussion of capital intensity
It may seem surprising that the average capital/labor ratio is higher for intermediaries
compared to producers. This might suggest a presence of a few large firms specialized
in transportation (containers, trucks, etc.) among the intermediaries. However,
we do not find this pattern in the data. First, the correlation between size (log
total exports) and (log) capital intensity is very low, only 0.02, so there is no clear
link between size and capital intensiveness. In addition, the distribution of (log)
capital intensiveness seems approximately normal, not bi-modal, see figure 1.9. The
difference in means is more likely driven more by outliers. E.g., the highest value of
capital intensity is approximately 50 times higher than the 95th percentile and more
than 500 times higher than the median. This shows that adding or dropping very
high values could have a distorting effect on the calculation of the mean, the median
is therefore probably a better measure in this case.
Figure 1.9: Log capital intensity - density producers & intermediaries for exporters
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1.C Appendix: results including MNEs
The main results of the paper are repeated here for the sample including multinational
enterprises (MNEs). In terms of number of firms, the differences are limited (results
not shown here), but in terms of trade value MNEs are very important, as can be
expected from the typical skewed distribution where a few large firms account for
a large proportion of trade. Nonetheless, it does not really change the order of
magnitude of the value share of intermediaries in trade: they are still important,
representing 28% of total export value and 43% of total import value for the year
2010, see tables 1.16 and 1.17. The premia for intermediaries are in line with the
results excluding MNEs, see table 1.18 for exports and table 1.19 for imports. The
only coefficient that changes qualitatively is the premium of import value in the
second column of table 1.19, where we find a positive but statistically not significant
coefficient, contrary to table 1.8 for the sample excluding MNEs, where the coefficient
was larger and statistically significant. The gravity analysis is very similar, see tables
1.20 and 1.21. Also the price premia for intermediaries are similar, 1.22 and 1.23,
the main difference is that the price premium for exports on all products (see ’all’
column) doubles in size, and becomes marginally statistically significant at the 10%
significance level. We also find very similar results for the POT analysis: the overall
share of POT exports in total export value is approximately 44% for intermediaries
and 17% for manufacturing firms, very close to the results for the sample without
MNEs, respectively 45% and 19%. Also the rest of the POT results are similar, see
table 1.24 and figure 1.10.
Table 1.16: Export value (in billion euro) by firm
type, MNEs included
Exports value Prod. Interm. Other Interm. %
2005 94 45 25 27%
2006 100 43 31 25%
2007 105 47 30 26%
2008 106 49 29 27%
2009 85 41 23 28%
2010 98 50 29 28%
a Producers: industry codes 1 - 33 (NACE rev2)
Intermediaries: industry codes 45, 46 & 47 (NACE
rev2)
Other: industry codes not mentioned above
b The last column indicates the % share of
intermediaries in the total export value
c Exports by MNEs are included
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Table 1.17: Import value (in billion euro) by firm type, MNEs
included
Import value producers intermediaries other intermediaries %
2005 61 69 30 43%
2006 67 71 35 41%
2007 73 76 33 42%
2008 75 81 38 42%
2009 55 68 27 45%
2010 68 76 33 43%
a Producers: industry codes 1 - 33 (NACE rev2)
Intermediaries: industry codes 45, 46 & 47 (NACE rev2)
Other: industry codes not mentioned above
b The last column indicates the% share of intermediaries in the total
import value
c Imports by MNEs are included
Table 1.18: Exports - premia for intermediaries, MNEs included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
exp val exp val # cou # prod p/c sales emp wage TFA k/l
dI -2.07∗∗∗ -1.67∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ -0.57∗∗∗ -0.79∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ -1.10∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.066) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) (0.041) (0.033) (0.009) (0.047) (0.039)
Pr. d. no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Size d. no no yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes
Obs. 16176 16176 16176 16176 16176 11835 10466 10466 12172 10299
R2 0.076 0.288 0.674 0.597 0.211 0.243 0.423 0.315 0.351 0.162
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a Definition producers and intermediaries: see data section
b The columns respectively give the premium for exporting intermediaries compared to firms that
export directly, for the following variables: export value (twice), the number of destination
countries, the number of products, the number of products per destination country, sales,
employment, average wage (defined as the ratio of the total wage bill and number of employees),
tangible fixed assets, and capital intensity (defined as the ratio of fixed assets and number of
employees). All dependent variables are in logs.
c Product dummies (’Pr. d.’) control for the main HS 4 digit product. Size dummies are deciles
for the total import value of the firm. Using other measures of firm size, such as sales, yields
very similar results.
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Table 1.19: Imports - premia for intermediaries, MNEs included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
imp val imp val # cou # prod p/c sales emp wage TFA k/l
dI -0.60∗∗∗ 0.064 -0.20∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ -0.54∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ -1.44∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.053) (0.010) (0.016) (0.013) (0.035) (0.026) (0.007) (0.038) (0.033)
Pr. d. no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Size d. no no yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes
Obs. 25589 25589 25589 25589 25589 17308 15030 15030 18091 14752
R2 0.005 0.282 0.599 0.629 0.341 0.279 0.505 0.306 0.361 0.127
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a Definition producers and intermediaries: see data section
b The columns respectively give the premium for importing intermediaries compared to firms that
import directly, for the following variables: import value (twice), the number of source countries,
the number of products, the number of products per source country, sales, employment, average
wage (defined as the ratio of the total wage bill and number of employees), tangible fixed assets,
and capital intensity (defined as the ratio of fixed assets and number of employees). All
dependent variables are in logs.
c Product dummies (’Pr. d.’) control for the main HS 4 digit product. Size dummies are deciles
for the total import value of the firm. Using other measures of firm size, such as sales, yields very
similar results.
Table 1.20: Export share - correlation intermediary share and gravity variables,
MNEs included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
all all all all non-EU non-EU
GDP -0.0308∗∗ -0.0319∗∗ -0.0327∗∗ -0.0327∗∗ -0.0352∗∗ -0.0346∗∗
(0.00310) (0.00312) (0.00311) (0.00315) (0.00332) (0.00298)
Distance -0.0105+ -0.0112 -0.0205∗∗ -0.0180∗∗ 0.00871 0.00704
(0.00551) (0.00703) (0.00585) (0.00684) (0.00534) (0.00561)
CostImport 0.000401 -0.00185 0.0540∗∗
(0.00196) (0.00186) (0.0106)
Tariff 0.0200∗∗ 0.0223∗∗ 0.0121∗∗
(0.00486) (0.00483) (0.00408)
Product dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 236797 233465 205303 204390 129687 97280
R2 0.462 0.465 0.472 0.473 0.448 0.453
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a First 4 colums are for all countries, last 2 columns only for non-EU countries
b All regressors are in logs. All regressions include product (CN 8 digit) dummies.
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Table 1.21: Import share - correlation intermediary import share and gravity
variables, MNEs included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
all all all all non-EU non-EU
GDP -0.00160 -0.00147 -0.00439 -0.00444 -0.00441 -0.0111∗
(0.00370) (0.00365) (0.00370) (0.00366) (0.00467) (0.00530)
Distance 0.00104 0.00614 0.000123 0.00257 0.0212∗ 0.0178
(0.00365) (0.00547) (0.00376) (0.00519) (0.0107) (0.0110)
CostExport -0.00281 -0.00160 0.00531
(0.00253) (0.00263) (0.0205)
Tariff 0.0158∗ 0.0173∗∗ 0.0231∗
(0.00660) (0.00661) (0.0105)
Product dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 115712 115426 110878 110731 46769 41788
R2 0.333 0.333 0.334 0.334 0.361 0.358
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a First 4 colums are for all countries, last 2 columns only for non-EU countries
b All regressors are in logs. All regressions include product (CN 8 digit) dummies.
Table 1.22: Price (unit value) premium for intermedi-
aries - exports, MNEs included
all hom diff
dI 0.0685
+ 0.244∗∗ 0.0252
(0.0376) (0.0875) (0.0406)
Product-country dummies yes yes yes
Size dummies yes yes yes
Observations 790144 137538 533751
R2 0.827 0.843 0.799
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a All specifications include product (CN8) × destination
country interaction dummies. They also contain size
dummies, i.e. decile dummies for the total export value of
the firm.
b Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
CHAPTER 1. INTERMEDIARIES IN TRADE: EVIDENCE
FROM BELGIUM 41
Table 1.23: Price (unit value) premium for intermedi-
aries - imports, MNEs included
all hom diff
dI -0.135
∗∗ 0.0811∗∗ -0.193∗∗
(0.0132) (0.0200) (0.0155)
Product-country dummies yes yes yes
Size dummies yes yes yes
Observations 903958 133548 638739
R2 0.765 0.815 0.717
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a All specifications include product (CN8) × source country
interaction dummies. They also contain size dummies, i.e.
decile dummies for the total import value of the firm.
b Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Figure 1.10: Share of pass on trade (POT) in exports, MNEs included
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Table 1.24: Price (unit value) premium for pass on
exports compared to imports by the same firm, MNEs
included
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Int prem Hom Diff
df=EX 0.166
∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.0912∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0164) (0.0197) (0.0225)
dI × df=EX 0.0335 0.0550+ 0.0246
(0.0242) (0.0320) (0.0311)
Observations 220821 220821 42747 144365
R2 0.916 0.916 0.912 0.903
R2 0.922 0.922 0.923 0.911
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a All specifications include firm × product (CN8)
interaction dummies.
b Column 1, pooled regression producers and
intermediaries. Column 2, intermediary dummy
interaction. Column 3 & 4, split sample regressions for
homogeneous and differentiated goods.
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Chapter 2
How do exporters react to changes
in cost competitiveness?
Summary This chapter analyzes the relation between unit labor costs and export
performance for Belgian firms. We find a negative effect of unit labor costs on the
export performance of firms: an increase of unit labor costs with 10 percent, implies
a drop in exports between 2 and 4 percent. In addition, higher unit labor costs
decrease the probability of starting to export (for non-exporters) and increase the
probability of stopping to export (for exporters). While our results show that unit
labor costs have an impact on the intensive margin and extensive margin of firm-level
exports, the effect is rather limited. This suggests that pass-through of costs into
prices is limited or that demand for exported products is not elastic.
This chapter is joint work with Catherine Fuss (National Bank of Belgium) and Jozef Konings.
The chapter is submitted to the ECB-CompNet working paper series, I am thankful to the two
anonymous referees of ECB-Compnet for helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank the
participants of the Vives informal seminar and the Ljubljana Empirical Trade Conference (LETC)
2013 for helpful comments on an early version of this chapter.
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2.1 Introduction
The growing imbalances in the Euro Area have triggered a debate about the role of cost
competitiveness for growth and how far austerity should go. When competitiveness
improves, countries can ‘grow’ out of the crisis and hence austerity measures become
less stringent. Globalization and its associated increase in international competition
has led to the view that exports have become more sensitive to costs and hence
competitiveness is often measured in terms of unit labor costs (European Commission,
2012; ECB, 2008), defined as the labor cost per unit of output. The focus on unit
labor costs as a measure for competitiveness rests on the idea that increases in unit
labor costs are passed on into higher export prices, resulting in a deterioration in
the balance of payments, hampering economic growth and increasing unemployment.
The unequal evolution of unit labor costs in the Euro area has therefore been a
major concern in recent years, or as the ECB puts it in a recent report (ECB, 2008):
“Cumulative increases in labor costs across euro area countries can be indicative of
growing imbalances and losses in competitiveness and, as such, are an important
early sign of the need for adjustment. Relative developments in labor costs across the
euro area countries, together with other indicators of competitiveness, have therefore
to be closely monitored.”
While there is a clear policy concern about the evolution of unit labor costs in
many European countries, stirred by close monitoring of the European Commission,
there exists very little conclusive evidence about the impact of unit labor costs on
export performance. Already in the seventies, Kaldor (1978) argued that the growth
in unit labor costs to measure international competitiveness is at best too simplistic.
In particular, he demonstrated that countries with the highest growth rates in GDP
tend to have high growth rates in unit labor costs. This is also known as the ’Kaldor
paradox’. In figure 2.1 we plot the evolution of the aggregate export market share of
Belgium and the aggregate relative unit labor costs (relative to the EU27).1 While
we can note a negative correlation, it is clearly not a very strong one. For instance,
from 2007 onwards it seems that relative unit labor costs and export market shares
have been moving together. The simple correlation coefficient between the growth in
RULC and the growth in export market share for the entire period is in fact quite
weak, only -0.044.
This apparent paradox has also recently been documented for Spain during the
great recession where despite the unfavorable evolution of Spanish relative export
prices only a modest decline in Spanish exports took place (Correa-Lo´pez and
Dome´nech, 2012). This ’disconnect’ between relative costs and exports has also
been a widely researched puzzle in international macro analyzing low exchange rate
pass-through into export prices. When changes in relative costs (or real exchange
rates) only have a limited impact on relative export prices and hence on export
quantities, the policy focus on wage moderation and convergence of unit labor
1Source: Eurostat
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of relative export market share and relative unit labor costs
for Belgium (relative to the EU27)
costs between countries seems less appropriate. What explains this low aggregate
correlation and does it mean that the widely used measure of unit labor costs to
measure competitiveness should not be used?
Both the theoretical and empirical work have stressed the importance of firm-level
heterogeneity in trade. The use of micro data also allows to understand the different
dimensions of trade, such as the extensive and intensive margins. Further it helps
to avoid biases from aggregation (such as ’the Spanish paradox’) as explained in
Altomonte, di Mauro, and Osbat (2013). Recent work in international trade therefore
makes increasingly use of detailed disaggregated data to understand the apparent low
correlation between a number of macro aggregates. For instance, Amiti, Itskhoki, and
Konings (2014) used highly disaggregated firm-product data to show that the largest
exporters are also the largest importers. This turns out to be important because
when exporters are hit by an exchange rate shock in their destination market, they
typically face a compensating movement in their marginal costs if they are importing
their intermediate inputs. And since the largest exports account for most of the
exports, they dominate the aggregate picture. In fact, while the largest exporters
tend to have an exchange rate pass through of about 50%, the smallest exporters
have nearly complete pass-through. In this paper, we therefore turn to disaggregated
data, at the firm level, to analyze the relationship between changes in unit labor
costs and firm export performance. It enables us to incorporate the heterogeneity of
firms in the analysis and to distinguish between the intensive and extensive margin.
In particular, we use a confidential Belgian firm-level data set with detailed
information on costs, productivity and exports for the period 1999-2010. These data
are provided by the National Bank of Belgium, which collects the company accounts
of firms on an annual basis and merges them based on a unique company identifier
(vat number) to the trade data that originate from the customs for non-EU trade and
a compulsory survey on trade activity for EU trade (see appendix 2.A). Furthermore,
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we supplement these data with confidential sales data from the VAT registry as
small firms are not required to report sales in their company accounts. By using
disaggregated data we are able to better take into account the heterogeneity between
firms that export. The importance is illustrated by figure 2.2, which shows the highly
skewed export distribution that characterizes exporting firms in a Lorenz curve. It
shows the relation between the cumulative fraction of exports and the cumulative
fraction of the number of firms accounting for these exports. In other words, we
can see that 20 percent of Belgian exporters account for almost 90 percent of all
exports. Thus exports are concentrated in a small group of large exporters, which
will dominate the aggregate exports, a stylized fact that has also been documented
by Muuˆls and Pisu (2009) for Belgium and for other countries, e.g. by Bernard,
Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007), using similar firm-level data as ours.
Figure 2.2: Lorenz curve of exports
Source: NBB and own calculations for the year 2004
But, typically these large exporters tend also be the largest importers of interme-
diate inputs, as pointed out by Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014). Having access
to imported intermediate inputs is not only a channel that firms can use as a hedging
tool, but it can also trigger firms to start innovating and exporting. Goldberg,
Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010) show how firms having access to imported
inputs start to innovate more in India and Amiti and Konings (2007) show how
having access to imported inputs enhance productivity growth. This reflects the
growing role of international supply chains, which suggests an alternative approach
to analyzing competitiveness. In fact, a recent report by the OECD (OECD, 2013)
exactly makes this point, showing that the rise of global value chains implies that
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the production process is dispersed across different countries. Exports therefore
contain a large component of intermediate imported inputs. Especially in small open
economies the import content of exports reaches more than 40% of total exports on
average. Ignoring the import content of exports in analyzing competitiveness may
result in wrongly attributing gains in export performance of firms to improved cost
competitiveness. High export growth, may just reflect the fact that some firms import
products to re-export them.2 Or when firms only add limited value to imported
inputs, exports reflect mainly the value of the intermediate inputs. We therefore
analyze net exports to capture firm-level competitiveness, although we also report
results based on gross export numbers as a robustness check.
Only a limited number of research papers examine the link between unit labor
costs and export competitiveness. Earlier work using mostly aggregate data found
weak or even a positive relationship between relative costs or prices and exports.
Fagerberg (1988) uses macro data for Japan, the US and the UK and finds that
relative unit labor costs still matter, but competition in technology and the ability to
compete on delivery turn out to be more important. In contrast, Carlin, Glyn, and
Van Reenen (2001), using disaggregated sector-level data for 15 OECD countries find
a robust relationship between relative costs and exports, with an elasticity of export
market share with respect to relative unit labor costs of -0.26. However, they fail to
find strong evidence of factors going beyond relative costs, such as the role of R&D
spending. Correa-Lo´pez and Dome´nech (2012) emphasize that the relatively modest
decline in Spanish export markets despite the unfavorable evolution of Spanish
relative export prices is largely due to firms’ strategic decisions, such as investment in
human capital, quality upgrading and on market and financial strategies. Altomonte,
Aquilante, and Ottaviano (2012) use firm-level survey data (EFIGE) to show how
unit labor costs affect the probability of being an exporter. Since productivity is an
important component of unit labor costs, they argue in favor of using total factor
productivity as it takes into account also other input factors, besides labor. However,
measuring total factor productivity is complex and suffers from a number of biases,
which makes it a harder for a ready to use index of competitiveness.3
In this paper we investigate the relationship between unit labor costs and export
performance for a small open economy, Belgium. Taking a microeconomic perspective,
we are able to consider various dimensions often ignored by the earlier literature. More
precisely, we consider both the intensive margin (export performance of continuing
exporters) and extensive margin (entry and exit of firms into export) of exports.
Further, we allow for heterogeneous effect of unit labor costs on export performance
according to firm and sector characteristics. We also evaluate the role of wages vs
productivity in the impact of unit labor costs on exports.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we provide theoretical back-
ground, starting with a description of how the Melitz (2003) model illustrates the
2See Damijan, Konings, and Polanec (2013) for a detailed discussion.
3For a discussion on measuring total factor productivity, see for instance Van Biesebroeck (2007).
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relationship between unit labor costs and firm-level export performance. Section 2.3
describes the data. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of unit labor costs
as a measure of cost competitiveness in section 2.4. Section 2.5 reports the results.
We conclude in Section 2.6.
2.2 Theoretical background
Earlier work on international trade and competitiveness focuses on the relation
between between unit labor costs and export performance at the country level. E.g.
Fagerberg (1988) presents a general equilibrium model where country-level prices
are determined by unit labor costs and a fixed mark-up. In this model, lower unit
labor costs increase the country’s GDP, increase exports and decrease imports.
However, recent work in international trade emphases the importance of firm
heterogeneity. We use the seminal paper of Melitz (2003) as a framework to illustrate
the relation between cost competitiveness and export performance at the firm level.
We focus on the main components that are relevant in this context, for further
details we refer to the Melitz (2003) paper itself. In this model, labor is treated as a
homogeneous factor of production and the wage per worker is equal across all firms.
Therefore labor productivity drives export performance. To align the Melitz (2003)
model with the concept of unit labor costs, we slightly modify it to allow for different
wages across firms. Wages can be different for a number of reasons, which we do not
explicitly model.
We follow Melitz (2003) and model demand as a representative consumer with
C.E.S. preferences over a continuum of goods, indexed by ω:
U =
[∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)ρdω
]1/ρ
, (2.1)
With U the utility of the representative consumer, Ω the set of available goods.
Because these goods are substitutes, ρ is between 0 and 1. The corresponding sales
of each good ω depend on the total demand in the market R, the aggregate price
level P and the price level of the firm p(ω):
r(ω) = R
[
p(ω)
P
]1−σ
, (2.2)
with σ the elasticity of substitution between goods, and σ > 1.
On the supply side, firms produce a single variety ω and have labor, l, as the only
input in the production process. Labor is used in the following way: l = f + q/ϕ.
Firms face the same fixed cost of production f , but the marginal cost depends on the
productivity level of the firm ϕ. Firms with a high ϕ are able to produce more units
q with the same use of labor l. Without modeling the details of the labor market,
we assume that firms can differ in the wage per worker w they face, in addition to
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differences in productivity. Profit maximization implies the following price setting
rule at the firm level, setting a fixed markup 1/ρ = σ/(σ − 1) over marginal cost:
p(ϕ) =
w
ρϕ
. (2.3)
In this setting, w/ϕ represents the labor cost per unit of output, or unit labor
costs. Total revenue of the firm therefore becomes:
r(ϕ,w) = R
[ϕ
w
Pρ
]σ−1
= R(Pρ)σ−1 · ulc1−σ, (2.4)
with R the total sales across all products and P the price index. The firm’s revenue
depends on various factors, but there is an inverse relation between unit labor costs
and the revenues of the firm. This relation depends on the elasticity of substitution
on the market.
Considering an open economy implies taking into account variable and fixed
trade costs. Omitting further details of the model, we simply state that under
variable iceberg trade costs, revenue on the foreign market (which equals exports
by definition) is proportional to revenue as in the expression in equation 2.4. So
expression 2.4 guides our analysis for investigating the intensive margin. Taking
the natural logarithm of 2.4, we see that the elasticity of exports compared to unit
labor costs is 1 − σ according to this model. This provides us with a benchmark
for the elasticities we find in the empirical section. More specifically, we expect
an elasticity of exports to unit labor costs of 0 when the elasticity of substitution
between varieties is perfectly inelastic (σ = 1), and an elasticity of exports to unit
labor costs of minus infinity when the elasticity of substitution between varieties is
perfectly elastic (σ =∞).4
To analyze the extensive margin within this framework, we follow the standard
Melitz (2003) assumption that exporters face a fixed cost. The assumption is needed
because of the demand structure. If there are no fixed costs to exporting, every
active firm will export given the CES utility (this is not the case in more general
approaches using quadratic utility as in e.g. Di Comite, Thisse, and Vandenbussche,
2014). If we assume a per period fixed cost fx of being active in the export markets,
only the most productive firms will find it profitable to export, that is, only firms
where the following holds:
pix(ulc) =
rx(ulc)
σ
− fx ≥ 0, (2.5)
with pix profits on the export markets and rx revenue on the export market. Only
the cost efficient firms, measured by unit labor costs, will be able to enter and stay
4Note that in the empirics, we cannot distinguish between the fixed part of labor f and the
variable part q/ϕ. However, we still prefer to use the Melitz (2003) model as a framework. The
goal of the framework is just to illustrate how our results can be interpreted in the context of the
standard firm heterogeneity model.
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active on the export market.
More recent papers have shown that demand factors are important too, especially
in explaining the intensive margin. Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) for example
introduce quality differentiation in a Melitz (2003)-type of model to get predictions
that give a closer fit with the data. Di Comite, Thisse, and Vandenbussche (2014)
argue that next to quality, taste is an important demand factor to consider in
explaining the differences of within firm-product exports across different destinations.
They introduce both vertical and horizontal differentiation in a Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008)-type of model but without imposing any relationship between cost, taste
and quality which generates new predictions. For example, they show that even a
lowly productive firm can have a strong export performance, if its products has a
strong match with local taste. Similar to the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model,
the pass-through in this new model is 50%. Against this backdrop, it seems that the
recent theoretical predictions are less clear cut on the importance of unit labor costs
really to explain differences in relative export performance and hence the usefulness
of unit labor costs a measure of competitiveness. In this respect, more empirical
guidance is needed. We therefore seek to estimate first the relationship between unit
labor costs and firm export performance. Next we analyze to what extent factors
going beyond cost competitiveness matter. Finally, we also analyze the role of unit
labor costs in explaining the extensive margin. More specifically, we investigate the
correlation of unit labor costs with entry into and exit from export markets, and
with the “within-firm” extensive margin i.e. adding and dropping export products
or destinations.
2.3 Data and summary statistics
Our main data source is the National Bank of Belgium balance sheet database,
providing a comprehensive panel of Belgian firms’ income statements, with detailed
financial and operational information, for the period 1999-2010. Belgian firms are
legally required to submit full or abbreviated company accounts, which implies that
our data cover most active firms.5 Since small firms are not required to report
their sales, we supplement these data with confidential data from the VAT register
on sales, in order to increase the number of observations in our sample. We focus
on manufacturing firms as most exports and imports would take place by these
firms. A substantial part of exports is carried out by firms active in the wholesale
sector (distribution). They are typically intermediaries in trade, which we do not
consider in our analysis as they do not produce the goods themselves so that their
cost competitiveness is less relevant to explain export performance. We merge these
firm-level company accounts with data on exports and imports at the firm level.
5Self-employed have a simple way of reporting financial information and are not included in the
data.
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The trade data are collected through a compulsory survey for intra-EU trade
and by the customs for extra-EU trade. These data include all firms that engage in
international trade above a minimum threshold. For extra-EU trade this threshold
is an import or export value of at least 1,000 euro, while for intra-EU trade the
threshold is higher, total imports or exports has to be at least 250,000 euro in a
year. Since 2006, this threshold has increased to 1,000,000 euro for exports and
400,000 euro for imports per year. While the trade data report export and import at
the firm-product-destination level, we aggregate them up at the firm level since we
observe unit labor costs not at the firm-product level, but just at the firm level. By
adding the product or destination dimension, we would just inflate the dimension of
the data set, duplicating observations on unit labor costs of the same firm, which
does not add additional insights. We follow the OECD and Eurostat in defining unit
labor cost (ULC) as the total cost of labor per unit of output, but computed at the
level of the individual firm:
ULCit =
Wit
Qit
, (2.6)
where Wit is the total nominal employee compensation, including social security
contributions, for firm i at time t, and Qit is the deflated value added of the firm,
which we use as a proxy for real output.6 This measure of unit labor costs is equivalent
to marginal costs when only one factor of production, labor, is used in production
and the production process displays constant returns to scale. They are linked to
export performance if increases in unit labor costs are passed on into higher prices,
and consequently exports decline.
To test for heterogeneity in firm export performance in response to changes in
unit labor costs, we experiment with a number of indicators, such as the firm-level
capital-labor ratio, the destination GDP per capita and a crisis dummy. We also
make a distinction between high-tech and low-tech sectors to capture the degree
of non-price competition. This measure is based on the Eurostat classification of
high-tech/low-tech manufacturing sectors7.
Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics for the exporting firms in our sample
and we compare them with manufacturing firms that never export, pooled over
all years. In our analysis we have over 6,000 firms that export and for which
we have information on labor costs, employment and value added.8 The average
manufacturing exporter employs 91 workers compared to only 9 employees in firms
that never export. Exporters have also higher labor costs, but this is compensated
by a higher labor productivity compared to non-exporters, so that they still have
slightly lower unit labor costs. The fact that exporters are larger, more productive
and pay higher wages confirms one of the stylized facts that has been documented in
6We use a value added deflator from Belgian National Accounts.
7We aggregate Eurostat’s definition of high-technology and medium-high technology to one
category, high-tech sectors.
8Only for firms that report full company accounts we have complete information, smaller firms
are not required to report all accounting information.
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similar firm-level data for other countries. The average exporting firm exports 18
million euro and when importing imports 13.9 million euro. About 80% of the firms
in our sample that export are also importers. Furthermore, exports and imports are
highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.66. This demonstrates that most
exporters rely on imports of intermediate inputs in their production process or that
exporters simply re-export imported products as shown by Damijan et al. (2013).
Hence, ignoring the import content of exports may lead to wrongly concluding that
firms and sectors are highly competitive when they have strong export growth, while
this merely may reflect high import growth. This suggests that measuring export
competiveness as net exports, i.e. the difference between exports and imports, is a
more sensible approach, which is what we will do in our analysis. The average net
exporter firm has net exports which are about half of gross exports (not shown in
table) and the growth in gross exports (0.05 when considering only net exporters) is
higher than the growth in net exports (0.007, see table) on average.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
exporter non-exporter
# firms 6,161 16,981
employment 91 (308) 9.0 (25.1)
labor cost (AC) per worker 40,979 (15,565) 32,407 (12683)
Real value added (AC) per worker 83,571 (730,342) 70,886 (224,943)
Tangible Fixed Assets (AC) per worker (K/L) 71,976 (1,004,659) 93,951 (547,496)
Unit Labor Cost 0.70 (1.91) 0.73 (9.71)
Export (ACM) 18.0 (119) 0
Importer (= 1 if imports >0) 0.80 (0.40) 0.15 (0.35)
Import (ACM, importers only) 13.9 (108) 0.8 (3.4)
Net exporter (=1 if net exports > 0) 0.55 (0.50) 0
Net exports (ACM, net exporters only) 15.4 (72.8) -
Growth in labor cost per worker 0.03 (0.11) 0.03 (0.17)
Growth in real value added per worker 0.007 (0.27) 0.004 (0.32)
Growth in unit labor costs 0.024 (0.26) 0.029 (0.31)
Growth in exports -0.03 (0.81) -
Growth in net exports 0.007 (0.60) -
EU Orientation (=1 if EU exports in total 0.64 (0.37) -
exports>0.70)
a Standard deviations in brackets. Averages are taken across all time periods.
While unit labor costs may be high and increasing, suggesting a deterioration
in firm-level competitiveness, it may be triggered by either excessive nominal wage
growth or insufficient labor productivity growth, or a combination of both. To
illustrate this, we decompose unit labor costs into its subcomponents, the nominal
labor cost per worker (i.e. the total wage bill per worker) and output per worker or
labor productivity:
ULCit =
Wit
Qit
=
Wit/Lit
Qit/Lit
. (2.7)
Figure 2.3 shows the aggregate evolution of ULC for our dataset, and the evolution
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of its two components. The labor cost per worker is rising almost linearly, with an
increase of about 36% between 1999 to 2010. As can be noted from table 2.1, the
growth in nominal labor costs in the average firm is also 3 percent per year, which
reflects the aggregate evolution in nominal labor costs. In figure 2.3 we can note that
aggregate labor productivity also increased, but not at the same pace as aggregate
labor costs. Up to 2004 the growth in labor productivity was below the growth in
nominal labor costs, but it reversed between 2005 and 2007. Since the crisis years
labor productivity growth has been lower again than the growth in labor costs, and
it was in fact negative for 2008 and 2009. As a result aggregate unit labor costs
in our sample have been relatively stable apart from the crisis years. However, the
aggregate picture in figure 2.3 hides a substantial amount of heterogeneity between
firms.
Figure 2.3: Aggregate evolution of unit labor cost, labor productivity and wages per
worker
To illustrate this, we distinguish between exporters (figure 2.4) and non-exporters
(figure 2.5) when calculating the aggregate evolution of unit labor costs, wage per
worker and labor productivity. We see that the pattern is quite different for labor
productivity, while the average wage evolution is roughly similar, although there
is somewhat of a difference during the last two years. Also the evolution of unit
labor costs is different, with non-exporters experiencing a rise in the first years, then
a relatively stable pattern until the rise in the crisis years 2009 and 2010, while
exporters experience a rise, but then a decline from 2004 to 2006, and then again
a substantial rise in 2008 and 2009 to go down again in 2010. The distinction
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between non-exporters and exporters is relevant for the analysis, as the unit labor
costs evolution of non-exporters will not impact the intensive margin of continuing
exporters, but could have an indirect effect on the export performance of sectors or
Belgium as a whole through the extensive margin of entering and exiting the export
markets. Therefore we study the extensive margin as well in our results section.
Figure 2.4: Aggregate evolution of unit labor cost, labor productivity and wages per
worker for exporters
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Figure 2.5: Aggregate evolution of unit labor cost, labor productivity and wages per
worker for non-exporters
2.4 Discussion of unit labor costs as a measure of
competitiveness
This section provides an overview of the advantages and disadvantages of using unit
labor costs as a measure of competitiveness.
The main advantage of unit labor cost is that it is a simple measure, easy to
calculate and based on data that is broadly available and comparable across countries.
In addition, the focus on value added as a measure for output ensures that wage costs
are compared to the part of output where labor is used in the production process.
Input materials are not include in the output measure, which is desirable if one is
interested in wage competitiveness. In addition, unit labor cost takes the cost of
employees into account, contrary to labor productivity. A higher labor productivity
is only beneficial for a firm’s price competitiveness to the extent that it is not fully
compensated by a higher wage.
But the simplicity comes at a cost. First, it is unclear whether unit labor cost
conceptually measures wage competitiveness or competitiveness in general. This
originates from the fact that the wage bill is used in the numerator, which is only
a cost of labor, while value added is used in the denominator, which is a measure
of output that is affected by all inputs. Value added does not incorporate the
role of other inputs, notably materials and capital, in a direct way. Therefore,
just as for labor productivity, the role of other inputs is ambiguous for our unit
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labor cost measure. The influence of other inputs can indirectly influence unit
labor costs in a desired way if unit labor costs is to be interpreted as a broad
measure of competitiveness: efficient use of material inputs, and increased use of
technology (capital), will generally decrease unit labor costs and potentially increase
competitiveness as well. On the other hand, a shift from labor to capital can affect
unit labor costs without necessarily improving competitiveness. However, only
the cost of labor is taken into account, not the cost of capital or material inputs.
Therefore, it is not as clear as one might expect whether unit labor cost conceptually
measures wage competitiveness or competitiveness in general. Even as a measure for
wage competitiveness, the possibility of rent-sharing between the firm and workers
complicates the interpretation. Second, unit labor costs suffer from the same caveats
as the standard value added based total factor productivity measure. Output and
input prices are unobserved, which might bias value added as a correct measure for
output. Also conceptually, value added as an output measure suffers from a number
of issues (see Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers, 2011). Third, important factors such as
quality, demand and scale of production are not taken into account.
Nonetheless, unit labor cost is still a popular measure among policy makers. The
goal of this paper is to analyze to which extent there is a link between unit labor
costs and export performance at the firm level. This will help the policy maker to
understand to what extent unit labor cost is a useful measure for policy purposes.
2.5 Results
In this section we start by analyzing the baseline relationship between the intensive
margin of net exports and unit labor costs at the firm level, using various estimation
approaches. Next we exploit differences between sectors and the role of firm hetero-
geneity and finally we tune in on the relationship between the extensive margin of
exports and unit labor costs.
2.5.1 Baseline results
Following the discussion in section 2.2, we start by estimating a simple relationship
between firm-level (net) export values and unit labor costs. Since we have no
information on rival (foreign) firms competing in the same export market, it is not
possible to compute a measure of relative unit labor costs at the level of the firm or
to compute a disaggregated measure of export market shares. We therefore include
instead sector-year fixed effects to control for relative movements in unit labor costs of
rival firms and export market shares. The basic export equation we seek to estimate
is then simply given by:
∆xit = β ·∆ulcit + µst + it, (2.8)
CHAPTER 2. HOW DO EXPORTERS REACT TO CHANGES IN COST
COMPETITIVENESS? 59
where all variables are in logs. We use a first difference model to control for unobserved
firm fixed effects. The variable xit represents the log of net exports in euros of firm
i at time t, and ulcit represents the log unit labor costs of firm i at time t. To
control for sector specific business cycles and shocks, we include sector-year fixed
effects µst. Finally, it is a white noise error term. We start by estimating this basic
equation using OLS in table 2.2, while in table 2.3 we report the same estimates,
but using system GMM to account for potential endogeneity of unit labor costs. We
consistently cluster the standard errors at the firm level throughout the paper, but
our results are robust to alternative clustering, such as clustering at the sector level
or at the sector-year level.9
In the first column of table 2.2, we estimate equation (2.8) including a full set of
sector times year effects, while in the second column we do the same but include
sector and year effects separately. Both specifications yield very similar results with
an estimated elasticity of net exports with respect to unit labor costs of close to -0.3.
In the third column we include as an additional control variable the change in the
capital stock, taking into account that capital investment may drive exports and
at the same time increases the capital input share, which would cause a decrease
in unit labor costs. This may take place when firms decide to substitute labor
for capital when labor costs are increasing. But we can note that the estimated
elasticity remains statistically significant with a very similar point estimate of -0.28.
To assess whether it is mainly nominal wage costs or changes in productivity that
drive the results, we decompose in the third and fourth column unit labor costs in
the nominal wage cost per worker and output per worker. The results in column
(3) show that firms that are more productive in terms of output per worker export
more (an elasticity of 0.30), while the estimated coefficient on nominal wages per
worker is negative, but small and not statistically significant different from zero.
This suggests that the variation in unit labor costs firms face is mainly driven by
changes in labor productivity. Given that the wage formation process in Belgium
is centralized and a large part of the variation in wages is driven by institutional
factors, such as collective agreements at the level of the sector or automatic wage
indexation, the variation of wage costs at the firm level is likely going to be small,
(see also Lo´pez Novella and Sissoko, 2013).
A concern with the results based on OLS in table 2.2 is potential endogeneity of
unit labor costs and in particular of labor productivity. The specifications in table
2.2 already controlled for firm fixed effects by taking first differences and for sector
9Taking for example the baseline specification presented in the third column in table 2.2, we
find a standard error for ∆ulc of 0.0208 when clustering at the firm level, 0.0260 when clustering
at the sector (Nace 2 digit) level and 0.0220 when clustering at the sector-year level. This might
suggest that the standard errors are larger when clustering at the sector level, but this is not the
case for all specifications. We also checked the robustness for the long differences (table 2.4) and the
heterogeneity table (table 2.8, presented further in this paper), and find that all coefficients keep
their significance level when clustering at the sector level instead of the firm level. When clustering
at the sector-year level, standard errors are consistently lower across the different specifications.
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Table 2.2: First difference OLS results - dependent variable ∆ net
export value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ulc -0.292∗∗ -0.281∗∗ -0.283∗∗
(0.0210) (0.0206) (0.0208)
∆K 0.0920∗∗ 0.0922∗∗ 0.0911∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134)
∆Q/L 0.313∗∗ 0.301∗∗
(0.0213) (0.0208)
∆W -0.0348 -0.0155
(0.0512) (0.0515)
Sector × Year effects Yes No No Yes No
Year effects No Yes Yes No Yes
Sector effects No Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 23207 23207 23009 22987 22987
R2 0.039 0.023 0.026 0.044 0.029
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a All variables are in logs.
specific business cycles and demand shocks by including sector-time fixed effects.
However, one could still argue that there is an endogeneity issue because wages and
output are jointly determined by the firm. There could be rent-sharing between the
firm and the workers, which would create a downward bias (in absolute value) of
the elasticity we are estimating. There could also simply be reversed causality when
there is ‘learning from exporting’, albeit in advanced countries like Belgium, it is less
likely that this is going to be a dominant factor.10 If there is an impact of exporting
on productivity we would expect this is also reflected in nominal wages and hence
unit labor costs (which is nominal wages adjusted for real labor productivity) should
be unaffected. If wages and labor are rigid and reacting less to changes in output,
this could lead to an upward bias (in absolute value) of the elasticity.
It is well known that finding good instruments in this kind of setting in which
panel data are used with many observations is not straightforward. Nevertheless, we
attempt to mitigate the potential endogeneity issues in a number of ways, apart from
controlling for fixed effects. First, we estimate the relation described in equation in
levels, i.e.
xit = αi + β · ulcit + µst + it, (2.9)
with system GMM, using lags 2 and 3 of unit labor cost as instruments in the
difference equation and the first lag of ∆ulc in the level equation.11 The results are
10Pisu (2008) finds no support for the learning-by-exporting hypothesis for Belgium.
11These are the standard instruments for endogenous regressors, see Roodman (2009). For
additional background on difference and system GMM, see also Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
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shown in table 2.3, where we show various specifications, starting in column (1) with
just including year fixed effects, in column (2) we include a full set of sector times year
effects, column (3) – (4) further include report the capital stock as an extra control.
For the first columns, the Hansen p test and the second order correlation test do not
reject the model, which suggests the model is well specified. Note that the number of
observations reported for the system GMM specification cannot be directly compared
to the number of observations in our OLS first difference baseline specification in
table 2.2.12 The results in table 2.3 show a point estimate of the elasticity of exports
with respect to unit labor costs of approximately -0.40. When we also control for the
change in the capital stock, assumed exogenous, the elasticity remains very similar,
with a point estimate ranging between -0.43 and -0.53 in columns (3) and (4). When
we compare the point estimates of the OLS specifications in table 2.3 and the system
GMM specifications, we can see that on average the latter yields a point estimate
of the unit labor cost elasticity that is 10 to 25 percentage points higher, but this
difference is limited taking into account the estimated standard errors. We will
therefore use OLS in the remainder of our analysis.
Table 2.3: System GMM estimation - dependent variable net export
value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ulc -0.401** -0.434** -0.434** -0.536**
(0.150) (0.144) (0.123) (0.119)
K 0.737** 0.748**
(0.012) (0.0128)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector effects No Yes No Yes
Hansen J test p-value 0.478 0.297 0.149 0.087
AR 2 p-value 0.265 0.281 0.038 0.05
Observations 29,965 29,965 29,965 29,965
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a All variables are in logs.
b We use the standard system GMM specification: lags 2 and 3 of unit labor
cost as instruments in the difference equation and the first lag of ∆ulc in
the level equation.
So far, our estimates have been based on one-year differences. Of course, firms
may need time to adjust and short-run rigidities may result in biased estimates
of the long-run elasticity of net exports with respect to unit labor costs. Using
12The fact that the number of observations in table 2.2 is different from the number of observations
in table 2.3, is not driven by the use of different samples. The sample used in both estimations is
the same. However, we follow the reporting standard for system GMM, which is reporting the total
number of observations available in levels. The number of observations actually used is substantially
lower, as the instruments are not available for all observations. The number of observations in our
first difference OLS specification in table 2.2 is lower than the number of observations in levels
because differencing leads to a reduction of the sample size.
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long-run differences also mitigates potential endogeneity due to co-movement in
exports and unit labor costs, as temporary shocks are likely to be less important.
We therefore report the same set of results using five-year long differences instead
of one-year differences. The results are shown in table 2.4. Not surprisingly, the
elasticity increases and falls in between -0.35 and -0.40. In column (5) we lag unit
labor costs with one period as an additional robustness check, but the results hardly
change.
Table 2.4: Long differences (5 year) OLS results - dependent variable
∆5 net export value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆5ulc -0.391
∗∗ -0.402∗∗ -0.381∗∗ -0.356∗∗ -0.346∗∗
(0.0364) (0.0382) (0.0369) (0.0346) (0.0418)
∆5K 0.205
∗∗ 0.207∗∗
(0.0178) (0.0194)
Sector × Year effects No Yes No No No
Year effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Sector effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11744 11744 11744 11636 9342
R2 0.023 0.060 0.049 0.074 0.077
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a All variables are in logs.
b Specification (5) uses unit labor costs lagged once.
Finally, we check whether the sensitivity of exports with respect to unit labor
costs is different when other export measures are used. First, we check the results
when gross exports is used, rather than net exports, as the dependent variable; i.e.
using exports without subtracting imports. The results are reported in table 2.5,
where we report both one-year and five-year differences. We can note that we still
obtain a negative and statistically significant effect of unit labor costs on export
performance, however, the point estimates are about 10 percentage points lower
compared to the specifications in which we use net exports.
As a second robustness check, we use value added exports the dependent variable,
see table 2.6. Gross exports will not exhibit a strong link with unit labor costs if the
cost of the exporting firm is small relative to the total cost of the exported product.
This is the case if the firm makes heavy use of intermediate inputs. Using net exports
as the dependent variable, defined as the difference of exports and imports, only
mitigates this to the extent that the intermediate inputs are imported by the firm. If
the firms sources its intermediate inputs on the domestic market, there might still be
a weak link between a value added based measure such as unit labor costs. Therefore
we go one step further and use value added exports as a dependent variable, which
proxies exports net of the intermediate inputs used to produce the exported products.
An approximation of the value added exports is obtained by subtracting the share of
CHAPTER 2. HOW DO EXPORTERS REACT TO CHANGES IN COST
COMPETITIVENESS? 63
Table 2.5: First difference OLS results - dependent variable ∆ gross
export value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆x ∆x ∆5x ∆5x
∆ulc -0.201∗∗ -0.206∗∗
(0.0183) (0.0183)
∆K 0.0985∗∗
(0.0117)
∆5ulc -0.285
∗∗ -0.272∗∗
(0.0345) (0.0336)
∆5K 0.264
∗∗
(0.0196)
Sector × Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 43589 43111 22395 22125
R2 0.029 0.032 0.042 0.064
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a All variables are in logs.
b The first 2 columns show results for the one year differences, the last 2
columns for the five year differences.
exports in intermediate inputs from the gross exports.13 We again report both one
year and five year differences. As before, we still obtain a negative and statistically
significant effect of unit labor costs on export performance. The point estimates are
10 to 15 percentage points higher in absolute value than the original specification
with net exports.
Moreover, going from the main specification to the robustness checks, the coef-
ficients change in a way that makes sense intuitively. If we take gross exports as
an independent variable, the estimated coefficient becomes lower in absolute value.
A part of the gross exports of a firm potentially rely heavily, or even entirely as
shown in Damijan, Konings, and Polanec (2013), on imports. An increase in unit
labor costs will not impact this part of gross exports, but only the part in which the
firm uses its workers. Therefore we expect the elasticity of gross exports to be lower
than for net exports. Turning to value added exports, we see that the coefficient
increases in absolute value compared to using net exports as the independent variable.
Net exports are potentially partly driven by domestically sourced inputs, and can
therefore be expected to suffer less from firm-level increases in unit labor costs than
value added exports. So a higher elasticity (in absolute value) for value added exports
is in line with our expectations.
13Value added exports is thus defined as gross exports minus the intermediate inputs used for
these exports. We only observe inputs at the firm level and hence do not observe the inputs
corresponding to the exports. Therefore we approximate the input share of exports by the share of
exports in sales multiplied by the total intermediate inputs.
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Table 2.6: First difference OLS results - dependent variable ∆ value
added export value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆x ∆x ∆5x ∆5x
∆ulc -0.451∗∗ -0.457∗∗
(0.0256) (0.0257)
∆K 0.121∗∗
(0.0142)
∆5ulc -0.467
∗∗ -0.461∗∗
(0.0485) (0.0455)
∆5K 0.269
∗∗
(0.0213)
Sector × Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 34520 34237 17605 17448
R2 0.037 0.039 0.059 0.081
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a All variables are in logs.
b The first 2 columns show results for the one year differences, the last 2
columns for the five year differences.
The analysis shows that unit labor costs have a non-negligible impact on ex-
port performance, but the elasticity is still rather low. Linking it with the Melitz
(2003)–based theoretical model presented in section 2.2, an elasticity of exports
with regards to unit labor costs of -0.2 to -0.4 implies an elasticity of substitution
σ between varieties of 1.2 to 1.4, which is not that far from a perfectly inelastic
elasticity of substitution (σ=1). This suggests that also demand factors such as
quality, taste and reliability matter for explaining firm-level exports. However note
that the model does not take changes in mark-ups into account, which might also be
an important factor in explaining the relatively low elasticity.
2.5.2 Heterogeneity in the sensitivity of exports with re-
spect to unit labor costs
While the above results tune in on the average effect of unit labor costs on net
exports, there may be quite a lot of heterogeneity in the responsiveness of firms
with respect to changes in unit labor costs, depending on the product market or
sector they operate in. As discussed in section 2.2, recent models in international
trade emphasize that apart from relative costs, also demand factors, such as quality
and taste differences, may be important to explain the export performance of firms.
Hence, sectors that are more intense in R&D may generate a different response to
increases in unit labor costs as their product demand depends more on the degree
of innovation and quality. We therefore estimate the elasticity of net exports with
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respect to unit labor costs for each two-digit NACE sector separately, shown in
table 2.7. The elasticity of net exports with respect to unit labor costs is estimated
negative in all sectors, but its magnitude ranges between -0.084 (and not statistically
significant) in ‘Electrical equipment’ to -0.742 in ‘Paper and Paper products’. It
is not surprising to find differences across sectors and we would expect these to be
related to differences in the capital labor ratio, the type of technology used or the
export orientation of the sector, which reflects different demand patterns (e.g. high
versus low income countries). Similarly, we may expect that some sectors may be
more vulnerable to demand shocks than others. Especially with the financial and
economic crisis export markets collapsed and in some products more so than in
others.
Table 2.7: Elasticity of net exports with regards to unit labor costs at the
sector level
Sector (Nace 2 digit code) ∆ ulc s.e. Obs
Food products (10) -0.225** 0.049 3,385
Textiles (13) -0.313** 0.049 2,548
Wearing apparel (14) -0.465** 0.11 658
Wood and wood products (16) -0.158+ 0.085 653
Paper and paper products (17) -0.742** 0.146 601
Printing and reproduction recorded media (18) -0.302** 0.145 667
Chemicals (20) -0.374** 0.058 1,980
Basic pharmaceutical products (21) -0.373** 0.113 324
Rubber and Plastic (22) -0.178** 0.081 1,907
Non-metallic mineral products (23) -0.275** 0.088 1,154
Basic metals (24) -0.270** 0.092 679
Fabricated metal products (25) -0.285** 0.084 2,498
Computer and electronic products (26) -0.276** 0.127 831
Electrical equipment (27) -0.084 0.107 693
Machinery and equipment (28) -0.452** 0.083 2,221
Motor vehicles (29) -0.224** 0.107 561
Furniture (31) -0.278** 0.127 910
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Coefficients according to specification (2.8). The regressions include ∆K as
control variables.
b The sectors Beverages (11) Tobacco products (12), Leather products (15), Coke
and refined products (19) and other transport equipment (30), are not displayed
because of the low number of observations for these sectors.
To illustrate to which extent the elasticities in table 2.7 are statistically signif-
icantly different from each other, we show a graphical representation of the point
estimates with the corresponding 95% confidence interval in figure 2.6. The overlap
of the confidence intervals gives an indication of whether the point estimates are
significantly different from each other. E.g., food products (10) and textiles (13) have
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confidence intervals that overlap substantially. The difference in elasticities is 0.088
in absolute value with a standard error of 0.069 and thus not statistically significant
at the conventional significance levels (with a p-value of approximately 20%). The
difference in elasticity between the sectors wearing apparel (14) and wood and wood
products (16) is statistically significant: the difference is 0.307 with a standard error
of 0.139 and a p-value of 2.8%. The graph shows that the confidence intervals of the
coefficients of these sectors only have limited overlap.
Figure 2.6: Illustration of the 95% confidence intervals for the sectoral elasticities in
table 2.7.
To further explore the heterogeneity, we carry out additional analysis to see to
what extent the export elasticity with respect to unit labor costs varies over time and
across a number of firm and sector characteristics that capture different demand and
supply shocks. The results are presented in table 2.8. We focus on the specification
using one-year differences, but the results for five-year differences are qualitatively
the same. The first column of table 2.8 interacts unit labor costs with a crisis dummy
equal to 1 for the years 2009 and 2010.14 We include separately year fixed effects and
sector fixed effects. Note that the interaction between unit labor costs and this crisis
dummy is positive, but statistically not different from zero. In other words, the crisis
did not have an effect on the sensitivity of (net) exports to changes in unit labor costs.
In contrast, the direct impact of the crisis on net exports for the average firm has
been strong and negative. The cumulative direct impact of the years 2009 and 2010
was estimated at -0.23 (not reported in the table), which means that for the average
14We experimented also with defining this dummy from 2008 onwards, but the results remained
the same.
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firm exports dropped by 23% in 2009 and 2010. In the second column we check
whether firms that export to high income countries have a different elasticity. To this
end, we define the firm-level destination GDP per capita as a gross export weighted
average of the GDP per capita of its different destination countries and interact
it with the change in unit labor costs. Arguably, if firms export to high income
countries, cost competitiveness may be less important, as other aspects related to
non-price competition, such as quality and reliability may matter more.15 We find
the expected positive coefficient, but it is not statistically significant. In column
(3) we explore to what extent non-price competition is relevant in high tech sectors,
that typically would be able to innovate more. High-tech sectors are defined on the
basis of the EUROSTAT classification of R&D intensive manufacturing sectors. We
consider sectors as high-tech when they are ranked according to Eurostat as either
high- tech and medium-high tech.16 However, we find no statistically significant
effect of high-tech sectors. This is somewhat surprising as we would expect these
sectors to be able to innovate more and that in these sectors non-price competition is
more relevant. Nonetheless, a similar result for R&D intensive sectors was found in
Carlin, Glyn, and Van Reenen (2001) using OECD sector-level data. Of course, R&D
intensity is measured in a rather crude way at the 2-digit Nace level, while typically
R&D tends to be concentrated in a few large firms. Firm-level data on R&D and
innovation would be required, which we do not have at our disposal. Instead, in
column (4) we test whether labor intensive firms are more sensitive to changes in
unit labor costs by interacting unit labor costs with the capital-labor ratio. We find
that labor intensive sectors have a much higher elasticity of net exports with respect
to unit labor costs relative to capital intensive firms. Finally, in column (5) we put
all specifications together to check whether all these effects still hold, which is the
case.
The results in tables 2.7 and 2.8 show that an average estimate of the elasticity
of net exports with respect to unit labor costs is not reflecting the full picture. The
relation between unit labor costs and exports depends on a number of firm and sector
characteristics, giving support to recent models that model both cost heterogeneity
and demand heterogeneity as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Di Comite, Thisse,
and Vandenbussche (2014).
We also experimented with other sources of heterogeneity not reported here.
We analyzed to what extend the export sensitivity with respect to unit labor cost
depends on whether exports go to the EU (internal market effect), but did not find
a different effect. To check if multinational groups behave differently, we included an
interaction with multinational status of the firm, but also did not find a statistically
robust relationship. We also interacted the change in unit labor costs with firm size
15On a related issue, Martin and Mayneris (2014) find that French high end exports are more
sensitive to the average income of the destination country, but less sensitive to distance. This
suggests that quality is more important relative to price (or costs) for high income countries.
16If we just restrict it to the very high-tech sectors, the results remained the same.
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Table 2.8: Heterogeneity of elasticity of net exports with regards to unit labor
costs over time and across firm and sector characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ulcit -0.291
∗∗ -0.849+ -0.271∗∗ -0.758∗∗ -1.280∗
(0.0229) (0.480) (0.0245) (0.199) (0.517)
∆ulcit× Crisist 0.0394 0.0423
(0.0506) (0.0548)
∆ulcit × log GDP per capita it−1 0.0538 0.0505
(0.0467) (0.0481)
∆ulcit× High Techs -0.0338 -0.0257
(0.0452) (0.0472)
∆ulcit × log Capital-labor ratio it−1 0.0433∗ 0.0438∗
(0.0186) (0.0186)
∆Kit 0.0918
∗∗ 0.0973∗∗ 0.0923∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0136) (0.0135)
Sector × Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23009 22484 23009 22393 22380
R2 0.026 0.029 0.026 0.029 0.030
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a All variables that are interacted with unit labor costs are also included separately in
the regressions, but not reported.
(proxied by log sales or employment). Again, no statistically robust relationship was
found.
2.5.3 Extensive margin
So far we have only focused on the intensive margin of exports, i.e. how export sales
increase or decrease with changing unit labor costs. But when fixed costs of entering
export markets are important, unit labor costs, which reflects in part productivity,
may be even more important for starting to export. As theoretically shown by Melitz
(2003), firms self-select into export markets when firms they are more productive.
So, we would expect that firms with higher unit labor costs will be less likely to
start exporting if not yet exporting and more likely to stop exporting when already
exporting. We analyze the relationship between entry in export markts and unit
labor costs by identifying all firms that start to export in a particular year, while not
exporting the year before. Our control group consists of all other manufacturing firms
that never export. The first three columns in table 2.9 reports various specifications
of a probit model for entry into export markets. In the first column we simply include
lagged unit labor costs, and the standard year and sector control dummies. Contrary
to our expectations, we find a statistically significant positive relation between unit
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labor costs and firm entry into export markets. However, when controlling for firm
size, through log employment, we find the expected negative coefficient, see the
second column. A possible explanation is that unit labor costs are underestimated
substantially for the smaller firms.17 The estimated effects are quite low: a decrease
of the ULC from the 75th percentile in our sample to the 25th percentile, increases
the probability to become an exporter with approximately 1.7 percentage points.
When going from the 10th to the 90th percentile, the increase is 3.7 percentage points.
In the third column, we report a specification where we separately include nominal
wages and labor productivity as is done in a number of papers that analyze the
extensive margin (e.g. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott, 2006). They indicate that firms
entering export markets have both a higher level of labor productivity and a higher
level of the nominal wage. This is consistent with what is found in the literature. For
instance Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) report a positive coefficient on both the
wage and on labor productivity. The positive coefficient on labor productivity reflects
self-selection of the better firms into export markets. The positive coefficient on the
wage is usually interpreted as an indicator of labor force quality, reflected by higher
nominal wages paid to workers with high human capital. The last three columns of
table 2.9 show the results for exit from the export markets. We compare firms that
exit the export markets, while still exporting the year before, with firms that always
keep exporting as a control group. Column (4) shows a statistically insignificant
positive relation between unit labor costs and exit. This coefficient becomes much
larger and statistically significant when controlling for employment, see column
(5). The magnitude is larger than for the entry analysis, but still somewhat low:
an increase of unit labor costs from the 25th to the 75th percentile, increases the
probability of the exit with 4 percentage points, going from the 10th to the 90th
percentile of 8.1 percentage points. The final column shows that this is mainly driven
by a lower labor productivity and that the coefficient on wage is not statistically
significant.
The disaggregated data allows us to study the ‘within-firm extensive margin’ as
well, i.e. the impact of unit labor costs on adding or dropping products, destinations
and product-destination combinations. We present the results in table 2.10. In the
first column, we run a probit regression on a dummy taking on the value ‘1’ if a firm
increases its number of export destinations compared to the previous year, and zero
otherwise. In column (2), we use the reverse: the dependent variable dummy for
destinations dropped takes on the value ‘1’ if the firm decreases its number of export
destinations, and zero otherwise. We find that firms with higher unit labor costs are
17Especially for small firms, the owner(s) of the firm are not always included as employees in
the firm accounting data and are thus not included in the wage bill. However, they often do work
full-time for the firm and thus are contributing to the value added of the firm. This leads to an
underestimation for unit labor costs of small firms, and the underestimation is more severe the
smaller the firm is. In this context this is problematic as export entrants tend to be larger than
non-exporters. Similarly, firms that exit the export market tend to be smaller than firms that stay
active in the export market.
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Table 2.9: Extensive margin – exit and entry of firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entry Entry Entry Exit Exit Exit
log ulc 0.0871∗∗ -0.311∗∗ 0.0118 0.539∗∗
(0.0184) (0.0292) (0.0335) (0.0631)
log Employment 0.376∗∗ 0.352∗∗ -0.560∗∗ -0.521∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0191) (0.0194)
logQ/L 0.336∗∗ -0.546∗∗
(0.0305) (0.0629)
logW/L 0.151∗∗ -0.0831
(0.0534) (0.0967)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 60989 59888 59888 29942 29892 29892
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.117 0.124 0.066 0.254 0.264
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a All regressors are lagged with one period. All specifications are probit
estimations.
less likely to increase the number of export destinations (column (1)) and more likely
to decrease the number of export destinations (column (2)). The next two columns
show the same analysis for exported products: firms with higher unit labor costs are
less likely to increase the number of exported products (column (3)), and more likely
to decrease the number of exported products (column (4)). The last two columns
show the results for unique export destination-product combinations. In line with
the previous results, we see that firms with higher unit labor costs are less likely
to increase the number of export destination-product combinations (column (5)),
and more likely to decrease the number of export destination-product combinations
(column (6)).
Table 2.10: Extensive margin – adding/dropping of destinations, products and
destination-product combinations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Add dest. Drop dest. Add prod. Drop prod. Add D-P Drop D-P
log ulc -0.165∗∗ 0.0826∗∗ -0.0800∗∗ 0.0399∗ -0.159∗∗ 0.0981∗∗
(0.0189) (0.0195) (0.0187) (0.0170) (0.0187) (0.0175)
log empl. 0.102∗∗ 0.0725∗∗ 0.0940∗∗ 0.0658∗∗ 0.0861∗∗ 0.0377∗∗
(0.00524) (0.00490) (0.00500) (0.00475) (0.00516) (0.00486)
Observations 34039 34039 34039 34039 34039 34039
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.011 0.013 0.007 0.013 0.006
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a All regressors are lagged with one period. All specifications are probit estimations.
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So we can summarize the results for the extensive margin as follows: a higher unit
labor cost decreases the probability of entering the export markets and increases the
probability of exit from the export markets when controlling for firm size. Also, firms
with higher unit labor costs are less likely to add export destinations, export products
and destination-product combinations. The effects are statistically significant but
rather small.
2.6 Conclusion
Unit labor costs has been a widely used measure to assess the competitiveness of
countries. Increasing unit labor costs are usually seen as a threat to export market
performance. However, very little empirical work has looked into the impact of unit
labor costs on export performance. This paper has tried to fill this gap by analyzing
the relationship between unit labor costs and exports at the firm level. We argue
first that using micro data is more appropriate as there exists a lot of heterogeneity
between firms not only in terms of productivity and hence unit labor costs, but also
in terms of their export market performance. Furthermore, we analyze net exports
of firms, i.e. exports adjusted for their import content, for which firm-level data
seem more appropriate.
We find that the elasticity of exports with regards to unit labor costs varies
between -0.29 and -0.40. But this elasticity varies between sectors and firms. In
particular, we find that more labor intensive firms have a higher elasticity of exports
with regards to unit labor costs. The financial and economic crisis affected exports,
but the elasticity of exports with respect to unit labor costs did not change. Finally,
we show that changes in unit labor costs also have a statistically significant impact
on the extensive margin of exports.
Our results are relevant for policy makers in understanding the role of cost
competitiveness in export performance. The paper helps evaluating the use of unit
labor cost as a competitiveness indicator. While our results show that unit labor
costs have an impact on the intensive and extensive margin of firm-level exports, the
impact is also rather low. This suggests that pass-through of costs into prices is low
or that demand is fairly inelastic with regards to prices. The latter indicates that
other factors such as taste and quality may at least be as important to incorporate
in indicators of competitiveness, as suggested by the recent trade models focusing on
quality and taste parameters. An important challenge for constructing indicators of
competitiveness is therefore to identify proper measures for quality and taste.
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2.A Appendix: detailed data description
2.A.1 Reporting trade data
Extra-EU data are taken from the customs data and intrastate survey data available
at the NBB. Trade data are collected of all transactions with a value higher than
AC1,000 or a weight over 1,000 kg. Following a broader use of electronic reporting
producers as from 2006, very small transactions are now reported while it was not
so before. The thresholds are more binding for intra-EU trade. From 1998 to 2005,
firms had to report their export and import flows if these were more than AC250,000
per year. From 2006 onwards, these threshold was raised to AC1,000,000 for exports
and AC400,000 euros for imports.
2.A.2 Accounting data
The trade data are merged to the company accounts of firms using the vat number.
All incorporated firms in Belgium are required to submit full or abbreviated company
accounts to the National Bank of Belgium. Since small firms are not required to
report sales, we supplement the firm-level data with confidential data on sales from
the VAT registry.
2.A.3 Data cleaning
We perform standard data cleaning to limit the influence of outliers: the changes in
unit labor cost, exports, net exports, capital, average wage, labor productivity and
materials over sales ratio that are smaller than the first percentile of the distribution
or larger than the 99th percentile of the distribution are dropped.
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Chapter 3
Productivity gains after outward
FDI: evidence from Slovenia
Summary This chapter analyzes whether firms that engage in outward foreign
direct investment, experience productivity gains in their domestic plants. To this
end, we apply the methodology of De Loecker (2013) to firm-level data on the
Slovenian manufacturing industry from 1994 to 2002. Our findings indicate that
firms that invested abroad experience a higher productivity growth than firms that
did not, controlling for many relevant variables such as past productivity, export
status and industry of the firm. The gains only occur for investments outside of
former Yugoslavia. They are larger for initially more productive firms and only occur
some years after the investment.
This chapter is joint work with Jozˇe Damijan (University of Ljubljana). I am thankful to the
participants of the 13th Annual GEP Postgraduate conference in Nottingham, especially to my
discussant Sourafel Girma, for helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank the participants of
the Vives informal seminar for helpful comments on an early version of this chapter.
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3.1 Introduction
Productivity differences between exporters and non-exporters have been investigated
extensively since the middle of the nineties when researchers discovered the richness
of firm-level trade data. Since then, a robust fact with only a few exceptions has
emerged from various studies: exporters are more productive than firms selling only
on the domestic market, see the surveys Wagner (2007) and Wagner (2012) for an
overview. Firms engaging in outward foreign direct investment (FDI) are also found
to be more productive than other firms, and even more productive than exporters. A
major question in the literature is: what causes these productivity differences? Is it
purely self selection, where more productive firms have a higher tendency to export
or to engage in outward FDI? Or are there gains in productivity after increased
internationalization?
This paper focuses on productivity gains after outward FDI: do firms increase
the productivity in their domestic plants after engaging in outward FDI? Our
methodology builds on the productivity estimation literature, including Olley and
Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006),
and the extensions for learning by exporting, as in Van Biesebroeck (2005) and
De Loecker (2013). Although productivity gains from exporting have been studied
in many papers, surprisingly little studies have been done on the productivity gains
from outward FDI.1
We contribute to the literature by providing new evidence for within-firm pro-
ductivity increases due to firms investing abroad, using Slovenian firm-level data
for the period 1994-2002. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first paper to
extend the state of the art productivity estimation techniques of the learning by
exporting literature to the context of outward FDI. This so called control function
approach deals with the endogeneity of FDI and use of inputs in the productivity
estimation. Furthermore, the methodology is convenient in our set up, because
of the limited number of firms that engage in outward FDI for the first time in
our dataset. This makes it difficult to use approaches that track firms over time,
such as difference-in-differences or fixed effects, as these approaches solely rely on
observations on firms that engage in outward FDI for the first time to identify
productivity gains. In contrast, our methodology uses variation both from firms
that engage in outward FDI for the first time as from firms that have already made
investments abroad before the start of the dataset, controlling for relevant variables
such as the past productivity level, export status or the industry of the firm.
As an advanced transition country subject to many economic changes in the
period we investigate, Slovenia offers an interesting setting to look for productivity
gains from the internationalization of firms. After the country became independent
1Exceptions include Kimura and Kiyota (2006) on Japan, Barba Navaretti, Castellani, and
Disdier (2010) on France and Italy and Hijzen, Jean, and Mayer (2011) also on France, using a
regression or matching based approach and reporting mixed results. For an overview of their results,
see section 3.2.
CHAPTER 3. PRODUCTIVITY GAINS AFTER OUTWARD FDI: EVIDENCE
FROM SLOVENIA 77
from former Yugoslavia in 1991, the economy converted from a semi-market economy
to a full market economy. The subsequent period was characterized by rapid economic
growth, structural changes and a further increase in international exposure, which
likely contributed to the productivity gains.2
The results show that there are productivity gains after outward FDI. Having an
investment abroad increases next year’s productivity level by 0.3 to 0.6% depending
on the specification, but the effect is small and at the limit of statistical significance.
The effect gets much stronger when distinguishing between destinations in former
Yugoslavia and other destinations. We only find productivity gains for the latter,
with a magnitude of about 1.1 to 1.6% depending on the specification. Possible
channels through which outward FDI improves productivity can be the following:
better information flows between the different stages of production, e.g. when foreign
affiliates are used to serve as suppliers of specific components, learning from being
active in more competitive markets, knowledge spillovers from the local market or
acquired firm,3 etc. Unfortunately, the exact mechanism cannot be fully disentangled
with our data. We cannot distinguish between the different types of FDI, such as
greenfield (setting up a new affiliate from the ground up) or brownfield FDI (taking
over a foreign firm), and horizontal or vertical FDI, as we do not have information on
the foreign subsidiaries. However, the results on the differences in productivity gains
between destination markets give some indication. We did not find productivity gains
for investments in former Yugoslavia, a region that was economically less advanced
than Slovenia with a market that Slovenian firms probably knew quite well (as they
were still a single country before 1991). It seems that for productivity gains to occur,
the markets should be more competitive or less well known. In addition, some of
the affiliates that Slovenian firms had in other parts of ex-Yugoslavia before 1990
were nationalized by new states and later re-acquired by Slovenian parent companies
during the second part of the 1990s, which can also explain why we do not find
productivity gains for outward FDI in that region. In terms of heterogeneity across
firms, we find that the effect increases with initial productivity. It also takes some
years after the first investment abroad for the productivity gains to occur rather
than taking place immediately after the investment. A caveat in our approach is
that we do not rely on instrumental variables, e.g. from a natural experiment, to
identify the productivity gains. Therefore, the results can only be interpreted as a
causal effect of outward FDI on productivity to the extent that the specifications
used do not suffer from omitted variable bias.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 gives an overview
on the literature on the link between internationalization and productivity. In section
2De Loecker (2007) finds productivity gains from exporting for Slovenia using data from almost
the same period. More details on the job reallocation and productivity dynamics in general can be
found in De Loecker and Konings (2006).
3An interesting paper to mention in this context is Branstetter (2006), who finds knowledge
spillovers between the acquired and the acquiring firms for Japanese firms taking over American
firms. He focuses on R&D patent spillovers.
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3.3 we discuss the data in detail and present summary statistics. Section 3.4 discusses
the production function estimation methodology, and explains how our methodology
relates to the previous work. The main results are presented in section 3.5, in
addition to extra checks for the validity of the model and robustness checks using
alternative specifications. We conclude in section 3.6.
3.2 Internationalization and productivity: litera-
ture review
Exporters are more productive than firms selling only on the domestic market.
Originally a novel result in Bernard and Jensen (1995), but by now it is a generally
accepted fact confirmed by many studies on different countries. Less consensus
exists about the direction of causality: is the productivity premium solely driven by
self selection, that is do the more productive firms simply tend to enter the export
markets, or are there learning effects, with firms increasing their productivity after
entry? Note that the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. First, most papers
tended to find strong evidence for the self-selection mechanism, but no evidence for
the learning by exporting mechanism (Clerides, Lach, and Tybout, 1998; Bernard
and Jensen, 1999; Damijan and Kostevc, 2006). This type of empirical studies were
a source of inspiration for the seminal theoretical Melitz (2003) paper, where the
central assumption that the productivity of a firm is predetermined drives the entry
into export markets. Later however, various studies found evidence for significant
productivity increases after entering the export market, such as Alvarez and Lo´pez
(2005), De Loecker (2007) and Van Biesebroeck (2005). The learning effects are
mainly found for developing economies, while there is little evidence for learning
by exporting in high income countries. An exception to this rule is the paper by
Lileeva and Trefler (2010), showing that Canadian manufacturing plants experienced
productivity gains due to better access to the US market.
The literature on outward FDI and productivity is less extensive. Most empirical
studies show that firms engaging in outward FDI are more productive than others,
even more productive than exporters. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) build
on the Melitz (2003) model and extend it for outward FDI. In their model, firms
self-select their internationalization mode based on their productivity: the least
productive are active in the domestic market only, the more productive export and
the most productive engage in outward FDI. They find, using cross sectional US data,
that firms engaging in outward FDI are indeed more productive than exporters, while
exporters are more productive than domestic firms. This productivity ’hierarchy’ is
confirmed for other countries using cross-sectional data, see e.g. Wagner (2006) for
Germany or Tomiura (2007) for Japan. Studies using panel data are rare. Damijan,
Polanec, and Prasˇnikar (2007) report, using panel data for Slovenia, that more
productive firms are indeed more likely to invest in foreign affiliates, confirming
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the selection effect. A couple of papers have investigated productivity gains from
outward FDI in the past. Kimura and Kiyota (2006) find, using a dataset on Japanese
firms, that there are indeed productivity gains from outward FDI. Barba Navaretti,
Castellani, and Disdier (2010) use a matching approach for French and Italian firms
from 1993 to 2000, distinguishing between FDI in developed and less developed
countries. Focusing on their difference-in-differences matching estimator, they find
a positive and statistically significant effect on productivity only for Italian firms
investing in developed countries. The paper of Hijzen, Jean, and Mayer (2011), for
French firms in the period 1987 to 1999, finds a positive and statistically significant
effect only for firms in non-skill-intensive manufacturing sectors.
Some papers investigate other aspects of the dynamics of outward FDI. Sev-
eral studies find evidence, contrary to what is often believed, that outward FDI
does not lead to a loss in employment or output for the firms making the invest-
ment(Barba Navaretti, Castellani, and Disdier, 2010; Hijzen, Jean, and Mayer, 2011;
Becker and Muendler, 2008). An exception is the paper by Debaere, Lee, and Lee
(2010) who find that moving to less-advanced countries decreases a firm’s employment
growth rate for Korea. Conconi, Sapir, and Zanardi (2013) investigate the dynamics
of FDI in a different way: their results suggest that Belgian firms first ’test’ a
foreign market with exports, and if successful, some establish foreign affiliates, while
’unsuccessful’ new exporters drop out of the foreign market.
Contrary to outward FDI, the question of productivity gains due to inward
FDI has received a lot of attention in the literature. The literature generally finds
productivity gains for firms that have been taken over, but mixed evidence on the
spillover effects to the domestic firms (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Konings, 2001;
Javorcik, 2004; Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Damijan, Kostevc, and Rojec, 2014).
Damijan, Kostevc, and Rojec (2013) investigate inward FDI in the context of global
value chains, illustrating significant export re-structuring for firms that are taken
over. Also various aspects of importing have been shown to increase productivity,
such as better access to imports (Amiti and Konings, 2007; Halpern, Koren, and
Szeidl, 2009) and import churning (adding and dropping of imported inputs, see
Damijan, Konings, and Polanec, 2014).
3.3 Data description
The data used in the empirical analysis are provided by the Slovenian Statistical Office
(SORS). We have panel data on all active firms for the years 1994 to 2002. In addition
to the detailed accounting information, the data contain yearly information on trade
flows and cross-border capital flows of individual firms. This yearly information
allows us to observe destination-specific entry and exit into export markets or foreign
direct investments. The data do not contain additional information on the monetary
values of the FDI stock or flows. We only observe aggregate destinations (see table
3.3 further in this section). A drawback of the data is that we cannot distinguish
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between the different types of FDI, such as greenfield (setting up a new affiliate) or
brownfield (taking over a foreign firm) FDI, and horizontal or vertical FDI, as we do
not have information on the foreign subsidiaries.
All data are in Slovenian tolars and have been deflated to make them comparable
across years. We exclude observations reporting less than 5 employees, as Damijan
and Kostevc (2006) note that the data for very small firms are highly unreliable
and noisy.4 We restrict ourselves to the manufacturing sector, retaining only firms
with a NACE rev.1 industry code from 15 to 36. Based on these NACE codes, we
define 11 sectors in the manufacturing industry. We do not pursue a narrower sector
definition, because of the low number of firms engaging in outward FDI. For the
details regarding the datacleaning, deflation of the variables and the definition of the
sectors, see the data appendix (appendix 3.A).
Table 3.1 shows the number of firms in our sample by internationalization status.
In 1994, of the 1514 firms with more than 5 employees, 1058 exported without
outward FDI, while 113 firms have an outward FDI stock in 1994. Over the full
period, we observe 167 engaging in FDI for the first time.5 In 2002, the total number
of firms has risen to 2010, of which 1286 export and 200 have an outward FDI stock,
with 19 firms investing abroad for the first time. The table clearly illustrates that
the vast majority of the firms that engage in outward FDI also export.
Table 3.1: Overview of export and outward FDI status of firms
Year Firms Only exporters Only oFDI Export with oFDI First ever oFDI
1994 1,514 1,058 0 113 -
1995 1,653 1,107 0 118 12
1996 1,734 1,107 1 136 24
1997 1,788 1,120 0 135 16
1998 1,902 1,195 1 160 26
1999 1,973 1,235 2 158 21
2000 1,972 1,243 1 175 19
2001 1,988 1,257 2 202 30
2002 2,010 1,286 0 200 19
Total 16,534 10,608 7 1,397 167
a Only firms with at least 5 employees are taken into account
b The column ’firms’ refers to the number of active firms; ’Only exporters’ refers to
firms that export but do not invest abroad; ’Only FDI’ refers to firms that have
an active investment abroad but do not export; ’Export + FDI’ refers to firms
that have an active investment abroad and export at the same time. The column
’First ever FDI’ refers to firms that invest abroad for the first time.
Table 3.2 shows some summary statistics for 1998, the central year in our dataset.
The mean number of employees is 96. Because of the skewed distribution, with many
small firms and few large firms, the mean is higher than the 75th percentile value of
85 employees. The skewed distribution is also apparent when looking at value added,
4The results are robust to taking a lower (e.g. 3) or higher threshold (e.g. 10).
5As we do not have information before 1994, we cannot know whether these firms export or
engage in outward FDI for the first time.
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tangible fixed assets and sales. The value added per worker is on average about 3.3
Million Slovenian Tolars.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics for 1998
mean p25 p50 p75
# firms 1902
# employees 96 8 21 85
Value added 311 24.2 66.9 219
Tangible fixed assets 600 16.9 68.9 347
Sales 1087 79.1 220 699
Value added per worker 3.3 2.0 2.8 3.9
a Only firms with at least 5 employees are taken into account
b All monetary values are in Millions of SIT (Slovenian Tolars; 1 AC = 186
SIT, 1 $ = 166 SIT)
Table 3.3 shows the observations of outward FDI for different destinations.6 The
table should be interpreted as follows: the total number of year-firm combinations
with positive outward FDI is 1404. Of these observations, 1103 had outward FDI
in former Yugoslavia (in the column ’Total OFDI’) which is 79% of all year-firm
combinations with positive outward FDI, and 739 have outward FDI only in former
Yugoslavia, not in the other regions. The table illustrates that most of the outward
FDI was done in former Yugoslavia, followed by the EU15.
Table 3.3: OFDI by destination
Total oFDI Exclusive
# % # %
Former Yugoslavia 1103 79 739 53
EU15 461 33 164 12
CEEC 184 13 53 4
OECD (non EU15) 121 9 15 1
Ex- Soviet Union 107 8 23 2
Other 66 5 4 0
Total 1404 998
a The table shows the number of firm-year combinations with outward FDI
in the dataset by destination. The column ’Total OFDI’ counts all
firm-year-destination combinations for each destination. The column
’Exclusive’ counts only the firm-year combinations that do not have
outward FDI in other countries.
6The different destination groups are defined as follows. Former Yugoslavia refers to Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro. The EU15 refers to the 15 countries
that formed the European Union in 1995. CEEC refers to the Central and Eastern European
Countries not included in the previous groups, consisting of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Ex- Soviet Union refers to the former
Soviet Union states not included in the previous groups.
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3.4 Methodology
This section discusses the methodology in detail. Subsection 3.4.1 discusses the
semiparametric production function estimator introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996),
and further refined by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg, Caves, and
Frazer (2006). It also explains the extension for productivity gains due to exporting,
as suggested by Van Biesebroeck (2005) and De Loecker (2013). Subsection 3.4.2
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the method, and links the method
to the difference-in-differences (DID) approach. In Subsection 3.4.3, we extend the
model to allow for productivity gains after outward FDI.
A general note on the interpretation of the results obtained with this methodology,
is that we follow De Loecker (2013) in relying on timing assumptions to identify the
productivity gains. The results can therefore only be interpreted as a causal effect of
outward FDI on productivity to the extent that the specifications used do not suffer
from omitted variable bias, contrary to Van Biesebroeck (2005) who uses instruments
for export status in the estimation.
3.4.1 Semiparametric production function estimation and
learning by exporting framework
In this subsection, we give an overview the production function estimation approach
suggested by Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006). Their work builds on the papers
Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
As is common in this context, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function,
with two inputs:
Yit = AitL
βl
itK
βk
it , (3.1)
where Yit represents the output (value added), Lit the number of workers and Kit
the capital of firm i in time period t. Ait represents the productivity of the firm.
For our main results, we estimate a value added production function. However, our
results hold for a gross output production function7 as well, as shown in section 3.5.4.
Taking the natural log of equation (3.1) yields the following expression:
yit = βk · kit + βl · lit + ωit + it. (3.2)
In equation (3.2), the productivity term log(Ait) is decomposed into two parts that
are both unobserved by the econometrician, ωit and it. The term it represents the
shocks to production that are unobserved by the firm when making its input decision
in year t. The term ωit captures the part of the productivity of the firm that is
7Bond and So¨derbom (2005) point out identification issues for perfectly flexible inputs when
using a gross output production function. However using a value added production function has
issues as well, as argued by Basu and Fernald (1997) and Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2011). We
therefore estimate both a value added and a gross output production function, and find that the
results are qualitatively the same.
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potentially observed or predictable by firms when they make their input decisions.
We follow Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) in using materials as the proxy variable for
productivity:8
mit = ft(ωit, lit, kit)⇒ ωit = f−1t (lit, kit,mit). (3.3)
Following the procedure of Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006), we estimate the
following equation in the first stage:
yit = βk · kit + βl · lit + f−1t (lit, kit,mit) + it. (3.4)
The function f−1t (lit, kit,mit) is proxied by a 4th order polynomial in lit, kit and mit.
From equation (3.4), we can see that βl and βk cannot be identified in the first stage,
as the lit and kit terms are collinear with the terms of the polynomial. However the
first stage does yield an estimate of the function φit:
φit(lit, kit,mit) = βk · kit + βl · lit + f−1t (lit, kit,mit) ≡ yit − it, (3.5)
which can be interpreted as the output net of the untransmitted shock it.
The coefficients lit and kit are then identified from two independent moment
conditions. The common assumption that ωit follows a first-order Markov process,
implies that we can write down the following equation:
ωit+1 = E[ωit+1|ωit] + ξit+1, (3.6)
or equivalently
ωit+1 = g1(ωit) + ξit+1, (3.7)
where ξit+1 is mean independent of all information known at t. Therefore, the
assumption that kit+1 is decided at t, yields the first moment condition:
E[ξit+1|kit+1] = 0. (3.8)
For the second moment condition, involving lit, we assume the following:
E[ξit+1|lit] = 0. (3.9)
Alternatively, we could take the stronger assumption that E[ξit+1|lit+1] = 0. This
assumption is likely to hold when the labor market is not flexible, which was probably
the case in Slovenia in the period we investigate.9 We have tried both, and the
results stay qualitatively the same. Further details on the implementation and a
detailed discussion on the underlying assumptions can be found in appendix 3.C.2.
Now we discuss the De Loecker (2013) extension of the Ackerberg, Caves, and
8See appendix 3.C.1 for a more detailed discussion
9See for instance the report of the World Bank (1999) on Slovenia, which explicitly mentions
the high hiring and firing costs as a barrier to labor market flexibility.
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Frazer (2006) framework to allow for the estimation of the learning effect from
exporting. We discuss this in detail, because once it is understood, it is straight
forward to extend it for outward FDI, as done in Subsection 3.4.3. Van Biesebroeck
(2005) mentions the following (see footnote p380): ’Proceeding in two steps, i.e.
first calculating productivity from an econometrically estimated production function
and, second regressing productivity on export status, is inappropriate. If exporting
improves productivity, it belongs in the first stage [, that is, the estimation of the]
production function and to the extent that it is correlated with inputs, the first stage
will suffer from omitted variable bias.’ This point is further developed and made
more explicit in De Loecker (2013). It should be noted that the term ’learning effect’
is defined very broadly in this context: the estimation is based purely on timing
assumptions. So he estimates a difference in productivity growth between exporters
and non-exporters, using a control function approach to control for past productivity.
Whether this effect can be attributed to a causal relation between past export status
and productivity, depends on the extent to which the model is correctly specified in
terms of the timing assumptions and included control variables.
De Loecker (2013) generalizes (3.7) by including the export status as a dummy
variable:
ωit+1 = g2(ωit, eit) + ξit+1, (3.10)
thus defining productivity as a non-parametric function of past productivity and
export status. This adjustment allows exporting to impact future productivity.
To illustrate how the productivity gains after exporting effect is retrieved from
this estimation, we begin by assuming a very restrictive AR(1) productivity process
and a simple additional linear effect of exporting on future productivity. Thus we
can write the following:
ωit+1 = ρωit + γeit + ξit+1. (3.11)
So productivity ωit+1 depends linearly on past productivity, on past export status
and on the unexpected innovation in productivity ξit+1. In this setting, γ can be
interpreted as the effect of the export status on future productivity, under the
assumption that the inclusion of lagged productivity fully controls for the well known
self selection effect that more productive firms are more likely to start exporting.
The general approach consists in using a polynomial to proxy the function g2(·) in
(3.10). After obtaining the polynomial, you can evaluate the effect at some relevant
values of productivity, e.g. the relevant percentiles of productivity, or evaluate the
effect for every exporting firm.
3.4.2 Advantages and disadvantages of the framework
The framework has several advantages. The main advantage is that the framework
allows current export status eit to impact future productivity ωit+1. This makes
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the method internally consistent: first calculating productivity from an estimated
production function and then using this productivity as a dependent variable in a
next step, such as a difference-in-differences (DID) approach, is likely to lead to
downward biased estimates. If exporting affects future productivity and if export
status is positively correlated with the inputs capital and labor, the effect of increased
productivity on output will be attributed to an increase in inputs. Thus it creates an
upward bias on the input coefficients and underestimates the productivity gains from
exporting. There are additional advantages to using this method. The productivity
gains parameters are obtained directly from the production function estimation
logarithm, so no additional steps are needed. The method method does not rely
solely on the firms that export for the first time, an important factor for our
application, with the relatively limited number of firms that invest abroad for the
first time in our dataset.
A disadvantage of the method used, is that it imposes severe restrictions on the
evolution of productivity, but these can be relaxed if needed. An additional disadvan-
tage is that it does not allow for systematic immediate unexpected productivity gains
because ξ is mean zero in expected value.10 Finally, the method does not offer a
theoretical mechanism on how exporting influences future productivity. However, all
of these concerns are also implicitly present in a DID approach. The relation between
DID and our approach is discussed in detail in appendix 3.B, where we illustrate
for the restrictive linear model in (3.11) that if the assumptions of the model hold
and productivity is correctly estimated in the DID approach, so taking export status
into account when estimating productivity, our approach yields the same results as
the DID approach. But when correctly estimating productivity, you do not need the
DID approach anymore, as the productivity gains are obtained directly from the
productivity estimation procedure. Appendix 3.B.2 illustrates the firm fixed effects
approach with labor productivity.
If the method is not complemented with instrumental variables to instrument for
the export status, as is done in this paper, one should be cautious in interpreting the
effect as a causal effect of export status on future productivity. If both productivity
gains and export status are correlated with an omitted variable, this could lead to a
bias in the estimation of the parameter of interest. E.g., if firms invest in productivity
and simultaneously export, the estimated effect of export status on productivity will
be upward biased.
10In the different setting of productivity gains from R&D investment, Doraszelski and Jaumandreu
(2013) make a similar assumption. They assume that the decision about investment in R&D is made
at the time the investment is executed, time t, and at the same time the firm already anticipates
the productivity gains in time t+ 1 already at time t, while the effective productivity gains are
only realized and observed by the firm at time t+ 1.
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3.4.3 Extension to outward FDI
Our approach extends this ’learning by exporting’ framework. As outward FDI
and exports are very closely related, it is important to keep controlling for the
export status of the firm while estimating the productivity gains after outward FDI.
Therefore, we assume the following productivity evolution process, that is a straight
forward extension of (3.10):
ωit+1 = g3(ωit, eit, oFDIit) + ξit+1, (3.12)
where eit represents the export dummy for firm i, and oFDIit represents the dummy
for the outward FDI status of the firm, taking the value 1 if the firm has invested
abroad in the current period, or has an FDI stock abroad because of investments in
the previous periods, and 0 otherwise.
Our most basic approach extends equation (3.11) with a dummy for outward
FDI:
ωit+1 = ρ ωit + γe eit + γfdi oFDIit + ξit+1. (3.13)
We can generalize this by assuming a more flexible productivity evolution, where we
allow export status to impact productivity in a flexible way:
ωit+1 = g(ωit, eit) + γfdi oFDIit + ξit+1. (3.14)
In practice, we use a 4th order polynomial to proxy for g(·). We maintain the
assumption that outward FDI has an additive effect on future productivity. We do
this mainly because of data constraints: the number of firms engaging in outward
FDI is relatively low for several sectors,11 which makes it difficult to estimate a
heterogeneous effect with multiple parameters. A full overview of every step in the
estimation algorithm can be found in appendix 3.C.2.
The parameter of interest, γfdi should be interpreted as the effect of outward
FDI in time t on the productivity growth from t to t+ 1, because we control for the
productivity level in time in time t. See below for a formal derivation on why this is
the case. We use a simplified version of (3.14) by abstracting from the export status.
The derivation goes as follows:
ωit+1 = g(ωit) + γfdi oFDIit + ξit+1
ωit+1 − ωit = g(ωit)− ωit + γfdi oFDIit + ξit+1
∆ωit+1 = g
∗(ωit) + γfdi oFDIit + ξit+1.
On the second line, we subtract ωit on both sides. On the third line, ∆ωit+1 stands
for ωit+1 − ωit, and g∗(ωit) stands for g(ωit) − ωit. This derivation shows that
estimating the effect of oFDIit on ωit+1, controlling flexibly for ωit, is fully equivalent
11A fact to illustrate this: 4 out of the 11 sectors have on average less than 7 firms per year with
outward FDI.
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to estimating the effect of oFDIit on ∆ωit+1, controlling flexibly for ωit.
12
3.5 Results
This section presents the main results of the paper in subsection 3.5.1 for the average
effect, 3.5.2. Checks for the validity of the model are presented in subsection 3.5.3
and robustness checks in subsections 3.5.4 and 3.5.5.
3.5.1 Estimation of the productivity gains
In this section we report our results. We start by confirming that there is a produc-
tivity premium for exporters and firms engaging in outward FDI. We then turn to
estimating the productivity gains after exporting. Finally, we report the main results
of this paper: the productivity gains after outward FDI.
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution in total factor productivity (TFP) by interna-
tionalization mode. We have used the productivity estimation from our preferred
specification which will be explained in detail later, but the productivity premia are
robust with regards to the measure of productivity used.13 Each curve shows the
density of the difference between the (log) productivity of the firm and the median
(log) productivity within the sector and year of that firm. As the variable is in
logs, the difference approximately has a percentage interpretation (e.g. a value of
1.1 indicates that the firm is about 10 % more productive than the median firm
in that sector). The graph shows different curves for the following groups: firms
that only sell on the domestic market (’non exporters’), firms that export but not
engage in outward FDI (’exporters’) and firms that engage in outward FDI (’FDI’). It
illustrates that the usual ’productivity hierarchy’ also holds for our data: firms that
export are more productive than domestic firms, but firms that engage in outward
FDI are even more productive than exporters.
The ’productivity hierarchy’ is confirmed in our regression analysis, see table 3.4.
We regress productivity on dummies indicating whether the firm is an exporter or
has engaged in outward FDI. The productivity premium for all exporters including
the ones that engage in outward FDI is about 10% compared to firms that sell
only on the domestic market (column(1)). If we exclude the exporters that engage
in FDI, the productivity premium reduces to about 8.5%. Including dummies for
exporting and outward FDI shows that firms that engage in outward FDI have an
additional productivity premium of about 13%, controlling for export status. The
fourth column distinguishes between outward FDI in former Yugoslavia (’ex Yu’)
countries and other countries (’non ex Yu’). Firms with outward FDI in former
12Appendix 3.E illustrates this in detail for labor productivity.
13To show this, we have put the results for labor productivity in appendix 3.D. For figure 3.1
and table 3.5, we have used the same productivity estimation as in column (6) of table 3.6.
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Figure 3.1: Productivity distribution
Footnote: The graph shows the log productivity for firms that only sell on the domestic market
(’non exporters’), firms that export but not engage in outward FDI (’exporters’) and firms that
engage in outward FDI (’FDI’). The median value of the sector-year (log) productivity is subtracted
to center the graph.
Yugoslavia have a slightly lower productivity premium that firms with outward FDI
in other countries, but the difference is not statistically significant.
Next, we focus on the productivity gains after internationalization: can part of
these productivity differences be explained by firms increasing their productivity after
entry into foreign markets? We start by re-establishing the results for productivity
gains after exporting. The results are shown in table 3.5. Note that the table is
not the result of a single regression, but is obtained from the iterative procedure
explained in the methodology section, where the productivity gains coefficients and
productivity are jointly determined. The results should be interpreted as follows: we
estimate the effect of export status in the current period, denoted et, on productivity
in the next period, denoted ωt+1. As shown in section 3.4.3, this parameter can
also be interpreted as the effect of export status in the current period et on the
productivity growth from t to t+ 1. The first column of the table shows the results
for estimating the AR(1) productivity evolution process in equation (3.11), assuming
the same production function parameters across the entire manufacturing industry.
The estimated parameter on lagged productivity is high and close to one, as expected
because productivity is thought of as being persistent. The parameter γ on lagged
export status is economically and statistically significant: exporting in the previous
CHAPTER 3. PRODUCTIVITY GAINS AFTER OUTWARD FDI: EVIDENCE
FROM SLOVENIA 89
Table 3.4: Productivity premia for export and outward FDI status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ω ω ω ω
Export 0.0983∗∗ 0.0840∗∗ 0.0827∗∗ 0.0826∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103)
Outward FDI 0.129∗∗
(0.0211)
Outward FDI (ex-YU) 0.0917∗∗
(0.0238)
Outward FDI (non ex-YU) 0.117∗∗
(0.0311)
Time × Sector FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 16534 15130 16534 16534
R2 0.495 0.488 0.503 0.504
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a The dependent variable ω is (log) productivity. The rows represent the internationalization
status of the firm.
b Column (1) shows the premium for all exporters, column (2) for exporters without a foreign
investment, column(3) shows the premium for firms with a foreign investment and column(4)
distinguished between foreign investment in former Yugoslavia and in other coutries.
period is associated with a productivity gain in the next period of approximately
1%. In the second column, we allow for a more general productivity process, with a
general function of past productivity ωt (proxied by a 4th order polynomial) and
still an additive effect of exports. The coefficient is slightly lower, but still of the
same order of magnitude. The third column assumes the same productivity evolution
process as the second column, but now we estimate the production function sector by
sector, and pool over all sectors to estimate the productivity gain. The estimate is
close to the previous estimates. In the final column, we control for inward FDI of the
firm. Firms that are taken over, are generally found to increase their productivity.
Therefore we want to verify whether the productivity gain is indeed due to exporting,
rather than due to firms being taken over. The results show that inward FDI indeed
has a positive effect on future productivity, but also that the coefficient on exporting
is not drastically affected.
Now we turn to the main results of our paper, shown in table 3.6. The first
column shows the estimation of specification (3.13), estimated by assuming the
same production function parameters for the entire manufacturing industry. Again,
productivity is persistent over time. As we found productivity gains after exporting,
it is important to keep controlling for export status. The coefficient on export
status is not affected. We also find an additional productivity gain after outward
FDI. Having an investment abroad increases next year’s productivity level by 0.6%
according to the specification in column (1). The effect decreases but is still positive
in column (2), where we estimate the more general productivity function according to
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Table 3.5: Productivity gains after exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ωt+1 ωt+1 ωt+1 ωt+1
ωt 0.919
∗∗
(0.00636)
et 0.0104
∗∗ 0.00771∗∗ 0.0101∗∗ 0.00990∗∗
(0.00239) (0.00239) (0.00326) (0.00235)
InwFDIt 0.00971
∗∗
(0.00282)
Time × sector effects yes yes yes yes
Polynomial in ωt no yes yes yes
Production function per sector no no yes yes
Observations 12877 12877 12877 12877
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a This table is not the result of a single regression, but is obtained from the iterative procedure
explained in the methodology section, where the productivity gains coefficients and
productivity are jointly determined.
b All specifications estimate the effect of the row variables on productivity ωt+1. All variables
are in logs. Sector-year effects are included in all stages of the estimation procedure.
c All row variables are lagged one year with regards to ωt+1. ωt is lagged productivity, et is the
lagged export status (1 if the firm exported the previous year, 0 otherwise) and InwFDIt is a
dummy indicating whether the firm is foreign owned (1 if the firm was foreign owned the
previous year, 0 otherwise).
d Column (1) fits the AR(1) productivity model of equation (3.11) to the data, Column (2)
allows for a general evolution of productivity with an additive effect of lagged export status,
Column(3) estimates (2) by sector and then pools across industries to find a common
productivity gain after exporting, Column (4) estimates (2) but controlling for inward FDI.
equation (3.14), allowing for exporting to impact future productivity heterogeneously.
The third column shows the estimation of equation (3.14) allowing for different
production function parameters per sector. The results suggest a positive effect of
outward FDI on productivity, but the effect is relatively low. The last three columns
are the equivalent of the first three columns, but distinguishing between investments
in former Yugoslavia and investments in other regions. The reason we do this, is
that most of the channels through which the learning effects could take place, would
not be present for outward FDI in former Yugoslavia. Knowledge spillovers from the
local market will be less important, as these markets should be relatively well known
to the firms. Slovenia was in terms of GDP per capita by far the most advanced
country of former Yugoslavia,14 so we expect the markets in the other countries to be
less demanding, and the firms to be generally speaking less productive. In addition,
the break up of ex-Yugoslavia created a situation where some of the affiliates that
Slovenian firms had in other parts of ex-Yugoslavia before 1990 were nationalized by
14The GDP per capita in 1998 was respectively about 2, 5, 9 and 6 times as high as the one for
Croatia, Serbia (and Montenegro), Bosnia (and Herzegovina) and Macedonia according to the data
of the World Bank.
CHAPTER 3. PRODUCTIVITY GAINS AFTER OUTWARD FDI: EVIDENCE
FROM SLOVENIA 91
new states and later re-acquired by Slovenian parent companies during the second
part of the 1990s. For these reasons, the scope for learning effects from outward FDI
in that region seems limited. The results confirm that the productivity gains after
outward FDI in former Yugoslavia were very low at best, and even slightly negative
according to column (6). The productivity gains after investments in countries
outside of former Yugoslavia were substantial: productivity increases by about 1.5%
according to the most flexible specification, shown in column (6).
We can summarize our results as follows: we find substantial productivity gains
after entry in foreign markets. First, we re-confirm that the productivity gains
after exporting. Second, we find substantial productivity gains after investing
abroad, the main result of this paper, while controlling for the export status. The
productivity gains after outward FDI are modest when pooling over all destinations:
having an investment abroad in the previous period raises current productivity
with approximately 0.6%. If we distinguish between the destinations, we find that
productivity gains after investments in countries outside of former Yugoslavia were
substantially higher, in total about 1.1-1.6% depending on the specification, while we
do not find evidence for productivity gains after investments in countries of former
Yugoslavia.
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Table 3.6: Productivity gains after outward FDI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ωt+1 ωt+1 ωt+1 ωt+1 ωt+1 ωt+1
ωt 0.918
∗∗ 0.919∗∗
(0.00646) (0.00649)
et 0.0111
∗∗ 0.0114∗∗
(0.00244) (0.00243)
OutwFDIt 0.00641
∗ 0.00366 0.00688+
(0.00265) (0.00251) (0.00355)
OutwFDIt (ex-Yu) 0.00296 0.00144 -0.00134
(0.00318) (0.00301) (0.00437)
OutwFDIt (non ex-Yu) 0.0132
∗∗ 0.0116∗∗ 0.0154∗∗
(0.00347) (0.00322) (0.00513)
Time × sector effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial in ωt and et no yes yes no yes yes
Prod. function per sector no no yes no no yes
Observations 12877 12877 12877 12877 12877 12877
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a This table is not the result of a single regression, but is obtained from the iterative procedure
explained in the methodology section, where the productivity gains coefficients and
productivity are jointly determined.
b All specifications estimate the effect of the row variables on productivity ωt+1. All variables
are in logs. Sector-year effects are included in all stages of the estimation procedure.
c All row variables are lagged one year with regards to ωt+1. ωt is lagged productivity, et is a
dummy indicating the lagged export status of the firm and OutwFDIt is a dummy indicating
the lagged outward FDI status.
d Column (1) fits the AR(1) productivity model to the data of equation (3.13), column (2)
allows for a general evolution of productivity and controls flexibly for past export status
according to equation(3.14), column(3) estimates (3.14) by sector and then pools across
industries to find a common productivity gain after outward FDI. The last three columns are
the equivalent of the first three, but distinguishing between outward FDI in former Yugoslavia
(’ex-Yu’) and FDI in other countries (’non ex-Yu’).
3.5.2 Heterogeneity of the productivity gains
In this subsection, we first investigate to what extent the productivity gains is
heterogeneous in the initial productivity of the firm. Next, we show how this effect
evolves over time.
To incorporate the heterogeneity of the productivity gains in initial productivity
of the firm, we modify equation (3.14) by adding an interaction term between lagged
productivity and outward FDI status. The productivity evolution process then
becomes:
ωit+1 = g(ωit, eit) + γ1,fdi oFDIit + γ2,fdi oFDIit × ωit + ξit+1. (3.15)
We use the same estimation algorithm as before, apart from the different productivity
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evolution (3.15), and focus on the estimation with the same production function
parameters for the entire manufacturing industry.15 The results are shown in table
3.7. The first column shows the estimation of the linear AR(1) productivity model
with extra interaction terms et × ωt and OutwFDIt × ωt, while colum (2) allows for
a general evolution of productivity and interaction with export status.
For firms investing outside former Yugoslavia, we find consist results: the pro-
ductivity gains are stronger for initially more productive firms. The results from the
table should be interpreted over the relevant range of productivity. Therefore, we
included figure 3.2 to illustrate the effect found in column (2). The graph shows the
relevant range of productivity, with the vertical dashed lines indicating respectively
the 10th and 90th percentile of productivity for firms engaging in outward FDI out-
side ex-Yugoslavia. Remember that total factor productivity is inherently a relative
concept, so the values on the x-axis have no direct interpretation as such. They
should be compared to a reference value, for instance the median log productivity
which we indicate below the graph. The black full line indicates the estimation of
the effect, while the gray dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval.16 We
see that the effect only is statistically significant for the initially most productive
firms. The effect is 0.0084 for the initial median productivity and 0.025 for the 90th
percentile. We also estimated the effect when adding a second order interaction
term γ3,fdi oFDIit × ω2it to specification 3.15. The result is shown in figure 3.3. The
general conclusion is the same: the effect is stronger for the initially most productive.
However, this specification also illustrates that the effect does not increase linearly
in initial productivity: an increase in initial productivity increases the effect less for
high levels of initial productivity.
For firms investing in countries in former Yugoslavia, the results are less consistent
across specifications. Column (1) shows an effect comparable to the effect for
destinations outside former Yugoslavia, but in the more flexible model in column (2)
the effect become lower. The effect is illustrated in figure 3.3. It is is substantially
smaller than the effect for firms investing outside former Yugoslavia and statistically
insignificant over a large part of the range.
In summary, the results show that the productivity gains after outward FDI
increase with a higher initial productivity.
15We do this to limit the number of parameters to be estimated. Estimating a different production
function for each industry and allowing for further heterogeneity is difficult given the limited number
of firms engaging in outward FDI per sector.
16The variance is calculated according to the following formula: var( ∂ωit+1∂oFDIit ) = var(γ1,fdi) +
ω2itvar(γ2,fdi) + 2ωitcov(γ1,fdiγ2,fdi).
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Table 3.7: Productivity gains after outward FDI - heterogeneity with regards to
initial productivity
(1) (2)
ωt+1 ωt+1
ωt 0.901
∗∗
(0.0199)
et -0.0953
(0.131)
et × ωt 0.0170
(0.0208)
OutwFDIt (ex-Yu) -0.265
∗∗ -0.158∗
(0.0790) (0.0770)
OutwFDIt (ex-Yu) ×ωt 0.0420∗∗ 0.0252∗
(0.0125) (0.0122)
OutwFDIt (non ex-Yu) -0.254
∗ -0.355∗∗
(0.110) (0.123)
OutwFDIt (non ex-Yu) ×ωt 0.0414∗ 0.0574∗∗
(0.0172) (0.0194)
Time × sector effects yes yes
Polynomial in ωt and et no yes
Prod. function per sector no no
Observations 12877 12877
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a This table is not the result of a single regression, but is obtained from the iterative procedure
explained in the methodology section, where the productivity gains coefficients and
productivity are jointly determined.
b All specifications estimate the effect of the row variables on productivity ωt+1. All variables
are in logs. Sector-year effects are included in all stages of the estimation procedure.
c All row variables are lagged one year with regards to ωt+1. ωt is lagged productivity, et is a
dummy indicating the lagged export status of the firm and OutwFDIt is a dummy indicating
the lagged outward FDI status.
d Column (1) fits the AR(1) productivity model to the data of equation (3.13) with extra
interaction terms et × ωt and OutwFDIt × ωt, column (2) allows for a general evolution of
productivity and controls flexibly for past export status according to equation(3.15).
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Figure 3.2: Heterogeneity of productivity gains after outward FDI outside former
Yugoslavia with regards to initial productivity - linear model
Footnote: The vertical dashed lines indicate the 10th and 90th percentile of the productivity distri-
bution of firms that engaged in outward FDI outside former Yugoslavia. The median productivity
is 6.34 according to the model of table 3.7, column (2). The gray dashed lines indicate the 95%
confidence interval.
Figure 3.3: Heterogeneity of productivity gains after outward FDI outside former
Yugoslavia with regards to initial productivity - quadratic model
Footnote: The vertical dashed lines indicate the 10th and 90th percentile of the productivity distri-
bution of firms that engaged in outward FDI outside former Yugoslavia. The median productivity
is 6.52 according to the quadratic interaction model. The gray dashed lines indicate the 95%
confidence interval.
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Figure 3.4: Heterogeneity of productivity gains after outward FDI in former
Yugoslavia with regards to initial productivity - quadratic model
Footnote: The vertical dashed lines indicate the 10th and 90th percentile of the productivity distri-
bution of firms that engaged in outward FDI outside former Yugoslavia. The median productivity
is 6.31 according to the model of table 3.7, column (2). The gray dashed lines indicate the 95%
confidence interval.
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We also check how the effect evolves over time. To this end, we include separate
dummies in equation (3.14) for ’recent’ outward FDI and ’old’ outward FDI. We
define recent outward FDI at the firm level as a firm engaging in outward FDI for
the first time no longer than three years ago. From three years onwards, we consider
the FDI ’old’.17 The results are shown in table 3.8. The coefficient on ’recent’ FDI is
close to 0, while the coefficient on ’old’ FDI is larger than the baseline average effect
of subsection 3.5.1. In summary, these results suggest that it takes some years before
the firms that engage in outward FDI start experiencing higher productivity gains.
Table 3.8: Productivity gains after outward FDI - evolution over time
(1) (2)
ωt+1 ωt+1
ωt 0.920
∗∗
(0.00661)
et 0.0114
∗∗
(0.00242)
’recent’ OutwFDIt (ex-Yu) -0.000688 -0.00120
(0.00475) (0.00460)
’old’ OutwFDIt (ex-Yu) 0.00326 0.000907
(0.00446) (0.00423)
’recent’ OutwFDIt (non ex-Yu) 0.00322 0.00198
(0.00595) (0.00610)
’old’ OutwFDIt (non ex-Yu) 0.0190
∗∗ 0.0179∗∗
(0.00453) (0.00400)
Time × sector effects yes yes
Polynomial in ωt and et no yes
Prod. function per sector no no
Observations 12568 12568
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a This table is not the result of a single regression, but is obtained from the iterative procedure
explained in the methodology section, where the productivity gains coefficients and
productivity are jointly determined.
b All specifications estimate the effect of the row variables on productivity ωt+1. All variables
are in logs. Sector-year effects are included in all stages of the estimation procedure.
c All row variables are lagged one year with regards to ωt+1. ωt is lagged productivity, et is a
dummy indicating the lagged export status of the firm and OutwFDIt is a dummy indicating
the lagged outward FDI status. See text for the definition of ’recent’ and ’old’ FDI.
d Column (1) fits the AR(1) productivity model to the data of equation (3.13), column (2)
allows for a general evolution of productivity and controls flexibly for past export status
according to equation(3.15).
17Our results are robust to taking another time frame, e.g. 2 years. We exclude observations for
the first years for firms that engaged in FDI already in 1994, the start of the dataset, as it is not
possible to know when these firms invested abroad for the first time. As a robustness check, we
also included these observations in the ’old’ FDI, the results stay qualitatively the same.
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3.5.3 Checking the assumptions of the model
The use of the production function estimation techniques assume that all firms have
the same technology parameters. One might be worried that this does not hold
for firms that engage in outward FDI. Firm engaging in outward FDI could have a
different production structure because they have a different vertical structure, e.g. if
they outsource some of there activities. So a firm outsourcing the least profitable part
of production to an affiliate abroad, while likely have a higher measured productivity
of the part that remains in Slovenia. There are four reasons to be confident that this
is not driving our results.
First, the timing assumption in the structural model is that the outward FDI
status in the current year t impacts future productivity next year (t + 1). If the
effect is purely due to outsourcing, we would expect a discrete jump in measured
productivity at the time of entry (denoted ’period 0’) into the foreign market. Upon
entry however, the firm did not have outward FDI in the previous period, so we
will not attribute this jump in productivity to a productivity gain after outward
FDI. In addition, in the periods after entry (’period 1’ and further), the jump in
productivity is accounted for, as in our estimation algorithm we flexibly control for
past productivity. We only use the productivity gains from period 1 onwards to
identify productivity gains after outward FDI.
Second, if the main reason why firms invest abroad was to reallocate parts of their
production abroad, we would expect a reduction in employment after the investment.
However, the results in table 3.9 suggest that firms investing abroad increase rather
than reduce employment after the investment. The results are obtained by regressing
the logarithm of employment on the dummies for export and outward FDI status,
including firm fixed effects and sector-time fixed effects.
Table 3.9: Employment evolution
(1) (2) (3)
l l l
Export 0.121∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.120∗∗
(0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0147)
OutwFDI 0.0690∗
(0.0320)
OutwFDI (non ex-Yu) 0.0809
(0.0521)
OutwFDI (ex-Yu) 0.0303
(0.0374)
Time × sector effects yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes
Observations 16534 16534 16534
R2 0.081 0.082 0.082
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a The dependent variable is (log) employment.
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Third, the heterogeneous effect across destinations found in the previous section
makes sense. The rest of former Yugoslavia was economically less developed than
Slovenia, and as they were a single country just before the start of our data, we do
not expect that Slovenian firms learn from investing in this region. This is exactly
what the results show: we only find productivity gains after outward foreign direct
investment to destinations outside of former Yugoslavia.
Fourth, we performed a rough test in the data to check whether the production
structure is systematically different for firms engaging in outward FDI compared
to the other firms in the industry. We check how the ratio of value added and
sales compares to the industry median. If e.g. the outward FDI consists mainly of
outsourcing, we would expect that they systematically have a lower value added over
sales ratio, because part of the value added of the firm is generated abroad. To check
this, we regressed the value added over sales ratio on a dummy for exports and a
dummy for outward FDI, see table 3.10. The first three columns of the table illustrate
that firms engaging in outward FDI do not have a systematically different value
added over sales ratio compared to other firms. The density graph for the difference
between the value added of the firm and the sector-year median, shown in figure 3.5,
even shows that the distribution is concentrated around the sector-year mean, with
less variation than for the other groups. However, when including firm fixed effects in
the final two columns, we see that firms investing abroad tend to decrease their value
added over sales ratio. The coefficients are statistically significant for outward FDI
and outward FDI in former Yugoslavia, and is at the limit of statistical significance
for outward FDI outside former Yugoslavia. In terms of magnitude, the coefficient
represents less than 5% for the average firm.18 So there is no strong evidence for a
systematic large change in production structure, but still some evidence that the
value added over sales ratio declined. Therefore, we take the use of materials into
account in the next subsection, where we use a gross output production function and
find qualitatively similar results as in our main specification.
18The average firm has a value added over sales ratio of about 0.35, firms with outward FDI on
average 0.33. If we take the coefficient of the fourth column, -0.0164, engaging in outward FDI
reduces the value added ratio by about 4.7%(=−0.0164/0.35× 100%).
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Table 3.10: Value added / sales ratio by internationalization status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VA/Sales VA/Sales VA/Sales VA/Sales VA/Sales
Export -0.0568∗∗ -0.0564∗∗ -0.0567∗∗ -0.0111∗∗ -0.0111∗∗
(0.00607) (0.00610) (0.00611) (0.00368) (0.00368)
OutwFDI -0.00369 -0.0164∗∗
(0.00855) (0.00627)
OutwFDI (ex-Yu) 0.00703 -0.0152∗∗
(0.0101) (0.00523)
OutwFDI (non ex-Yu) -0.0142 -0.0174
(0.0123) (0.0110)
Time × sector effects yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effect no no no yes yes
Observations 16534 16534 16534 16534 16534
R2 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.834 0.834
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a We regress the ratio of value added and sales on different dummies for export
and outward FDI.
Figure 3.5: Ratio value added / sales
Footnote: The median value of the sector-year value added over sales ratio is subtracted to center
the graph.
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3.5.4 Robustness check: gross output production function
As a robustness check, we estimate a gross output production function. A gross
output production function allows substitution between materials and the other
factors of production, i.e. labor and capital. This relaxes the implied assumption of
using valued added as output measure that a fixed proportion of materials is used for
producing a unit of output. We make use of the same law of motion as specified in
the methodology section, see expressions (3.13) and (3.14). To identify the coefficient
on materials, we use the following moment condition:
E[ξit+1|mit] = 0, (3.16)
in addition to the moment conditions in expressions (3.8) and (3.9).
The results can be found in table 3.11. This is a replication of table 3.6, but with
a gross output production function rather than a value added production function.
We see that the results are similar. We find a positive effect of outward FDI on future
productivity only in the first column, but this is not robust across specifications,
see columns 2 and 3. Columns 4 to 6 consistently show a positive effect of outward
FDI in destinations outside of ex-Yugoslavia, while the evidence for outward FDI in
ex-Yugoslavia countries is mixed. The effect in column 6 is about one third of the
effect we found in our value added specification, but this is not necessarily unrealistic.
As shown in Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2011), the heterogeneity in productivity
tends to be less pronounced for gross output production function estimates than
for value added production function estimates. This is also true for our estimates:
for the value added production function estimation, the ratio of the 90th percentile
and the 10th percentile of productivity within a sector is between 1.5 and 2.3 for
the central year in our dataset, 1998. For the gross output production function
estimation, this ratio is between 1.13 and 1.46, confirming there is substantially less
heterogeneity. Therefore, the gross output production function estimate of the effect
of outward FDI on the future productivity level, is also likely to be smaller, and this
is confirmed by our results.
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Table 3.11: Productivity gains after outward FDI - gross output production function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ωt+1 ωt+1 ωt+1 ωt+1 ωt+1 ωt+1
ωt 0.800
∗∗ 0.786∗∗
(0.0302) (0.0317)
et 0.0125
∗∗ 0.0116∗∗
(0.00212) (0.00205)
OutwFDIt 0.0161
∗∗ 0.00168 -0.0000520
(0.00330) (0.00123) (0.00153)
OutwFDIt (ex-Yu) 0.00982
∗∗ -0.000143 -0.00142
(0.00278) (0.00137) (0.00157)
OutwFDIt (non ex-Yu) 0.0169
∗∗ 0.00501∗∗ 0.00429∗
(0.00343) (0.00145) (0.00203)
Time × sector effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial in ωt and et no yes yes no yes yes
Prod. function per sector no no yes no no yes
Observations 12877 12877 12542 12877 12877 12542
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a This table is not the result of a single regression, but is obtained from the iterative procedure
explained in the methodology section, where the productivity gains parameters and
productivity are jointly determined.
b All specifications estimate the effect of the row variables on productivity ωt. All variables are in
logs. Sector-year effects are included in all stages of the estimation procedure.
c All row variables are lagged one year with regards to ωt+1. ωt is lagged productivity, et is a
dummy indicating the lagged export status of the firm and OutwFDIt is a dummy indicating
the lagged outward FDI status.
d Column (1) fits the AR(1) productivity model to the data of equation (3.13), Column (2)
allows for a general evolution of productivity and controls flexibly for past export status
according to equation(3.14), Column(3) estimates (3.14) by sector and then pools across
industries to find a common productivity gain after outward FDI. The last three columns are
the equivalent of the first three, but distinguishing between outward FDI in former Yugoslavia
(’ex-Yu’) and FDI in other countries (’non ex-Yu’). In columns (3) and (6), we drop sector 10
because it gives unrealistic coefficients of the production function, e.g. a negative labor
coefficient. Possibly the estimation algorithm is too demanding for the limited number of
observations in this sector, as this is the smallest sector in the sample.
3.5.5 Robustness check: regression based approach with la-
bor productivity
As an additional robustness check, and to illustrate that the effect we pick up is
not introduced in one of the steps of the complex algorithm, we present some basic
straight-forward regressions in this section. Remember that the effect in our algorithm
is identified from the law of motion as in expressions (3.13) and (3.14). Intuitively
speaking, we estimate the effect of outward FDI in period t on the productivity level
of the next period t+ 1, controlling for relevant variables such as past productivity
and export status. To simplify this, we mimic our main table taking a standard
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regression approach and a simple productivity measure, i.e. labor productivity,
defined as value added per worker. We run variations of the following regression:
lprit+1 = ρ lprit + γe eit + γfdi oFDIit + dst + it, (3.17)
where lprit stands for (log) labor productivity and dst is a year-sector interaction
dummy.
The results can be found in table 3.12. In these regressions, lagged outward FDI
in general already has a positive coefficient (see columns 1 to 3), but the effect is
more pronounced for destinations outside of ex-Yugoslavia (columns 4 to 6).
Table 3.12: Productivity gains after outward FDI - labor productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lprt+1 lprt+1 lprt+1 lprt+1 lprt+1 lprt+1
lprt 0.778
∗∗ 0.778∗∗
(0.00834) (0.00835)
et 0.0126
+ 0.0152∗ 0.0138∗ 0.0126+ 0.0153∗ 0.0138∗
(0.00678) (0.00651) (0.00660) (0.00678) (0.00650) (0.00659)
OutwFDIt 0.0294
∗∗ 0.0305∗∗ 0.0309∗∗
(0.00918) (0.00803) (0.00791)
OutwFDIt (ex-Yu) 0.0179 0.0163
+ 0.0171+
(0.0109) (0.00959) (0.00944)
OutwFDIt (non ex-Yu) 0.0313
∗ 0.0346∗∗ 0.0346∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0116) (0.0116)
Time × sector effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial in lprt and et no yes yes no yes yes
Polynomial per sector no no yes no no yes
Observations 12877 12877 12877 12877 12877 12877
R2 0.706 0.718 0.722 0.707 0.718 0.722
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a All specifications estimate the effect of the row variables on labor productivity, defined as value
added per worker. All variables are in logs. Sector-year effects are included in all regressions.
b All row variables are lagged one year with regards to lprt+1. lprt is lagged productivity, et is a
dummy indicating the lagged export status of the firm and OutwFDIt is a dummy indicating
the lagged outward FDI status.
c Column (1) estimates specification (3.17), column (2) uses the terms of a fourth order
polynomial of lprt and et as a regressors, column(3) is the equivalent of column (2), but with
estimates by sector and then pooling across industries to find a common productivity gain after
outward FDI. The last three columns are the equivalent of the first three, but distinguishing
between outward FDI in former Yugoslavia (’ex-Yu’) and FDI in other countries (’non ex-Yu’).
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on productivity gains after outward FDI. We use
data on Slovenian manufacturing firms in the period 1994-2002. In this period the
country experienced rapid productivity growth, structural changes of its economy,
and a further increase in international exposure of its firms. It therefore offers an
interesting setting to check for productivity gains due to this internationalization
process. We investigate whether firms investing abroad experience productivity gains
in their domestic plants.
The results of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, we confirm an
established fact in the literature: exporters are more productive than non-exporters,
and firms investing abroad are even more productive. We apply and adapt the
methodology on learning by exporting, as developed in De Loecker (2013) and
Van Biesebroeck (2005), to look for productivity gains after outward FDI. We find
evidence for productivity gains: our results show that part of the productivity
premium of firms investing abroad is due to productivity gains after entry. The
productivity gains only occur for investing in countries outside of former Yugoslavia.
The gains are larger for initially more productive firms, suggesting that absorptive
capacity is important: firms may learn more when they are already at a higher level of
productivity. The productivity gains do not occur immediately after the investment,
it takes some years before the productivity gains occur. Possible explanations are
that learning from foreign markets takes time to impact the domestic plants or
optimizing the functioning of the firm after the investment abroad takes some years.
Outward FDI is a possible source of productivity gains for the domestic plants,
notably for the most productive ones. This provides an argument for the claim that
policy makers should foster the ‘stars’ among the domestic firms and facilitate their
expansion abroad where possible.
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3.A Appendix: detailed data description
The data are deflated in the following way. Materials and value added have been
deflated using the producer price index (at the 2-digit NACE industry level). For
capital we have used the CPI.
We carefully cleaned the data for outliers in the following way: observations with
extreme values for growth rates (smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than the
99th percentile) in value added, capital or labor have been dropped. We retained
only observations with positive values for materials, sales, value added and tangible
fixed assets.
The different sectors are defined in line with the EU KLEMS database industry
classification. Using this classification reduces the 22 NACE rev.1 two digit codes
to 11 sectors. We do this to ensure that we have enough observation per sector to
perform the data demanding algorithms and prefer this over arbitrarily dropping two
digit codes that can be considered too small. The definition of the different sectors
can be found in table 3.16, together with the estimations of the production function.
3.B Appendix: difference-in-differences approach
3.B.1 Relation between our procedure and the DID approach
In this subsection, we show the relation between our estimation procedure and
the difference-in-differences (DID) approach. It is instructive to show what the
timing assumptions in the model mean. In doing so, we show that the bias for DID
estimation is no longer present when productivity is correctly estimated.
For simplicity, we stick to the simplest possible setting. We return to the learning
by exporting framework of the simplest functional form:
ωit+1 = ρωit + γeit + ξit+1. (3.18)
What we do in a DID framework, is taking a comparable firm to benchmark the
productivity evolution against. The idea is that if the productivity increase observed
after entry into export markets, is also observed for comparable firms, it cannot be
attributed to learning by exporting. However, estimating productivity relying on an
exogenous evolution process and then using the difference in differences framework
is not consistent (De Loecker, 2013) as the increase in output due to productivity
risks to be attributed to an increase in inputs.
However, when productivity is estimated correctly, DID yields unbiased estimates
of the productivity gains again.19 To develop this reasoning, we stick to a simple
and intuitive DID framework. We compare the difference over time between the
19Contrary to what is mentioned in De Loecker (2013) However the main point of his paper is
still valid: relying on an exogenous productivity evolution framework does not allow for learning by
exporting.
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treated firm, with index i, and the control firm, with index j. The difference over
time is obtained by substracting the productivity before treatment, denoted ωit−1,
from the productivity after treatment, denoted ωit+s). So for a single firm that
starts to export and one corresponding control firm, the estimated treatment effect
becomes: (ωit+s − ωit−1)− (ωjt+s − ωjt−1). Note that to simplify, we have assumed
that ’before treatment’ is period -1, and the treatment effect is measured in period
s, with s the time between entry at time 0 and the period under consideration. In
the framework developed in the previous subsection, there will not be an increase
in productivity in period 0 (the period that the firm enters the export market),
as the productivity evolution process assumes that only the first lag of exporting
affects productivity. We see what happens in the DID framework with a produc-
tivity that evolves according to specification (3.18), and that is consistently estimated.
Period −1: before entry
The matching process prior to the difference in differences calculation has made sure
that (on average) the productivity of the control firm j is equal to the productivity
of the ’treated’ firm i:
ωit−1 = ωjt−1. (3.19)
Period 0: the ’treated’ firm enters the export market
Productivity for both firms evolves according to (3.18): ωi/j,0 = ρωi/j,−1 + γei/j,−1 +
ξi/j,0. For both firms, there is no productivity effect of exporting as ei/j,−1 = 0
(abbreviation that we use for ei,−1 = 0 and ej,−1 = 0). So our difference in differences
estimate becomes:
(ωi,0 − ωi,−1)− (ωj,0 − ωj,−1)
≡(ρωi,−1 + ξi,0 − ωi,−1)− (ρωj,−1 + ξj,0 − ωj,−1)
=(ρ− 1)(ωi,−1 − ωj,−1) + ξi,0 − ξj,0
⇒E[(ωi,0 − ωi,−1)− (ωj,0 − ωj,−1)|ei,0 = 1, ej,0 = 0, ei/j,−1 = 0] = 0.
This is 0 in expected value, taking into account (3.19) and the assumption that ξ is
zero mean.
Period 1: the ’treated’ firm has entered the export market last period:
Now a difference in productivity arises. Productivity for both firms evolves according
to (3.18): ωi/j,0 = ρωi/j,−1 + γei/j,−1 + ξi/j,0, but only for the treated firm i the export
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status ei,0 = 1. The DID estimate for this period becomes:
(ωi,1 − ωi,−1)− (ωj,1 − ωj,−1)
≡(ρωi,0 + γ + ξi,1 − ωi,−1)− (ρωj,0 + ξj,1 − ωj,−1)
≡(ρ(ρωi,−1 + ξi,0) + γ + ξi,1 − ωi,−1)− (ρ(ρωj,−1 + ξj,0) + ξj,1 − ωj,−1)
=(ρ2 − 1)(ωi,−1 − ωj,−1) + γ + ρ(ξi,1 − ξj,1) + (ξi,0 − ξj,0)
⇒E[(ωi,1 − ωi,−1)− (ωj,1 − ωj,−1)|ei,0 = 1, ei,−1 = 0, ej,0/−1 = 0] = γ
Period 2 and further:
For period 2, the total learning effect would become:
E[(ωi,2 − ωi,−1)− (ωj,2 − ωj,−1)|ei,1/0 = 1, ei,−1 = 0, ej,1/0/−1 = 0] = (1 + ρ)γ
E[(ωi,∞ − ωi,−1)− (ωj,∞ − ωj,−1)|ei,t≥0 = 1, ei,t<0 = 0, ej,. = 0] = γ/(1− ρ)
Again, it is instructive to summarize what we have learned from this analysis.
First, we can conclude that under this productivity evolution process, the DID
estimates do yield consistent estimates, but only if productivity is consistently
estimated, so including the export status in the production function estimation
algorithm.20 The second and most important point: when correctly estimating
the production function, the learning by exporting effect is estimated jointly with
the production function coefficients, so there is no need to do an additional DID
estimation.
3.B.2 Illustration with labor productivity
Our main methodology identifies productivity gains both through firms that are
already involved in outward FDI, and firms that engage in outward FDI for the
first time during the period of the data. This is convenient in our context, as the
number of observations with ’new’ outward FDI is very limited, as shown in table
3.1 of the data section. To illustrate the difference with methods that rely fully on
the observations with ’new’ outward FDI for identification of the coefficient, we also
report a regression with firm fixed effects and labor productivity as the dependent
variable, see table 3.13. As expected the coefficient on outward FDI is not statistically
significant. For the export dummy, we have a statistically significant coefficient, as
shown in column 1, and we also show that inward FDI has a positive and statistically
significant coefficient in column 4. The results for the export dummy illustrate that
a relatively modest effect can be significant if the standard error is small enough, i.e.
there are enough changes in export status. The results for inward FDI illustrate that
if the effect is large enough, it can be significant despite of the limited number of
changes in inward FDI status. For outward FDI, we find a positive coefficient, but
20When not including the export status, the DID estimates will be most likely downward biased,
see De Loecker (2013) for a detailed discussion
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with a p-value of 0.22 for the coefficient on outward FDI outside of ex-Yugoslavia.
Ideally of course, our results should be robust to using this kind of specifications, but
the limited number of changes in outward FDI status undoubtedly makes it difficult
in a firm fixed effects context to pick up the modest increase in productivity that we
find in the other specifications.21 However, note that a more precise estimation is
needed, that is using a matching approach to select ex-ante similar firms as a control
group, and then tracking the productivity evolution over time. This is something we
plan to do in a next version of the paper.
Table 3.13: Productivity gains after outward FDI - labor productivity with fixed
effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lprit lprit lprit lprit
et 0.0520
∗∗ 0.0519∗∗ 0.0518∗∗ 0.0503∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0152)
OutwFDIt 0.00300
(0.0257)
OutwFDIt (ex-Yu) -0.0136
(0.0285)
OutwFDIt (non ex-Yu) 0.0443
(0.0359)
InwFDIt 0.153
∗∗
(0.0353)
Time × sector effects yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 16534 16534 16534 16534
R2 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.111
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a All specifications estimate the effect of the row variables on labor productivity growth, with
labor productivity defined as value added per worker. All variables are in logs. Sector-year
effects are included in all regressions.
b lprt is labor productivity (defined as value added per worker), et is a dummy indicating the
export status of the firm and OutwFDIt is a dummy indicating the outward FDI status.
21To illustrate the limited number of changes in outward FDI outside of ex-Yugoslavia: we have
only 53 firms in our dataset that invest in a country outside of ex-YU for the first time in the period
observed and where we have data on at least the year before investing, the year when making the
investment and the first year after making the investment.
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3.C Appendix: further details on the productiv-
ity estimation methodology
3.C.1 Inversion equation to control for endogeneity
Equation (3.2) cannot be estimated using OLS, because of the simultaneity problem:
the firm’s optimal choice of inputs will generally be correlated with the part of
productivity that is observed by the firm, ωit. Olley and Pakes (1996) argue that it is
possible to control for ωit in the estimation process, if you assume that, conditional
on capital, a firm’s investment level is a strictly increasing function of its current
productivity ωit, that is
iit = ft(kit, ωit). (3.20)
The strict monotonicity assumption allows you to invert equation (3.20) as follows:
ωit = f
−1
t (kit, iit). (3.21)
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) propose to use input materials mit instead of investment
in equations (3.20) and (3.21). Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006) relax the
assumption in Olley and Pakes (1996) that labor is freely variable. Their inverted
equation therefore becomes the following (using materials as the proxy variable for
productivity):
mit = ft(ωit, lit, kit)⇒ ωit = f−1t (lit, kit,mit). (3.22)
3.C.2 Details on the estimation algorithm
The ’usual’ Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006) methodology is implemented as
follows. In the first stage, we estimate φit by running an OLS regression of (3.4)
including time dummies, yielding φˆit = yit− ˆit. Given a solution candidate22 (β˜l, β˜k),
we can calculate the estimates of the ξit’s in two steps. First, we take a candidate
solution (β˜l, β˜k) and use the estimate φˆit to compute the implied ωˆit as follows:
ωit(β˜k, β˜l) = φˆit − β˜k · kit − β˜l · lit. (3.23)
Second, we regress ωit+1 on a 4th order polynomial of ωit, a constant and time
dummies. The residuals from this regression are estimates of the ξit(β˜l, β˜k)’s. We
can now iterate this procedure to find the solution (βl, βk) that minimizes the sample
analogue to the moment conditions (3.8) and (3.9):
1
T
1
N
∑
t
∑
i
ξˆit+1(β˜l, β˜k) ·
(
kit+1
lit
)
. (3.24)
22As starting values we take the coefficients obtained by running an OLS regression of yit =
βk · kit + βl · lit + δt + ηit.
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At this point, it is useful for reasons of clarity to summarize the general assump-
tions that are taken in this approach:
1. The functional form assumption of expression (3.2) states that all firms (within
an industry) have the same technology parameters, and that existing produc-
tivity differences across firms or productivity evolutions within a firm over
time, are Hicks neutral. Output is driven by 3 factors: two inputs, labor and
capital, and by the state variable productivity (ωit).
2. Productivity is observed by the firm but not by the econometrician. The use
of materials ’reveals’ the productivity of the firm, see expression (3.22).
3. Productivity ωit evolves exogenously according to a first order Markov process
(expression (3.6)). That is, expected productivity in the next period only
depends on productivity in the current period. The firm cannot influence
the evolution of productivity. In addition, the firm knows how expected
productivity evolves, and uses this information to form expectations on its
productivity for next period.
4. The timing assumptions of when the inputs are decided upon, allow to construct
the moment conditions to identify the unknown parameters in the model: the
coefficient on the inputs βk and βl. In addition, an estimate of the unobserved
productivity ωit can be backed out of the model.
Our estimation of the productivity gains goes as follows. We start from a
Cobb-Douglas production function, with two inputs:
yit = βk · kit + βl · lit + ωit + it, (3.25)
where all variables are in logs and yit represents the output (value added), lit the
number of workers and kit the capital of firm i in time period t, ωit the productivity
shock observed by the firm and it is the iid error term capturing unanticipated
shocks and measurement error.
We rely on material demand to proxy for productivity, and follow De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012) in allowing internationalization status to affect optimal input
demand:23
23De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) argue that one needs to include the relevant variables
potentially affecting differences in input demand choices of the firms. The idea behind it, is that
firms with a higher demand for output, will, conditional on other inputs, use more materials in
order to produce a higher output. However, this reasoning seems to be relevant for gross output
production functions only, where firms can indeed produce more when using more materials inputs
and holding other inputs constant. When using value added as measure for output, the firm is
assumed to use a fixed proportion of materials for a unit of output, and therefore cannot increase
output by increasing materials, conditional on labor, capital and productivity. We therefore also
experimented with the basic materials demand function mit = ft(ωit, lit, kit) without including
dummies for export and outward FDI status, and found that the results are very similar.
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mit = ft(ωit, lit, kit, eit, oFDIit)⇒ ωit = f−1t (lit, kit,mit, eit, oFDIit). (3.26)
A major advantage of using a static input, such as materials, is that we do not
have to revisit the firm’s dynamic programming problemf˙ootnoteAs explained in
e.g. De Loecker (2011), De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and Doraszelski and
Jaumandreu (2013). In our setting, the materials used are the solution to the
firm’s short run profit maximization problem without dynamic implications. This in
contrast with using investment as a proxy variable, see Van Biesebroeck (2005) for
more details.
The first stage is used to estimate the expected output net from the unanticipated
shock, denoted φˆit = yit − ˆit. To this end, we approximate the following expression,
φit(lit, kit,mit, eit, oFDIit) = βk · kit + βl · lit + f−1t (lit, kit,mit, eit, oFDIit) ≡ yit− it,
(3.27)
by regression output yit on a 4th order polynomial in labor lit, capital kit, materials
mit and a dummy for export status eit, complemented with an additive dummy for
outward FDI. We also use time dummies (or sector-time interaction dummies in case
we estimate the effect over the pooled manufacturing sample).
Given a solution candidate,24 (β˜l, β˜k) we can calculate the estimates of the ξit’s in
two steps. As in the ’normal’ ACF procedure, we take a candidate solution (β˜l, β˜k)
and use the estimate φˆit to compute the implied ωˆit as in expression (3.23). Second,
we regress ωit+1 on a 4th order polynomial in ωit and the export status eit, and in
addition to a constant and time dummies, also on the dummy for outward FDI,
in line with expression (3.14). This can be iterated using the moment condtions
(3.8) and (3.9), to minimize the sample analogue in expression (3.24). Note that
the procedure directly yields us the parameter of interest, that is γFDI in expression
(3.14).
24As starting values we take the coefficients obtained by running an OLS regression of yit =
βk · kit + βl · lit + eit + oFDIit + δt + ηit.
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3.D Appendix: productivity premia labor produc-
tivity
Figure 3.6: Labor productivity distribution
Table 3.14: Productivity premia for export and outward FDI status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VA/l VA/l VA/l VA/l
Export 0.142∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.123∗∗
(0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184)
OutwFDI 0.162∗∗
(0.0300)
OutwFDI (ex-Yu) 0.124∗∗
(0.0361)
OutwFDI (non ex-Yu) 0.123∗∗
(0.0424)
Time × sector effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 16534 15130 16534 16534
R2 0.185 0.178 0.190 0.190
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a The dependent variable VA/l is (log) labor productivity, defined as value added per worker.
3.E Appendix: interpretation of the coefficient
This subsection further illustrates that the coefficient of interest picks up differences
in productivity growth, not just persistent productivity differentials between firms
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that did and firms that did not engage in outward FDI.
To this end, we use labor productivity growth as dependent variable rather than
the (log) level of labor productivity. We use variations of the following regression:
∆lprit+1 = φ lprit + γe eit + γfdi oFDIit + dst + it. (3.28)
The set up of this table is different from the previous tables. The first column
uses only the lagged export dummy as a regressor, the second column adds the lagged
outward FDI dummy as a regressor and the third column replaces the lagged outward
FDI dummy, by a dummy that distinguished between outward FDI in ex-Yugoslavia
and outward FDI in other countries. The first 3 columns do not show any significant
coefficient, which contradicts the earlier results. However, the expected effects appear
again when we control for the past labor productivity level, see columns 4 to 6. The
results show a negative relation between labor productivity growth from t and t+ 1
and the productivity level in t, suggesting that less productive firms catch up with
the firms that have a higher productivity. When controlling for this effect, we find a
positive coefficient on past export status and past outward FDI status, notably for
outward FDI in outside ex-Yugoslavia.
Table 3.15: Productivity gains after outward FDI - labor productivity growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆lprt+1 ∆lprt+1 ∆lprt+1 ∆lprt+1 ∆lprt+1 ∆lprt+1
lprt -0.221
∗∗ -0.222∗∗ -0.222∗∗
(0.00832) (0.00834) (0.00835)
et -0.00377 -0.00368 -0.00378 0.0163
∗ 0.0126+ 0.0126+
(0.00597) (0.00615) (0.00613) (0.00664) (0.00678) (0.00678)
OutwFDIt -0.000695 0.0294
∗∗
(0.00626) (0.00918)
OutwFDIt (ex-Yu) -0.00663 0.0179
(0.00745) (0.0109)
OutwFDIt (non ex-Yu) 0.0106 0.0313
∗
(0.00976) (0.0135)
Time × sector effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 12877 12877 12877 12877 12877 12877
R2 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.192 0.192 0.192
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a All specifications estimate the effect of the row variables on labor productivity growth from
year t to year t+ 1, with labor productivity defined as value added per worker. All variables
are in logs. Sector-year effects are included in all regressions.
b lprt is lagged productivity, et is a dummy indicating the lagged export status of the firm and
OutwFDIt is a dummy indicating the lagged outward FDI status.
Important to note here is that column (4) in table 3.12 and column (6) in table 3.15
114 3.F. Appendix: production function coefficients
show exactly the same point estimates. This is not a coincidence. The corresponding
regression specifications (3.17) and (3.28) are fully equivalent, as formally shown
below. To simplify the derivation, we only include the lagged export status, and
drop time-sector dummies. We start from the simplified version of expression (3.17),
and show with some basic algebraic manipulations, that it is fully equivalent to a
simplified version of expression (3.28).
lprit+1 = ρ lprit + γe eit + it
lprit+1 − ρ lprit = γe eit + it
(lprit+1 − lprit) + (1− ρ) lprit = γe eit + it
∆lprit+1 = (ρ− 1) lprit + γe eit + it
∆lprit+1 = φ lprit + γe eit + it
3.F Appendix: production function coefficients
Table 3.16: General productivity evolution with sector-specific TFP
Nace codes Description Labor Capital
15 Food and beverages 0.80 0.23
17-19 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and footwear 0.55 0.20
20 Wood and cork 0.71 0.16
21-22 Paper, pulp, printing and publishing 0.76 0.22
23-25 Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel 0.89 0.18
26 Other non-metallic mineral 0.71 0.22
27-28 Basic and fabricated metal 0.54 0.24
29 Machinery n.e.c. 0.74 0.16
30-33 Electrical and optical equipment 0.71 0.25
34-35 Transport equipment 0.84 0.16
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 0.84 0.15
a Production function coefficients according to our preferred specification, specification
used in column(6) of table 3.6.
b All coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level (bootstrapped standard
errors).
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Chapter 4
How effective are investment
subsidies in Flanders? An RDD
approach.
Summary This chapter analyzes the effect of a subsidy program for small and
medium sized enterprises in Flanders from 2004 to 2009 (the program was called ’de
groeipremie’ in Dutch). The subsidies were awarded according to a ranking system
that favored young, growing and productive firms with a strong cash flow, granting
subsidies to the highest scoring firms until the depletion of funds. The nature of
this allocation system creates a sharp cut off in granting the subsidy according to
the score: only firms above the cut off score are granted the subsidy. This setting
allows to estimate a local average treatment effect around this cut off, making use
of ’regression discontinuity design’ (RDD) methodologies. The main assumption
is that firms just below the cut off score, who did not get the subsidy, are a good
counter-factual for firms just above this cut off. We find a sizable positive effect
on investment, employment, output and productivity, but only for the very small
firms, e.g. firms with less than 10 employees. Larger firms seem to use the subsidy
to finance investments that they would have undertaken anyway.
I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Jozef Konings for helping me to obtain the subsidy data from
the ’Agentschap Ondernemen’ of the Flemish government (English translation: Entrepreneurship
Agency). I am also thankful to the participants of the KU Leuven ’Governments and Markets’
Centre of Excellence informal seminar for helpful comments and suggestions. This research project
has been executed in the context of Steunpunt Ondernemen en Regionale Economie (Short: STORE;
English translation: Center for Entrepreneurship and Regional Economics).
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4.1 Introduction
Despite the high amounts of state aid spent to support private business initiatives,1
the evaluations of the effectiveness of state aid are relatively rare. There is no
consensus among academics on whether state aid is a suitable tool to fuel economic
activity. The basic evaluation problem is that government programs might simply
finance activities that firms would have undertaken in the absence of industrial
policy, as noted in Criscuolo, Martin, Overman, and Van Reenen (2012). Because
of the difficulty to determine a plausible counter-factual of receiving state aid, it is
inherently difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of state aid, see Rodrik (2005). This
applies as well to our context of investment subsidies in Flanders. If the subsidies
are targeted towards firms that would have invested anyway, a simple comparison
between firms that received subsidies and firms that did not receive subsidies is likely
to overstate the effect of the subsidies. To estimate a causal effect of the subsidies,
we need to control for this selection effect.
The subsidies we investigate were issued by the Flemish government between 2004
and 2009 to firms across all sectors to stimulate investment and economic growth.
To this end, the Flemish government awarded approximately AC250M of subsidies
in total to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). To award the subsidy, the
government set up a total of 16 call systems, where firms could apply for a subsidy
with an investment project. Each project was scored according to a transparent
process with pre-determined and openly communicated criteria. The criteria favored
firms that are young, experienced a high employment growth in the past and perform
well in terms of labor productivity, cash flow, use of own funds in the investment
and other measures. The highest scoring applications were granted the subsidy, until
the funds are depleted.
In this paper, we exploit the quasi-experimental setting of the subsidy, introduced
by the sharp cut off of the call systems: firms that score below the cut off are not
granted the subsidy, only firms above the cut off are granted the subsidy. This allows
us to make use of the ’regression discontinuity design’ (RDD) methodology (Lee and
Lemieux, 2010; Cerqua and Pellegrini, 2014). Our main assumption is that firms
that scored just below the cut off are a good counter-factual for firms just above the
cut off. Thus, we can estimate a ’local average treatment effect’ (LATE) around
the cut off. The goal of our paper is to estimate the causal effect of the subsidy on
our variables of interest: investment, employment, output and productivity. The
results help the policy maker in evaluating whether the subsidy program induced a
higher firm growth and productivity for firms that received the subsidy. The LATE
around the cut off is an interesting parameter in this context, as the cut off is the
point where we would expect the highest effect. The subsidy call system favors firms
1According to the State Aid Scoreboard of the European Commission, the total non-crisis state
aid in the EU27 member states was AC67B in 2012, or 0.52% of GDP. Source: http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/non_crisis_en.html
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that use more of their own funds in the investment, and that generally perform well.
We would expect the firms with the best score to be likely to do the investment
irrespective of receiving the subsidy, so crowding out of investments can expected to
be high for these firms. Firms at the cut off have the lowest score of the firms that
received the subsidy, so crowding out can be lower for the firms at the cut off. An
evaluation of the LATE tells the policy maker whether there was a causal effect of
the subsidy, and consequently whether it would be useful to expand the budget for
the subsidy in the future.
Our data consists of two main sources. The data of the subsidy, provided by the
Flemish government, contains information on the firms, the requested subsidy, the
score of the project and whether the subsidy was granted or not. We merge this data
with the standard accounting data, containing yearly information on employment,
capital stock and output. Our methodology and data are close to the work of Cerqua
and Pellegrini (2014) who investigate the effect of subsidies in Italy.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. Our paper is one of the only
papers to exploit a quasi-experimental setting in evaluating the effectiveness of
general investment subsidies. In addition, we are the first to investigate the growth
subsidies for Flanders, an economically relatively well performing region with a
steady annual regional GDP growth of over 3% from 2003 to 2009 and very limited
regional differences in wealth.2 This is a unique setting, as most other papers, such
as Criscuolo, Martin, Overman, and Van Reenen (2012) on the regional selective
assistance program for development and intermediate areas in the UK and Cerqua
and Pellegrini (2014) on Law 488 in the South of Italy, tend to focus on development
areas.
Our results indicate that the causal effect of the subsidies on the growth of the
receiving firms was rather limited. We find a positive effect on investment, sales,
value added, employment and productivity, but only for the very small firms, e.g.
firms with less than 10 employees. For larger firms we do not find any effect. The
results are robust to various specifications. Possible explanations for the limited
effect include the low subsidy amount and the selection criteria to award the subsidy.
The subsidy as a percentage of the corresponding investment was rather low, possibly
too low to have a measurable effect.3 In addition, firms were selected on having
a high cash flow and using own funds for investment, which favors firms that can
do the investment anyway. Interestingly, the result that the impact of the subsidy
only exists or is stronger for small firms is in line with Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014),
Criscuolo, Martin, Overman, and Van Reenen (2012) and Bronzini and Iachini (2011).
For the larger firms, for which we did not find an effect on growth or productivity, we
do find higher profits due to the subsidy. There was no effect on cash flow of the firm.
2Flanders has 5 provinces, which exhibit only mild differences in income per capita: the lowest
income per capita was still 82% of the highest income per capita in 2009.
3The subsidy as % of total investment was generally around 10% for most applications, see the
data section for more details on the maximum %.
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These results suggest that the larger firms use the subsidy to finance investments
that the firm would have undertaken even without the subsidy, and mainly use the
subsidy to increase their profits relative to the situation without subsidies. We also
analyzed the impact of the subsidy on the exit of firms, but did not find a statistically
significant effect, possibly due to the limited number of firm-exits in our dataset.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an
overview of the literature on state aid. Section 4.3 explains the data and gives some
background information on the subsidy. In section 4.4, we explain the methodology
in detail. The results are presented in section 4.5. We conclude in section 4.6.
4.2 Literature review
There is little consensus among academics regarding the effectiveness of state aid.
Government programs might simply finance activities that firms would have under-
taken in the absence of industrial policy, as noted in Criscuolo, Martin, Overman,
and Van Reenen (2012). Another often used argument against interventionism is
that the government is unlikely to better assess the chances of commercial success
more effectively than the market (Aghion, Boulanger, and Cohen, 2011). However,
there are also strong arguments in favor of state aid. In general, state aid can
be useful to mitigate externalities, such as knowledge spillovers or environmental
damage. Another factor to consider is the existence of capital market imperfections
and credit constraints, which can be alleviated by a targeted state aid policy. Aghion,
Dewatripont, Du, Harrison, and Legros (2012) argue that state aid is beneficial as
long as it is adequately targeted and properly governed. They provide theoretical
and empirical support in favor of a policy that is de-concentrated, not favoring one
particular firm. They show that the degree of competition in a sector has a positive
effect on the increase of total factor productivity for industrial policy targeted towards
Chinese firms. Also a more spread-out subsidy over many firms within a sector has
a positive effect on productivity.
Even when the subsidy is effective in increasing investment, the effect on employ-
ment depends on the production process. If labor and capital are complementary, an
increase in capital will also induce an increase in labor. But if they are substitutes,
firms will potentially decrease labor when the cost of capital is reduced through
subsidies.4
Few papers estimate a causal effect of industrial policy targeted towards subsidiz-
ing investment and employment. The main reason is that it is inherently difficult to
estimate a causal effect. Simply comparing subsidized firms with non-subsidized firms
causes a positive bias in the estimated effect if the subsidies are targeted towards
investments that would have happened anyway. If industrial policy is targeted
4For a more detailed discussion on the conditions that determine whether subsidies increase or
decrease employment in a standard production function framework with perfect competition in all
markets, see Criscuolo, Martin, Overman, and Van Reenen (2012).
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towards the firms that struggle to survive, a negative bias of the estimated effect
would occur in a simple OLS regression (Rodrik, 2005).
Before firm-level data became widely available, studies focused on sectoral level
data, see e.g. Daly, Gorman, Lenjosek, MacNevin, and Phiriyapreunt (1993) on
Canada and Schalk and Untiedt (2000) on Germany. More recent papers focus on
firm-level data. However, the programs investigated are generally not discretionary,
so it is difficult to estimate the appropriate counterfactual. Therefore, an alternative
is to take a descriptive approach, as done by Harris and Robinson (2005) who
investigated the Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) program in the UK. Other
papers mitigate this issue by controlling for observables (e.g. Bergstro¨m, 2000, for
Swedish firms between 1987 and 1993), limiting the control group to firms that were
eligible but did not apply (Harris and Trainor, 2005, for Northern Ireland using
plant level data from 1983-1997), or using a matching on observables approach (e.g.
Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011, for Italy over the period 1996-2004). Also Czarnitzki
and Lopes-Bento (2013) use matching on observables to mitigate endogeneity issues
in the context of Flemish R&D subsidies. Gonza´lez, Jaumandreu, and Pazo´ (2005)
take a distinct approach, estimating a model of firms’ decisions about performing
R&D when government support can be expected and use Spanish survey data in
the 1990s to explore the effects of R&D subsidies. Some papers try to get closer to
a causal effect by using an RDD approach related to ours. Bronzini and de Blasio
(2006) investigate a similar setting as ours in Italy for the ’Law 488’ program. They
use the rejected firms as a control group and also include specifications where they
limit the sample to firms that are in the middle of the ranking. The paper by Cerqua
and Pellegrini (2014) investigates the same program for a longer time period and
uses a multiple RDD approach. Bronzini and Iachini (2011) use RDD in a context of
R&D subsidies for Italy (the ’Law no. 7/2002, art. 4’ program), while Jacob and
Lefgren (2011) focus on the impact of National Institutes of Health (NIH) grants
in the US on subsequent publications and citations. Criscuolo, Martin, Overman,
and Van Reenen (2012) use an instrumental variable approach instead, exploiting
exogenous changes in eligibility of the different regions for the RSA program in the
UK.
The results show a remarkable resemblance: the papers that take firm size
heterogeneity into account, find an effect on investment that either only exists for
small firms (Criscuolo, Martin, Overman, and Van Reenen, 2012; Bronzini and Iachini,
2011) or a positive effect across all firm sizes but higher for small firms (Cerqua
and Pellegrini, 2014; Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013;
Gonza´lez, Jaumandreu, and Pazo´, 2005). The effect on productivity is mixed: most
papers do not find an effect on productivity (Cerqua and Pellegrini, 2014; Criscuolo,
Martin, Overman, and Van Reenen, 2012; Bergstro¨m, 2000) with some exceptions
who find a positive (Harris and Robinson, 2005) or negative effect (Bernini and
Pellegrini, 2011).
In most countries, the subsidy granted relative to the investment was quite
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substantial in the context of investment programs. For the Law 488 program in Italy
it was up to 50% in specific regions and 20% in other regions (Bronzini and de Blasio,
2006). The RSA progam in the UK allowed for a maximum investment subsidy of
20-30%, depending on the region (Criscuolo, Martin, Overman, and Van Reenen,
2012). In Northern Ireland it was 45% (Harris and Trainor, 2005). For Finland in
the period 2001-2003, subsidy spending was up to 50% for some specific projects.5
and up to 10-30% for small firms and 5-20% for medium sized firms, see Tokila and
Haapanen (2012).
Other papers investigate related topics. Ham, Swenson, I˙mrohorog˘lu, and Song
(2011) find positive effects on local labor markets from government programs that
encourage employment development in disadvantaged areas in the US. Devereux,
Griffith, and Simpson (2007) find that the RSA discretionary government grants have
a positive effect on the location decision of firms in the UK, but that firms are less
responsive in areas where there are fewer existing plants in their industry, suggesting
that subsidies are less effective in regions where there are limited co-location benefits.
4.3 Data description
4.3.1 Background on the subsidy
In 2003, the Flemish government set up a subsidy to support small and medium
sized enterprises (SMEs)6 in their investments in Flanders. The subsidy was directed
towards firms that performed well and experienced a strong past employment growth.
In addition, the subsidy should stimulate innovative firms.7 Firms across virtually
all sectors could apply.
To award the subsidy in an objective manner, the government introduced a ’call’
system,8 with a total of 16 calls from the year 2004 to 2009: the government calls
for applications until a pre-determined deadline, and then scores each application
according to a transparent process with pre-determined and openly communicated
criteria. The highest scoring applications get granted the subsidy, until the funds are
depleted. Small enterprises get a subsidy that is maximum 15% of the investment,
while it is limited to 7.5% for medium sized firms. Later this was reduced to 10% and
5For projects that ’enhance the competitiveness or internationalization of an enterprise in the
longterm’.
6A small enterprise meets the following conditions: it has less than 50 employees, its yearly
revenue is lower than AC7M (AC10M from 2005 onwards) and its balance total is less than AC5M
(AC10M from 2005 onwards), and is independent (less than 25% ownership by large companies). A
medium sized enterprise meets the following conditions: it has less than 250 employees, its yearly
revenue is lower than AC40M (AC50M from 2005 onwards) and its balance total is less than AC27M
(AC43M from 2005 onwards), and is independent (less than 25% ownership by large companies).
7These policy goals are listed e.g. in the policy note of the Flemish minister of Economy at that
time Patricia Ceysens, see http://docs.vlaanderen.be/portaal/beleidsbrieven2007-2008/
ceysens/beleidsbrief_ceysens.pdf
8More background on this call system can be found in the document Ooghe and Spaenjers
(2005).
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5%. For regions in Flanders marked as in need of economic support, the maxima were
allowed to be 10% higher. The investment can only be started after the submission
deadline and needs to be finished within 3 years after the subsidy decision date. The
investment should be minimum AC12.5K (AC25K for firms older than 5 years) and
maximum AC8M. Applying is costless but requires going through the administrative
process of the application.9
Each application was scored on 9 criteria relative to the other firms that applied,10
and for most of them the corresponding score is formula based. There were two broad
categories in these criteria: criteria based on the goals of the subsidy, set by the policy
maker (’policy criteria’) and criteria to favor better performing companies (’company
performance criteria’). The policy criteria were the following (+ indicates that higher
is better, - indicates that lower is better): the requested subsidy as a percentage of
investment vs the maximal allowed subsidy percentage (-), the degree of ’sustainable
entrepreneurship’ (+, proxied by whether the firm had a sustainability certificate),
the ICT level of the firm (+, proxied by whether the firm has a website or not), the
age of the firm (-) and the employment evolution of the firm (+, from 3 years before
the application to 1 year before the application). The company performance criteria
were the following: auto-financing of the project (+, the proportion of the investment
the firm will finance with its own means), the cash flow of the firm relative to total
assets (+), the gross value added per employee (+) and the ratio of the gross wage
bill and value added of the firm (-). The scores on the different categories are then
re-scaled and weighted11 to become comparable and summed to yield the total score.
Further details on how the score for each application is determined can be found in
appendix 4.A.
Firms can apply multiple times. They can re-apply with the same project if
their application is unsuccessful, and they can always re-apply with a new project,
independent of whether they already received the subsidy. The next subsection
discusses this more extensively, and provides an overview of the re-applications. The
next subsection also provides an overview of the different calls and corresponding
summary statistics.
4.3.2 Data description and summary statistics for the sub-
sidy data
This subsection provides a description of the subsidy data, an overview of the different
calls, and the summary statistics on the subsidy data.
9Banks offer to do the application process for the firm at a cost of AC350 per application, with
an extra fee of 7.5% of the subsidy if successful (minimum AC500 and maximum AC3500). Source:
online document of the firm ’Pylser boekhouding & fiscaliteit BVBA’.
10Since the call of 3 June 2005 (decision date) the criterion ’requested subsidy as a % of investment
vs max allowed limit’ was dropped. In addition, since the call of 15 September 2006 the criterion
’ratio gross wage bill and value added’ was dropped.
11See the appendix 4.A on the subsidy for details on the scaling
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The Entrepreneurship Agency12, a department of the Flemish government, pro-
vided us with the data on the subsidy. The data contain all firms that applied for
the growth subsidy13, and provide information on whether the firm received the
subsidy, the amount of subsidy requested, the planned investment, the sub-scores
on the different criteria and the total score of the firm. The data also contain a
firm identifier that allows us to merge the data with the accounting data (see next
subsection on the merging).
Figure 4.1 illustrates the distribution of the scores for the largest call in terms of
number of applications (decision date 3 March 2005, 1889 applications). The red
line in the graph shows the cut off: all applications with a lower score are rejected,
and all applications with a higher score are accepted.
Figure 4.1: Density of the scores for the largest call in terms of number of applications.
Footnote: The vertical dashed line indicates the acceptance cut off.
For a summary of the acceptance rate of awarding the subsidy, see table 4.1. The
table shows that about 18% of the applications were granted the requested subsidy.
Because firms can re-apply if the subsidy is rejected, the acceptance rate is higher
in terms of number of firms: about 27%. The following numbers (not shown in the
table) illustrate the multiple applications per firm further. Of the 9161 firms that
applied, 56% applied once, 30% applied twice and 14% applied three or more times.
When an application is rejected, firms can re-apply in a future call with the same
12In Dutch: Agentschap Ondernemen
13In Dutch: Groeipremie
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project. Of the 16148 applications, 24% are re-applications of projects that were
rejected in preceding calls. Firms that are granted the subsidy, can also re-apply
with new projects. Of the 2437 firms that received the subsidy, 14% received it
multiple times, of which 10% (of the total number of firms that received the subsidy)
two times and 4% more than two times. In theory, it was possible to apply with
multiple projects in the same call, but only 6 firms did this.
Table 4.1: Overview all calls
Total Accepted Rejected
Applications 16148 2966 13182
(%) 18 82
Firms 9161 2452 6709
(%) 27 73
a Numbers are for the full period of the subsidy. There were 16 calls for submission of
application, the first was decided in July 2004 and the last in April 2009. Firms can apply
again with the same project if rejected.
To perform the econometric analysis, we need to mitigate the issue of firms that
apply more than once. We do this by keeping only 1 application per firm. The
application we keep is selected in the following way. For rejected firms, we keep
only the best application.14 If a firm has a successful application and one or more
unsuccessful applications, we keep only the first successful application of the firm.15
Also if the firm receives the subsidy multiple times, we keep only the first successful
application.16 This reduces the number of applications from 16148 to 9161 (= the
number of firms). These choices do not affect the results qualitatively.17
Table 4.2 provides an overview of the different calls and corresponding summary
statistics. We see that each call has a budget of AC12M to AC30M. The total subsidy
granted across the different years was almost AC250M. Between 14 and 28% of
the applications are rewarded a subsidy, depending on the call. The last four
columns show respectively the total amount of granted subsidies, the total investment
corresponding to the granted subsidies, the total amount of requested subsidies and
the total investment corresponding to all the projects requesting subsidy.
See table 4.3 for summary statistics on the subsidy data and the corresponding
investment. The table shows that the average subsidy is about AC80K. The subsidy
ranges from about AC7K for the 10th percentile to about AC200K for the 90th percentile.
14’Best application’ is defined as closest to the acceptance cut off. This drops 4701 applications or
29% of the original 16018 applications that remain after basic datacleaning (dropping observations
with missing vat number or missing/erroneous entries for the subsidy amount or total investment
amount).
15This additionally drops 1689 applications, or 11% of the original 16018 applications
16This additionally drops 479 applications, or 3% of the original 16018 applications.
17The main results are robust to only keeping the first application of the firms that never received
the subsidy instead of keeping the best application, or dropping all firms that received the subsidy
and ever got rejected instead of only dropping the unsuccessful applications of these firms.
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Table 4.2: Overview per call
Index Decision Application # appl. # acc. % Tot. appr. Tot. inv. appr. Tot. req. Tot. req.
call date deadline appl. acc. subs. (ACM) subs. (ACM) subs. (ACM) inv. (ACM)
1 2-Jul-04 31-Mar-04 1410 391 28 30 275 122 1090
2 3-Mar-05 31-Dec-04 1893 443 23 30 331 137 1430
3 3-Jun-05 31-Mar-05 1202 165 14 12 153 84 1030
4 15-Sep-05 30-Jun-05 976 201 21 12 136 66 788
5 2-Dec-05 30-Sep-05 994 188 19 12 135 67 797
6 10-Mar-06 23-Dec-05 1022 134 13 12 125 73 852
7 6-Jun-06 31-Mar-06 1232 153 12 12 136 89 1040
8 15-Sep-06 30-Jun-06 988 141 14 12 140 71 842
9 14-Dec-06 29-Sep-06 761 126 17 12 131 58 673
10 20-Apr-07 22-Dec-06 788 125 16 12 132 66 756
11 23-Jul-07 30-Apr-07 764 148 19 16 185 66 787
12 7-Dec-07 31-Aug-07 813 197 24 16 196 62 740
13 21-Apr-08 21-Dec-07 878 178 20 16 204 72 880
14 29-Jul-08 30-Apr-08 890 123 14 16 179 77 903
15 24-Nov-08 31-Jul-08 687 126 18 16 203 65 796
16 15-Apr-09 24-Dec-08 850 127 15 16 168 76 909
Total 16148 2966 18 249 2829 1250 14313
a Numbers are for the full period of the subsidy. There were 16 calls for submission of
application, the first was decided in July 2004 and the last in April 2009. Firms can apply
again with the same project if rejected.
b The columns refer respectively to the call index, the decision date, the application date, the
number of applications, the number of accepted applications, the percentage of accepted
applications, the total approved subsidy, the total investment linked to the approved subsidy,
the total requested subsidy and the total investment linked to the requested subsidy.
The corresponding investment amout is about AC900K on average, ranging from AC85K
(10th percentile) to about AC2.2M (90th percentile). The subsidy generally covers
about 10% of the investment. There are some differences between the firms that
receive the subsidy and the firms that do not, but they are rather limited.
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Table 4.3: Subsidy and investment summary statistics
N mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Requested subsidy amount No subs. 13182 76 107 7 16 39 90 188
(in 1,000AC) Subsidy 2966 84 138 5 14 33 89 234
Total 16148 77 113 7 16 38 90 193
Planned total investment No subs. 13182 871 1,231 92 195 435 1,000 2,114
(in 1,000AC) Subsidy 2939 968 1,598 55 149 350 996 2,642
Total 16121 889 1,306 85 180 417 1,000 2,200
Subsidy fraction of investment No subs. 13182 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10
(-) Subsidy 2939 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.15
Total 16121 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11
a Numbers are for the full period of the subsidy. There were 16 calls for submission of application,
the first was decided in July 2004 and the last in April 2009.
b The ’No subsidy’ rows refer to firms that applied but were not granted the subsidy, the
’Subsidy’ rows refer to firms that applied successfully for the subsidy, and the ’Total’ rows refer
to both groups, i.e. all firms that applied.
c We do not have the total investment for some of the firms that received the subsidy, therefore
the number of observations is slightly smaller for ’planned total investment’ and ’subsidy
fraction of investment’.
4.3.3 Merge with the accounting data and pre-subsidy sum-
mary statistics
To investigate the impact of the subsidy on various variables of interest, i.e. employ-
ment, sales, total fixed assets and labor productivity, we need to merge the subsidy
data with the accounting data, obtained from the Bel-First database. This database,
commercialized by Bureau Van Dijck, includes information about all Belgian firms
that need to file annually an income statement and balance sheet. These are all
Belgian enterprises with the exclusion of one-man businesses. The accounting data
goes from 2001 (3 years before the first subsidies were awarded in 2004) to 2012 (3
years after the last subsidies were awarded in 2009). The firm identifier allows us to
merge the subsidy data with the accounting data. As a substantial part of the firms
that apply for the subsidy are one-man businesses, we cannot match all firms. Of
the 9149 that applied for a subsidy, only 6092 have filed accounting information for
at least one of the years of the period considered, and only 4931 file an accounting
statement for all years going from one year before the subsidy decision to three years
after the subsidy decision. We applied standard datacleaning on our sample, see
appendix 4.B for more details. Our results therefore only apply to SMEs that are
not one-man businesses.
The summary statistics on the accounting variables of our sample of firms
are shown in table 4.4 for the year before the subsidy on the following variables:
employment, fixed assets,18 sales, value added, labor productivity (value added per
18The accounting system allows for four categories of fixed assets: start up costs, intangible fixed
assets, tangible fixed assets and financial fixed assets. The subsidy can only impact intangible
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worker) and age of the firm. The firms that were awarded a subsidy are larger (in
terms of employment, fixed assets, sales and value added), more productive and
younger.
Table 4.4: Accounting data summary statistics for the year before the subsidy
approval decision
N mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Employment No subs. 4463 16 23 2 4 8 19 38
(in FTEs) Subsidy 932 25 35 1 3 10 33 62
Total 5395 18 26 2 4 9 21 42
Fixed assets No subs. 4463 716 1135 65 160 378 814 1640
(in AC1000) Subsidy 932 1299 2562 61 160 459 1393 3053
Total 5395 817 1499 64 160 388 871 1890
Sales No subs. 4407 4866 29768 452 859 2030 4900 10384
(in AC1000) Subsidy 913 6042 9173 415 847 2454 6893 17595
Total 5320 5068 27362 444 858 2065 5299 11216
Value added No subs. 4450 1014 1424 139 252 539 1197 2296
(in AC1000) Subsidy 926 1778 2505 107 247 814 2219 4568
Total 5376 1145 1685 134 251 561 1326 2683
Value added per worker No subs. 4450 60 33 33 42 53 69 94
(in AC1000/FTE) Subsidy 926 79 109 30 43 58 84 122
Total 5376 64 55 33 42 54 72 100
Age No subs. 4411 18 13 5 9 15 23 34
(in years) Subsidy 904 12 11 2 3 9 17 28
Total 5315 17 13 4 7 14 22 34
a Numbers are for the full period of the subsidy. There were 16 calls for submission of
application, the first was decided in July 2004 and the last in April 2009.
4.4 Methodology
Our methodology is based on the regression discontinuity design (RDD) method-
ologies. Due to the set up of the subsidy score system, we have a sharp ’regression
discontinuity’ in our data: firms that have a score just below the cut off do not
get a subsidy, while firms just above the cut off do get the full requested subsidy.
Therefore we can use the RDD methodologies as set out in Lee and Lemieux (2010)
and Angrist and Pischke (2008). The main assumption is that firms just below the
and tangible assets. Depreciation and amortization, used to calculate gross investment, refers to
fixed assets without the financial fixed assets. Thus, we define ’fixed assets’ as fixed assets minus
financial fixed assets, as the latter are not included in the subsidy nor impacted by depreciation.
Thus, when we use the term (total) fixed assets in the remainder of the text, we actually refer to
fixed assets minus financial fixed assets.
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cut off are the best control group for firms just above the cut off. As there is only
variation in treatment at this cut off, we are estimating a local average treatment
effect (LATE) around the cut off. Estimating a treatment effect further from the cut
off is not feasible, as there is no good control group available: e.g., it is difficult to
argue that firms that scored well below the cut off are a good control group for firms
that score above the cut off, as they will exhibit large differences along the score
criteria.
We define a dummy Dsubsi which takes on the value 1 if the score of the firm (sci)
is above the cut off score for awarding the subsidy (scco), which means that the firm
gets the subsidy, and 0 if the score of the firm is below the cut off score for awarding
the subsidy, which means that the firm does not get the subsidy. Formally, we can
write:
Dsubsi =
{
1 if sci ≥ scco
0 if sci < scco.
(4.1)
First, we start with a standard fixed effects regression to estimate the effect of
the subsidy on the firms that received one. The specification is written down in
equation (4.2):
log(yi,t) = σD
subs
i,t + αi + ηt + i,t, (4.2)
with index i standing for the firm and t for the year. Dsubsi,t takes on the value one
from the year the firm is awarded the subsidy. yi,t is our variable of interest, i.e.
employment, total fixed assets, sales and labor productivity. αi is the firm fixed
effect, ηt a year dummy and it represents the error term. This specification as such
does not automatically have a causal interpretation, as underlying unobservables
may be different between the treated and the untreated firms. We control for this by
systematically reducing the sample to firms that had a score close to the approval
cut off. So we compare only firms that were just accepted with firms that were
just rejected, as illustrated in figure 4.2 for the largest call in terms of number of
applications.
However, a fixed effects regression does not capture the dynamics of the investment.
I.e. the investment does not necessarily have an immediate impact, and may take
2-3 years to fully materialize. Therefore, we use alternative specifications, with the
cumulative four year growth from the year before the subsidy to three years after the
subsidy as a dependent variable. Hereby, we use five different types of specification,
which we will present in the results section. First, as a benchmark, we start with a
simple diff-in-diff comparison of the evolution of say employment of all firms that
received the subsidy vs the firms that did not receive a subsidy. Formally, we use
the following regression specification:
∆4Yi =
yi,3 − yi,−1
yi,−1
− 1 = σDsubsi + λcall + δsect + i, (4.3)
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Figure 4.2: Density of the scores for the largest call in terms of number of applications,
limiting the observations to the zone around the cut off.
Footnote: The black vertical dashed line indicates the acceptance cut off, the grey vertical dashed
lines indicate the zone around the cut off that we consider to estimate the causal effect. The dashed
lines furthest from the cut off correspond to a distance from the cut off of one standard deviation of
the score variable, while the closest lines correspond to a distance of 1/4 of the standard deviation.
where ∆4Yi represents the (cumulative) growth in the variable of interest yi,t, e.g.
employment, three years after the subsidy call decision date (’3’) relative to the year
before the subsidy call decision date (’-1’). λcall is the dummy for the call in which
the firm participated, δsect controls for sector-specific evolutions.
19 We do not need
to add time dummies, as time effects are already taken up by the call dummies. This
specification will simply show that firms that did get the subsidy indeed experienced
a higher employment growth than firms that did not get the subsidy. The results do
not have a causal interpretation yet, as firms were selected on variables that increase
the likelihood of employment growth, e.g. past employment growth.
In the subsequent specifications, we do estimate a causal effect by controlling for
the selection of firms that received the subsidy. In the second specification, we do
this by adding a third order polynomial20 of the score in equation (4.3) to control for
19We define a total of 12 aggregated sectors based on the broad structure of the NACE rev2
classification: A+B, C, D+E, F, G, H I, J, K+L, M, N and P-S. We do not pursue a narrower
sector definition because of the limited number of observations in the data.
20A higher order polynomial is used to take into account possible non-linearities. Increasing the
order does not have an impact on the results, but we prefer to limit the number of terms to avoid
CHAPTER 4. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES IN
FLANDERS? AN RDD APPROACH. 133
the selection effect of the score f(sci) on the dependent variable of interest. More
formally, we run the following regression:
∆4Yi = σD
subs
i + f(sci) + δsect + i ≈ σDsubsi +
3∑
k=1
βksc
k
i + δsect + i. (4.4)
As a more flexible variation of the above specification, we allow the polynomial21
to be different on both sides of the ’treatment’, as advised in Lee and Lemieux (2010)
and Angrist and Pischke (2008):
∆4Yi = σD
subs
i +
2∑
k=1
[
Dsubsi β
Di=1
k (sci − scco)k + (1−Dsubsi )βDi=0k (sci − scco)k
]
+ λcall + δsect + i. (4.5)
This allows for a more precise estimation of the function f(sci) around the cut off
point.
Fourth, as a robustness check, we limit the sample to firms that are close to the
cut off.22 More formally, we use the following:
E
[
∆4Y
0
i |sci = scco
] ≈ [∆4Yi|sci ∈ [scco −∆, scco[]
E
[
∆4Y
1
i |sci = scco
] ≈ [∆4Yi|sci ∈ [scco, scco + ∆]],
and
E
[
∆4Y
1
i −∆4Y 0i |sci = scco
]
= lim
∆→0
E
[
∆4Y
1
i |sci ∈ [scco, scco + ∆]
]
−E [∆4Y 0i |sci ∈ [scco −∆, scco[] ,
where E [∆4Y
0
i |sci = scco] is the expected value of the variable of interest (e.g.,
employment growth) at the cut off score if the firm is not awarded the subsidy
(indicated by superscript ’0’). We only use the firms that are close to the subsidy
approval cut off, see figure 4.2. This approach exploits the assumption that firms
just below the cut off score are the best control group for firms just above the cut off
over-fitting. To simplify, equation (4.4) only contains one polynomial, but in practice we used a
polynomial per call. This is necessary because the scores are not comparable across calls, as they
are relative to the other firms in the same call (explained in appendix 4.A).
21We reduced the polynomial to a second order polynomial to avoid over-fitting. Note that even
then, the number of polynomial parameters to be estimated increases by one compared to the
’normal’ third order polynomial, as we estimate a different second order polynomial on both sides
of the treatment.
22We limit the sample to firms that have a score that is 0.29 or less from the cut off score. The
number 0.29, which is 1/3 of the standard deviation of the score, balances two objectives: the lower
we take the distance to the cut off score, the more accurate all things equal, but it also implies that
we have less observations and therefore lose estimation precision. Taking a lower value yields similar
results, but the significance level drops (at least partly) due to the lower number of observations.
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score.
For our last specification, we use a mix between the third and fourth specification:
we limit the sample to firms close to the cut off, and in addition control for a linear
term23 in the score variable, that is allowed to be different on both sides of the
treatment.
In addition to looking for an average effect, we will also look for a heterogeneous
effect across different firm sizes. To this end, we will split the sample at the median
of employment, or alternatively use a linear log employment (in FTE’s) interaction.
The latter is done according to the following specification:
∆4Yi = σD
subs
i + β logFTEi,−1 ·Dsubsi + ρ logFTEi,−1 + λcall + δsect + i. (4.6)
4.5 Results
This section gives an overview of the results. We find that the causal effect of the
subsidy is an increase in investment, employment, sales, value added and productivity,
but the effect is limited to small firms only, e.g. firms with less than 10 employees.
We do not find any effect for larger firms. Therefore in aggregate, the effects are
rather limited. For larger firms, we do find an increase in profits due to the subsidy,
but no increase in the cash flow of the firm. We also analyse the impact on exit,
but do not find a statistically significant causal effect, possibly due to the limited
number of firm-exits in the dataset.
The section is organized as follows: subsection 4.5.1 discusses the pre-subsidy
differences between the firms that received the subsidies and firms that did not,
subsection 4.5.2 shows the results for investment, subsection 4.5.3 shows the results
for different measures of firm size (sales, value added and employment), subsection
4.5.4 the results for productivity, subsection 4.5.5 the results for profits and cash
flow, and subsection 4.5.6 the results for exit.
4.5.1 Pre-subsidy differences
This subsection shows the differences between the firms that were granted the subsidy
and the firms that were rejected, at the time before the subsidy decision is taken, and
how our RDD approaches eliminate these differences. To illustrate these differences,
we use only the observations in the year before the subsidy is allocated, and then
run an OLS regression of the dependent variable of interest on a (future) subsidy
23Given the limited number of observations, it is not feasible to include a high order polynomial.
Remember that the polynomial should be allowed to differ across the 16 different calls and across
treatment groups. E.g. a specification with a 1st order polynomial requires an estimation of the
parameter of interest, 12 sector dummies, 64 polynomial parameters (16 calls × (1 linear term
+1 call dummy) parameters for the polynomials × 2 treatment groups). These are already 77
parameters with approximately 1000 observations. Given that we only keep observations close to
the cut off, a linear control should suffice.
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dummy, and dummies to control for the sector and the call. The results are shown
in table 4.5 for the variables that determine the application score (see section 4.3.1
or appendix 4.A for more details). The columns respectively show the differences
for the subsidy as a percentage of the maximum allowed subsidy (’subs/max’), the
sustainability certificate dummy (’sust’), a website dummy (’web’), the age of the
firm in days (’age’),24 the cumulative relative employment growth over two years (’∆
Emp’), the degree of autofinancing of the investment (’Autof’), the value added per
worker (’Lprod’), the cash flow over total assets (’CF’) and the wage bill over value
added (’ULC’, standing for unit labor cost). As expected, the firms that receive the
subsidy request a lower subsidy compared to the maximum allowed (column 1), have
a higher probability of having a sustainability certificate (column 2) or a website
(column 3), are younger (column 4), experienced a higher past employment growth
(column 5), had a higher degree of autofinancing (column 6) and performed better in
terms of labor productivity (column 7), cash flow (column 8) and unit labor costs
(column 9).
If we include a third order polynomial of the score, we see that these difference
disappear or at least get substantially reduced, see table 4.6. Some of the differences
are still statistically significant, but for most this is not too troubling as they changed
sign (column 1, 2, 3 and 6). Only for cash flow, the difference only gets reduced.
However, other implementations of the RDD approach are either more successful in
eliminating the differences or at least eliminate the differences for the variables that
are statistically significant here (see tables 4.24, 4.25 or 4.26 in appendix 4.C), so we
are still confident in our approach as a whole.
Table 4.27 in appendix 4.C shows that firms that are granted the subsidy are 7%
to 23% larger than firms that are not granted the subsidy, depending on the measure.
These differences disappear or are at least no longer statistically significant in our
different RDD approaches.
24The selection score for the age criterion was age in days, with the score decreasing with age.
After 5 years there was a limit, from this age onwards the score was equal to the score value of an
age of five years. In the tables on the pre-subsidy differences regressions, we therefore set the age
to 5 years from 5 years onwards.
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Table 4.5: Pre-subsidy differences between firms that received the subsidy and firms
that did not
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
subs/max sust web age ∆Emp Autof Lprod CF ULC
Dsubs -0.126∗∗ 0.0565∗∗ 0.153∗∗ -0.241∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.0904∗∗ 0.0364∗∗ -0.0633∗∗
(0.0181) (0.00765) (0.0127) (0.0164) (0.0192) (0.0134) (0.0162) (0.00334) (0.00876)
Call d. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 1494 5395 5395 5395 4531 5395 5375 5391 3174
R2 0.111 0.062 0.058 0.139 0.062 0.043 0.057 0.099 0.064
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable indicated in the column: the maximum allowed subsidy (’subs/max’), the
sustainability certificate dummy (’sust’), a website dummy (’web’), the log age of the firm in
days (’age’), the cumulative relative employment growth over two years (’∆ Emp’), the degree
of autofinancing of the investment (’Autof’), the log value added per worker (’Lprod’), the
cash flow over total assets (’CF’) and the wage bill over value added (’ULC’, standing for unit
labor cost).
b subs/max and ULC are only used as a criterion for the score for a limited number of calls. We
only include observations for the calls where they are used.
Table 4.6: Pre-subsidy differences between firms that received the subsidy and firms
that did not - controlling for the application score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
subs/max sust web age ∆Emp Autof Lprod CF ULC
Dsubs 0.0518+ -0.0285∗∗ 0.0371+ -0.00356 -0.00194 -0.0898∗∗ -0.0355 0.0111+ -0.0233
(0.0314) (0.00460) (0.0207) (0.0201) (0.0315) (0.0267) (0.0314) (0.00615) (0.0167)
Call d. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 1494 5395 5395 5395 4531 5395 5375 5391 3174
R2 0.255 0.271 0.450 0.268 0.105 0.232 0.104 0.132 0.078
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable indicated in the column: the maximum allowed subsidy (’subs/max’), the
sustainability certificate dummy (’sust’), a website dummy (’web’), the log age of the firm in
days (’age’), the cumulative relative employment growth over two years (’∆ Emp’), the degree
of autofinancing of the investment (’Autof’), the log value added per worker (’Lprod’), the
cash flow over total assets (’CF’) and the wage bill over value added (’ULC’, standing for unit
labor cost).
b subs/max and ULC are only used as a criterion for the score for a limited number of calls.
We only include observations for the calls where they are used.
c We control for the application score through a third order polynomial.
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4.5.2 Results for investment
This subsection shows the results for various measures of investment. We will
show that there is substantial evidence that the subsidies had a positive effect on
investment, but for the smallest firms only. For the larger firms in the dataset, the
estimated effect is small and not statistically significant. We first show the results
for net investment, i.e. changes in fixed assets. Later, we also show results for gross
investment, taking into account depreciation and amortization.
We start with a standard fixed effects regression with log fixed assets as a
dependent variable, see table 4.7. Going from column (1) to column (5), we step
by step reduce the interval across the acceptance cut off, only keeping the firms
that are closer and closer to the cut off. We see that without limiting the sample,
the estimated coefficient is about 0.15, but when reducing the sample to firms close
to the cut off, the coefficient decreases to 0.08 and loses its statistical significance.
The interpretation of this coefficient is that the estimated effect of the subsidy is an
increase in fixed assets of about 8%. This is at best weak evidence for an effect.
Table 4.7: Fixed effects specification for total assets - sample limited to applications
increasingly closer to the cut off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all 1 sd 1/2 sd 1/3 sd 1/4 sd
Dsubs 0.152∗∗ 0.155∗∗ 0.129∗∗ 0.110∗ 0.0784
(0.0303) (0.0343) (0.0398) (0.0446) (0.0503)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 66292 43748 22135 15047 11303
R2 0.197 0.199 0.211 0.200 0.196
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log fixed assets
b The columns refer to which firms are kept in the sample. The column title indicates how close
the firms need to be to the cut off to be kept in the sample. E.g., in column (5) only firms
within 1/4 of a standard deviation of the score variable are kept in the sample (the standard
deviation of the score variable is 0.86, so 1/4 of the standard deviation is 0.215).
Interestingly, the picture becomes much clearer when allowing for heterogeneity in
size. We interact the treatment with the size of the firm, as explained in specification
(4.6), captured by log employment. We see that firms that received the subsidy have
grown more strongly than firms that did not receive the subsidy, but the difference
decreases with increasing initial employment size. This is shown in table 4.8. The
coefficient of Dsubs shows the difference in fixed assets increase for firms with one
FTE, the reference level. The interaction effect shows that this difference declines
with increasing firm size. The size of the coefficients should be interpreted as follows,
illustrated for column (5): the subsidy increases the fixed assets by approximately
35.6% for firms that had one FTE in the year before the subsidy. This effect drops
by approximately 11.2 percentages points for each increase of log FTE by 1: e.g.
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for the median employment before the subsidy of 9, the total effect is reduced to
approximately 11%.25 If we split the sample at the mean employment before the
subsidy, we find a positive and statistically significant effect only for the smaller
firms (less than 9 FTE’s in the year before the subsidy decision date), while the
effect is small and not statistically significant for the larger firms (more than 9 FTE’s
in the year before the subsidy decision date). The split sample results are shown in
appendix 4.E.1. This heterogeneity in size is in line with earlier results of Bronzini
and Iachini (2011), Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014) and Criscuolo, Martin, Overman,
and Van Reenen (2012).
Table 4.8: Fixed effects specification for total assets including an interaction term
with initial employment - sample limited to applications increasingly closer to the
cut off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all 1 sd 1/2 sd 1/3 sd 1/4 sd
Dsubs 0.500∗∗ 0.525∗∗ 0.454∗∗ 0.418∗∗ 0.356∗∗
(0.0660) (0.0727) (0.0859) (0.0976) (0.108)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.143∗∗ -0.156∗∗ -0.134∗∗ -0.124∗∗ -0.112∗∗
(0.0218) (0.0242) (0.0282) (0.0321) (0.0352)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 61494 40544 20350 13838 10405
R2 0.207 0.210 0.225 0.213 0.207
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log fixed assets
b The columns refer to which firms are kept in the sample. The column title indicates how close
the firms need to be to the cut off to be kept in the sample. E.g., in column (5) only firms
within 1/4 of a standard deviation of the score variable are kept in the sample (the standard
deviation of the score variable is 0.86, so 1/4 of the standard deviation is 0.215).
However, a fixed effects model does not fully capture the dynamics of the increase,
as explained in the methodology section. Next therefore, we focus on comparing the
cumulative growth from the year before the allocation of the subsidies to 3 years
after the allocation. The results are shown in table 4.9 for the effect across all firm
sizes and table 4.10 for the heterogeneous effect for different firm sizes.
In table 4.9 we present the 5 different specifications as explained in the method-
ology section in the columns. In the first column, as a benchmark, we show the
difference in fixed asset growth between firms that received the subsidy and firms
that did not, as specified in equation (4.3). Firms that received the subsidy had a
cumulative growth that was approximately 33 percentage points higher. In the next 4
columns however, we see that there is little evidence for a causal effect. In the second
column, we control for a polynomial in the score that the firms were given in the
call, which corresponds to specification (4.4) in the methodology section. The effect
250.356− 0.112× log(9) = 0.11
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becomes substantially smaller and is no longer statistically significant from zero. The
coefficient is smaller in the rest of the columns and is never statistically significant.
In the third column, we control for a polynomial that can differ across treatment
group, see specification (4.5). The fourth column is a diff-in-diff comparison between
firms that received the subsidy and firms that did not receive the subsidy, but with
the sample limited to firms that are close to the subsidy approval cut off. The fifth
column shows the results for the reduced sample, but with a linear control for the
score.
Table 4.9: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative four year fixed assets growth after
receiving the subsidy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.330∗∗ 0.232 0.188 0.0954 0.0368
(0.0996) (0.189) (0.229) (0.150) (0.275)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 4857 4857 4857 1112 1112
R2 0.031 0.044 0.049 0.071 0.122
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: cumulative growth in fixed assets 3 years after the subsidy allocation
relative to the year before the subsidy (year ’-1’)
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard
deviation of the score variable.
In table 4.10 we present the same 5 different specifications, but adding a size
interaction term as in table 4.8. The results suggest that fixed assets increased,
but with a statistically significant effect only for the small firms. The estimated
coefficients are of similar size across the last four columns, the statistical significance
level varies however depending on the specification with the coefficients not always
statistically significant at the conventional significance levels.
We also analyzed gross investment, taking into account depreciation and amor-
tization. In table 4.11 we report the results for cumulative gross investment from
the year before the subsidy to 3 years after the subsidy was awarded, relative to the
initial fixed assets. As for net investment, we do not find a general effect for gross
investment across all firm sizes (results not shown here). Table 4.11 shows the results
for the size interaction specification. All coefficients again have the same sign and
order of magnitude (taking into account the standard errors) across specifications
and are statistically significant expect for the first one in column (5).
Although the coefficients are not always statistically significant, the same picture
shows across specifications: the subsidies had a positive effect on investment for
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Table 4.10: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative four year fixed assets growth after
receiving the subsidy - interaction with initial log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.710∗∗ 0.545+ 0.599+ 0.692+ 0.533
(0.226) (0.284) (0.322) (0.389) (0.459)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.151∗ -0.131+ -0.115 -0.224+ -0.196
(0.0741) (0.0752) (0.0764) (0.128) (0.126)
log(FTE) before -0.342∗∗ -0.344∗∗ -0.344∗∗ -0.315∗∗ -0.301∗∗
(0.0350) (0.0357) (0.0357) (0.0810) (0.0780)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 4857 4857 4857 1112 1112
R2 0.061 0.072 0.076 0.070 0.158
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: cumulative growth in fixed assets 3 years after the subsidy allocation
relative to the year before the subsidy (year ’-1’)
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard
deviation of the score variable.
the smallest firms, but this effect rapidly declines with increasing firm size. Shown
separately, the lack of statistical significance in some of the specifications might cast
some doubt on the evidence, but the next subsection shows that the evidence for
other measures of firm growth, i.e. increase in sales, value added and employment,
is more robust. This suggests that the fact that some specifications do not show
statistically significant coefficients for investment, might be due to measurement
noise. Fixed assets is typically a rather complex and noisy variable, where the
reporting is influenced by the tax implications, i.e. the goal of the firm is not to
report its fixed assets as accurately as possible, but rather to minimize taxes paid.
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Table 4.11: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative four year gross investment after
receiving the subsidy - interaction with initial log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 1.287∗∗ 0.972∗ 1.252∗∗ 1.089+ 1.016
(0.345) (0.429) (0.484) (0.588) (0.689)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.269∗ -0.248∗ -0.250∗ -0.339+ -0.351+
(0.114) (0.115) (0.116) (0.193) (0.191)
log(FTE) before -0.463∗∗ -0.467∗∗ -0.466∗∗ -0.468∗∗ -0.472∗∗
(0.0526) (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.116) (0.116)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 4661 4661 4661 1072 1072
R2 0.058 0.071 0.076 0.129 0.175
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log cumulative gross investment, aggregated over 4 years, starting from
the year the subsidy is awarded to 3 years after the decision year of the subsidy.
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard
deviation of the score variable.
4.5.3 Results for different measures of firm size: sales, value
added and employment
In addition to the effect on investment, we have also analyzed the effect on the other
variables of interest. The size-related variables all show the same picture: overall,
there is only a limited or no effect (see appendix 4.E). When we allow for a different
effect according to the initial size of the firm, we do find an effect, but only for the
very small firms. The size interaction tables for respectively sales, value added and
employment are shown respectively in table 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14. The fixed effects
regressions are qualitatively the same (see appendix 4.E).
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Table 4.12: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative four year sales growth - interaction
with initial log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.293∗∗ 0.181∗∗ 0.144∗ 0.274∗∗ 0.240∗
(0.0460) (0.0592) (0.0679) (0.0791) (0.0953)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0562∗∗ -0.0476∗∗ -0.0410∗ -0.0745∗∗ -0.0650∗
(0.0160) (0.0164) (0.0168) (0.0270) (0.0272)
log(FTE) before -0.0578∗∗ -0.0622∗∗ -0.0622∗∗ -0.0458∗∗ -0.0510∗∗
(0.00701) (0.00716) (0.00716) (0.0164) (0.0165)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 4529 4529 4529 1077 1077
R2 0.078 0.093 0.097 0.067 0.131
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: growth in sales 3 years after the subsidy allocation relative to the year
before the subsidy (year ’-1’)
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard
deviation of the score variable.
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Table 4.13: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative four year value added growth -
interaction with initial log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.419∗∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.257∗∗ 0.278∗∗ 0.281∗
(0.0588) (0.0733) (0.0817) (0.101) (0.120)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0880∗∗ -0.0745∗∗ -0.0711∗∗ -0.0771∗ -0.0725∗
(0.0196) (0.0199) (0.0202) (0.0336) (0.0337)
log(FTE) before -0.125∗∗ -0.131∗∗ -0.131∗∗ -0.124∗∗ -0.122∗∗
(0.00855) (0.00870) (0.00869) (0.0207) (0.0207)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 4828 4828 4828 1107 1107
R2 0.109 0.126 0.129 0.116 0.175
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: growth in value added 3 years after the subsidy allocation relative to the
year before the subsidy (year ’-1’)
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard
deviation of the score variable.
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Table 4.14: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative four year employment growth -
interaction with initial log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.413∗∗ 0.178∗ 0.168∗ 0.240∗ 0.103
(0.0591) (0.0741) (0.0822) (0.103) (0.125)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0744∗∗ -0.0594∗∗ -0.0583∗∗ -0.0555 -0.0429
(0.0196) (0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0338) (0.0350)
log(FTE) before -0.191∗∗ -0.198∗∗ -0.198∗∗ -0.186∗∗ -0.193∗∗
(0.00876) (0.00885) (0.00886) (0.0201) (0.0204)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 4857 4857 4857 1112 1112
R2 0.189 0.210 0.217 0.190 0.256
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: growth in employment 3 years after the subsidy allocation relative to the
year before the subsidy (year ’-1’)
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard
deviation of the score variable.
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4.5.4 Results for productivity
This section shows the results for productivity. The analysis is complicated by the
fact that the very small firms (micro-firms) are exceptionally productive. This is
illustrated in table 4.15. In the first column, we regress labor productivity, defined
as value added per FTE, on three size dummies ψFTE=ki,t , taking the value of one
when the number of FTE’s equals respectively one, two and three. The dependent
variable is in logs, so the coefficients indicate approximately the labor productivity
premium relative to firms with more than three FTE’s. Column (1) shows that
firms with one FTE are approximately 60% more productive than firms with more
than three FTE’s, for firms with two or three FTE’s, these premia are respectively
approximately 28% and 13%. The results hold when including log fixed assets as a
regressor, the coefficients even become larger, indicating that there is also a total
factor productivity (TFP) premium.
Table 4.15: Micro-firms productivity premia
(1) (2)
Lprod Lprod (TFP)
ψFTE=1i,t 0.593
∗∗ 0.766∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0166)
ψFTE=2i,t 0.278
∗∗ 0.432∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0138)
ψFTE=3i,t 0.133
∗∗ 0.270∗∗
(0.0131) (0.0120)
log(FAi,t) 0.158
∗∗
(0.00431)
Sector dummies yes yes
Call dummies yes yes
Observations 66029 65976
R2 0.153 0.265
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log labor productivity
b The second column includes log fixed assets as a regressor. Therefore the coefficients on the
employment dummies can be interpreted as total factor productivity (TFP) premia.
The main explanation we see is that the owner of the firm is not always reported
as an employee of the firm, even if active in the firm.26 This creates a positive
measurement bias of labor productivity for small firms, which is more severe the
lower the number of FTE’s. An alternative explanation is that the marginal product
of the employees diminishes with each extra employee that the firm hires. Irrespective
26The owner is at least partly paid through the profits of the firm. Some owners choose to be an
employee of their firm, e.g. for tax reasons (if they pay themselves a low wage, the tax rate on
their wage is lower than the corporate taxes), but not all owners do this. We see for instance many
firms reporting zero employment in their accounting statements.
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of the reason way micro-firms are more productive and increasingly so the smaller
they are, this is potentially problematic in the context of this paper as we found
evidence that the subsidy increased employment for the very small firms. Hence, we
need to control for this in our analysis.
We mitigate this problem in two ways: in our main specification, we use detailed
controls for firm employment.27 As a robustness check, we run the analysis again with
labor productivity calculated as value added per ’FTE plus 1’ (shown in appendix
4.E.4). The results are qualitatively the same.
We find evidence that the subsidy increased productivity for the smallest firms.
The results show a similar picture as before: a small effect at the limit of statistical
significance for the coefficient across all firm sizes (not shown here), but more
interesting results when we allow for a heterogeneous effect according to pre-subsidy
firm size. We first show the results for labor productivity, and then for total factor
productivity (TFP).
The results for labor productivity using the fixed effects specification are shown
in table 4.16. Here we see that, for the smallest firms, the firms that received the
subsidy improved their labor productivity relative to the firms that did not get the
subsidy (coefficient of Dsubs), but the difference decreases with firm size (coefficient
of log(FTE) before ×Dsubs). Limiting the sample to firms closer to the acceptance
cut off, we see that this difference gets smaller, but is still statistically significant.
The results for the cumulative growth, i.e. the growth in labor productivity 3
years after the subsidy allocation relative to the year before the subsidy (year ’-1’),
are shown in table 4.17. The first column again shows that a simple comparison
shows that firms that received the subsidy experienced a higher growth in labor
productivity. When estimation the LATE around the cut off in the next 4 columns,
we see a positive effect for the smallest firms that decreases with increasing firm size.
Next, we estimate the effect on TFP by running similar regressions, still with labor
productivity as a dependent variable, but controlling for fixed assets, which controls
for the fact that labor productivity could be systematically higher for firms that use
more capital. The results are shown in tables 4.18 and 4.19. We see qualitatively
the same results as before, although the significance level drops somewhat. We can
conclude that the subsidy had an impact on productivity of small firms, both on
labor productivity and TFP.
27More specifically, we add separate dummies for a FTE of respectively one, two and three.
We also add log FTE as a general control for the number of FTE’s. The details on the exact
implementation are explained in appendix 4.D
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Table 4.16: Fixed effects specification for labor productivity including an interaction
term with initial employment - sample limited to applications increasingly closer to
the cut off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all 1 sd 1/2 sd 1/3 sd 1/4 sd
Dsubs 0.145∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.0953+
(0.0312) (0.0338) (0.0398) (0.0453) (0.0510)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0467∗∗ -0.0494∗∗ -0.0429∗∗ -0.0456∗∗ -0.0360∗
(0.00972) (0.0106) (0.0124) (0.0140) (0.0154)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 61321 40416 20295 13808 10386
R2 0.228 0.224 0.226 0.217 0.224
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log labor productivity, defined as value added per FTE
b The columns refer to which firms are kept in the sample. The column title indicates how close
the firms need to be to the cut off to be kept in the sample. E.g., in column (5) only firms
within 1/4 of a standard deviation of the score variable are kept in the sample (the standard
deviation of the score variable is 0.86, so 1/4 of the standard deviation is 0.215).
c The regressions also control for different productivity according to firm size, see appendix 4.D
for a detailed description.
Table 4.17: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative labor productivity growth - interaction
with initial log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.137∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.103∗ 0.0850 0.136∗
(0.0324) (0.0397) (0.0456) (0.0523) (0.0638)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0411∗∗ -0.0373∗∗ -0.0330∗∗ -0.0344∗ -0.0381∗
(0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0110) (0.0175) (0.0176)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 4828 4828 4828 1107 1107
R2 0.148 0.160 0.164 0.141 0.162
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: growth in labor productivity 3 years after the subsidy allocation relative
to the year before the subsidy (year ’-1’). Labor productivity is defined as value added per
FTE.
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard
deviation of the score variable.
c The regressions also control for different productivity growth according to firm size, see
appendix 4.D for a detailed description.
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Table 4.18: Fixed effects specification for TFP including an interaction term with
initial employment - sample limited to applications increasingly closer to the cut off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all 1 sd 1/2 sd 1/3 sd 1/4 sd
Dsubs 0.114∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.107∗ 0.0773
(0.0286) (0.0308) (0.0364) (0.0422) (0.0471)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0366∗∗ -0.0383∗∗ -0.0326∗∗ -0.0374∗∗ -0.0296∗
(0.00892) (0.00973) (0.0113) (0.0130) (0.0142)
log(FAi,t) 0.120
∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.129∗∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.141∗∗
(0.00389) (0.00497) (0.00749) (0.00922) (0.0113)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 61272 40392 20287 13801 10380
R2 0.276 0.275 0.277 0.271 0.284
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log labor productivity, defined as value added per FTE
b The columns refer to which firms are kept in the sample. The column title indicates how close
the firms need to be to the cut off to be kept in the sample. E.g., in column (5) only firms
within 1/4 of a standard deviation of the score variable are kept in the sample (the standard
deviation of the score variable is 0.86, so 1/4 of the standard deviation is 0.215).
c The regressions also control for different productivity according to firm size, see appendix 4.D
for a detailed description.
d The coefficients can be interpreted as the effect on TFP because we control for log fixed assets.
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Table 4.19: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative TFP growth - interaction with initial
log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.117∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.0827+ 0.0726 0.121+
(0.0312) (0.0383) (0.0440) (0.0519) (0.0631)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0361∗∗ -0.0329∗∗ -0.0289∗∗ -0.0299+ -0.0328+
(0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0173) (0.0174)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 4828 4828 4828 1107 1107
R2 0.187 0.197 0.200 0.168 0.187
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: growth in labor productivity 3 years after the subsidy allocation relative
to the year before the subsidy (year ’-1’). Labor productivity is defined as value added per
FTE.
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard
deviation of the score variable.
c The regressions also control for different productivity growth according to firm size, see
appendix 4.D for a detailed description.
d The coefficients can be interpreted as the effect on TFP because we control for growth in fixed
assets, see appendix 4.D for a detailed description.
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4.5.5 Results for profits and cash flow
The analysis in the previous subsections shows that the subsidy has no measurable
effect on investment for the larger firms. This naturally raises the question what
these firms do with the funds. Do the firms use the subsidy to improve their cash
flow? Or does the subsidy simply go to increased profits?
Our analysis suggests that there is no effect on cash flow. We analyzed whether
the firms improved their cash flow over total assets ratio or their current ratio,28 but
did not find an effect. The results are shown in appendix 4.E.5. However, we do find
strong evidence that the larger firms that received the subsidy indeed experienced
higher cumulative profits over the years after the subsidy was awarded. We use as a
dependent variable the logarithm of the cumulative pre-tax profits, aggregated over 4
years, starting from the year the subsidy is awarded to 3 years after the subsidy. We
limit the sample to firms larger than 9 FTE’s, where no effects where found for any
of the size variables (see appendix 4.E.1 and 4.E.3 for an illustration for fixed assets
and sales). The regression includes pre-subsidy employment to control for initial firm
size. The results are shown in table 4.20. All specifications show higher profits for
firms that received the subsidy, even though they did not grow more. The coefficients
show that the firms experienced approximately between 55% and 90% higher profits
than firms that did not receive the subsidy. This is likely to be an underestimation
of the full profit gains due to the subsidy, because the firm can potentially increase
its profits over a longer time period as the subsidy enter the accounting statements
over the full ’accounting life’ of the investment. We also used alternative measures,
such as profits relative to pre-subsidy employment or pre-subsidy total assets, and
found qualitatively similar results (see appendix 4.E.6).
In summary, these results show that larger firms did not react to the subsidy in
terms of investment, employment or sales, but simply used the subsidy to increase
their profits.
28A current ratio or liquidity ratio measures a company’s ability to pay short-term obligations.
It is defined as the ratio of current assets and current liabilities.
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Table 4.20: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative four year profits - sample limited to
firms with initial employment higher than 9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.737∗∗ 0.763∗∗ 0.551+ 0.606∗∗ 0.893∗
(0.155) (0.280) (0.322) (0.225) (0.390)
log(FTE) before 0.861∗∗ 0.813∗∗ 0.798∗∗ 0.545∗∗ 0.670∗∗
(0.0960) (0.0961) (0.0974) (0.193) (0.199)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 2378 2378 2378 634 634
R2 0.087 0.137 0.143 0.117 0.170
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log cumulative pre-tax profits, aggregated over 4 years, starting from the
year the subsidy is awarded to 3 years after the decision year of the subsidy.
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard
deviation of the score variable.
4.5.6 Impact on exit
This paragraph analyzes whether the subsidy lowered the probability of firm exit. We
define exit as follows. A firm exits when it either stops filing accounting statements
(we no longer observe accounting data from the firm) or the firm experiences a very
large drop in employment or fixed assets (reduction to 25% or less of the value the
year before).29 We introduce the latter, because often the actual exit process of a
firm is lengthy, preceded by a reduction in size and then taking several years to
actually close down. The rule of the large drop allows us to observe exit earlier on,
which is important given the timing of the subsidy.30
Table 4.21 gives an overview of the exit rates respectively 3, 4 and 5 years after
the subsidy allocation decision. The table shows that firms that did not receive the
subsidy experienced a higher exit rate than subsidized firms. However this does
not control for the fact that firms that received the subsidy are generally better
performing and hence less likely to exit anyway. Also, call and sector effects are not
taken into account. We therefore turn to a formal econometric analysis.
To estimate the difference in exit probability between firms that received the
29We exclude firms with less than three FTE’s at the year before the subsidy as applying this
rule does not work for firms of this size, making the definition of exit inconsistent across firm sizes.
30The subsidy program stops in 2009 and our accounting data stops in 2012. So if we want to
use a 5 year time frame, we already lose a part of the subsidy program observations. If detecting
exit takes even longer, it is basically not possible to do the analysis because we lose too many
observations.
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Table 4.21: Exit overview per treatment status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
total observations Exit % non-subsidized Exit % subsidized ∆ Exit %
Exit after 3 years 4148 8.16 7.35 0.81
Exit after 4 years 3519 10.73 8.73 2.00
Exit after 5 years 2902 13.66 10.07 3.59
a ’Exit %’ refers to the percentage of firms that exited within y years after the subsidy
allocation decision.
subsidy and firms that did not, we use a probit model. We focus on exit after a
period of 5 years. A shorter time frame will not yield many firms that exit and
a longer time frame is not feasible given the timing of the subsidy (between 2004
and 2009) and the availability of the accounting data (currently only until 2012).31
We included sector and call controls in all regressions. The results are shown in
table 4.22. As a benchmark, we estimate a probit regression without additional
controls in column (1). The coefficient indicates that firms that do not get the
subsidy are indeed more likely to exit. Remember that interpreting the size of the
coefficient is not straight forward for probit regressions, and it makes more sense
to look at the estimated probabilities. The estimated probability for exit is 13.87
% for non-subsidized firms and 9.86 % for subsidized firms.32 In column (2) we
control for size through log fixed assets (taking log FTE yields the same results) and
for performance through labor productivity. The coefficient is hardly affected. If
we now move to the estimation of a LATE in column (3) and (4), we see that the
coefficient is still negative but lower and no longer statistically significant. Column
(3) includes a linear control for the application score of the firm, while column (4)
limits the observations to the firms close to the cut off. Given the low exit rates
and the limited number of observations, it might be difficult to pick up an effect.
The model in column (4) estimates a probability of exit of 10.4% for non-subsidized
firms and 8.2% for subsidized firms. So in terms of magnitude, the difference is not
overwhelming but also non-negligible. When more years of accounting data become
available, the analysis can be potentially more conclusive on whether there is an
effect on exit. It would also be interesting to check if there is an effect for the larger
firms, as perhaps the higher profits might induce firms to stay active.
31When taking a 5 year period, we can only use the first 12 calls, and lose the last 4 calls. Taking
a 6 year period would mean we lose 3 additional calls, a 7 year period would mean we can only use
the first 5 calls.
32These estimated probabilities are approximately equal to the calculated probabilities in the
third row of table 4.21 They are not exactly equal due to the inclusion of call and sector dummies.
When running a probit regression without control dummies, you find exactly the same values as in
table 4.21.
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Table 4.22: Effect of the subsidy on exit after 5 years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms
Dsubs -0.248∗∗ -0.232∗ -0.130 -0.173
(0.0897) (0.0902) (0.124) (0.151)
log(FA−1) 0.0138 0.0165 -0.133+
(0.0313) (0.0314) (0.0696)
log(Lprod−1) -0.144 -0.130 -0.147
(0.107) (0.107) (0.180)
Call dummies yes yes yes yes
Linear score controls no no yes yes
Observations 2880 2880 2880 753
Pseudo R2 0.159 0.161 0.167 0.224
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a The dependent variable is a dummy for firm exit after 5 years, taking the
value ’1’ if the firm exits within 5 years after the subsidy is awarded. All
regressions are probit regressions.
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4.6 Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to determine the causal effect of the Flemish investment
subsidies granted between 2004 and 2009 on the outcomes for the firm receiving the
subsidy: growth in fixed assets, output, employment and productivity. Our paper
is one of the only papers to exploit a quasi-experimental setting in evaluating the
effectiveness of subsidies. The set up of the subsidy call system allows us to credibly
estimate a causal effect around the subsidy cut off. The subsidies were awarded
according to a transparent ranking system where every project is scored according
to openly communicated criteria. The subsidy is granted with a sharp cut off in the
score: firms that score below the cut off are not granted the subsidy, while firms
above the cut off are granted a subsidy.
When correcting for the selection effect using RDD, we find that the effect of the
subsidies on the growth of the receiving firms was rather limited. When we allow
for size heterogeneity, we find a positive effect on investment, employment, sales,
value added and productivity, but only for the very small firms, e.g. firms with less
than 10 employees. For larger firms, we do not find any effect. The heterogeneous
effect in terms of size confirms earlier results of Bronzini and Iachini (2011), Cerqua
and Pellegrini (2014) and Criscuolo, Martin, Overman, and Van Reenen (2012). Our
evidence suggests that larger firms use the subsidy to finance investments they would
have undertaken anyway. The only effect we find for these firms is an increase in
profits. We also analyzed whether the subsidy had an impact on firm-exit, but did
not find a statistically significant effect. The latter could be investigated better
when allowing for an analysis of exit over a longer time span, which is currently not
possible given that the subsidy program occurred relatively recently.
If the goal of the policy maker was to support firm growth, our results suggest
that the subsidy program has not been successful, apart from the effect on the very
small firms. Proposing a new design is not in scope of this paper, but a comparison
with the results for other programs suggests two possible adjustments that the policy
maker should consider. The first is raising the subsidy as a percentage of total
investment, as it was rather low compared to the programs in other countries where
studies found a larger overall impact of the subsidy. Second, focusing on successful
companies is not necessarily bad, but in addition favoring investments financed with
a high fraction of the firm’s own funds, creates a high probability of subsidizing
investments that would have occurred anyway.
The scope of the paper does not include certain aspects of the effects of the
subsidy, such as the effect on entry, the effect on extreme outcomes such as exceptional
growth or the long run effects of the investments. We leave this for further research.
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4.A Appendix: further background on the sub-
sidy
The criteria for eligibility and awarding the subsidy are written down in the Belgian
legal gazette,33 see Belgisch Staatsblad / Monteur Belge (March 25, 2003) and
Belgisch Staatsblad / Monteur Belge (November 10, 2003).
The following formula describes the normalization of the values:
Xn =
Xi −Mean
StDev
, (4.7)
where StDev =
√
(
∑
Xi−Mean)2
N−1 and N the number of applications.
The weights of the different criteria (that change somewhat over time) can be
found in table 4.23.
Table 4.23: Weights of the criteria for the different calls
Which calls? First 2 calls Next 5 calls Last 9 calls
Autof 0.15 0.15 0.20
CF/Total Assets 0.39 0.39 0.40
Sustainability 0.25 0.25 0.25
ICT 0.25 0.25 0.25
Age 0.25 0.25 0.25
Wage bill/VA 0.33 0.33 0.00
Max support 0.25 0.00 0.00
VA/Empl 0.13 0.13 0.40
Empl growth 0.50 0.50 0.50
a The ’first 2 calls’ refer to the calls with a decision date on 2/7/2004 and 3/12/2005. The ’next
5 calls’ refer to the calls with a decision date between 3/6/2005 and 6/6/2006. The ’last 9
calls’ refer to the calls with a decision date starting from 15/9/2006
Note that the weights are not a good representation of the impact of each criterion
on the score. Some variables have very little impact on the score, irrespective of the
weight. The problem is that outliers have a huge impact on the StDev in formula
(4.7), this in turn causes the normalized values Xn for not-outliers to be very small
in absolute value for variables that contain outliers. E.g., the ratio of wage bill and
value added had negligible impact despite the rather high weight attached to it: some
firms had a small, negative value added, yielding a very high ratio in absolute value.
These outliers caused the StDev to be very high, reducing Xn for non-outliers to
almost zero on this criterion.
33’Monteur Belge’ in French or ’Belgisch Staatsblad’ in Dutch
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4.B Appendix: datacleaning procedure
We apply standard data cleaning to our dataset to limit the influence of outliers, as
described below.
We drop the observations where employment and total fixed assets are negative
or missing. We also drop all firms that file accounting statements but report very
low numbers for certain variables in the year before the subsidy is decided upon, i.e.
firms with less than 1 FTE, less than AC10K in total fixed assets and less than AC100K
in sales. In addition we apply winsorizing to the data for the cumulative growth
regressions: all values for the dependent variable larger than the 95th percentile
are set to the 95th percentile value, all values smaller than the 5th percentile are
set to the 5th percentile value. We do the same for the score variable (within each
call). For interaction regressions, we apply the same rule to the log pre-subsidy
employment interaction term. For the fixed effects regression, we set all values of
the dependent variable of interest that are lower than the 1st percentile to the 1st
percentile and higher than the 99th percentile to the 99th percentile. In case we
take the log transformation of a dependent variable that can be negative (e.g., for
cumulative investment or profits), we set the (log) value to 0 for negative values.
4.C Appendix: pre-subsidy differences
Table 4.24: Pre-subsidy differences between firms that received the subsidy and firms
that did not - controlling for the application score (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
subs/max sust web age ∆Emp Autof Lprod CF ULC
Dsubs 0.0220 0.0229∗∗ 0.0760∗∗ 0.00796 -0.0335 -0.0581+ -0.0370 0.00257 -0.0106
(0.0358) (0.00416) (0.0249) (0.0242) (0.0371) (0.0328) (0.0393) (0.00760) (0.0198)
Call d. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 1494 5395 5395 5395 4531 5395 5375 5391 3174
R2 0.267 0.305 0.451 0.279 0.110 0.238 0.107 0.138 0.080
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable indicated in the column.
b subs/max and ULC are only used as a criterion for the score for a limited number of calls. We
only include observations for the calls where they are used.
c We control for the application score through a second order polynomial, allowed to be different
on both sides of the ’treatment’.
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Table 4.25: Pre-subsidy differences between firms that received the subsidy and firms
that did not - only firms close to the acceptance cut off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
subs/max sust web age ∆Emp Autof Lprod CF ULC
Dsubs -0.00448 0 0.000663 -0.0449∗ 0.0346 0.0366+ 0.0342 0.0231∗∗ -0.0418∗∗
(0.0253) (.) (0.0171) (0.0180) (0.0261) (0.0216) (0.0255) (0.00508) (0.0134)
Call d. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 534 1203 1203 1203 952 1203 1198 1203 904
R2 0.093 . 0.061 0.131 0.136 0.059 0.096 0.146 0.064
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable indicated in the column.
b subs/max and ULC are only used as a criterion for the score for a limited number of calls. We
only include observations for the calls where they are used.
c The sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard deviation of the
score variable.
Table 4.26: Pre-subsidy differences between firms that received the subsidy and firms
that did not - only firms close to the acceptance cut off and control for score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
subs/max sust web age ∆Emp Autof Lprod CF ULC
Dsubs 0.0144 0 -0.0250 -0.0314 -0.0609 0.0209 -0.00812 0.0101 -0.0424+
(0.0430) (.) (0.0277) (0.0270) (0.0442) (0.0399) (0.0485) (0.00946) (0.0244)
Call d. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 534 1203 1203 1203 952 1203 1198 1203 904
R2 0.110 . 0.094 0.162 0.187 0.098 0.128 0.179 0.086
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable indicated in the column.
b subs/max and ULC are only used as a criterion for the score for a limited number of calls. We
only include observations for the calls where they are used.
c The sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard deviation of the
score variable. We control for the application score through a linear term, allowed to be
different on both sides of the ’treatment’.
Table 4.27: Pre-subsidy differences in size between firms that received the subsidy
and firms that did not
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FTE FA VA Sales
Dsubs 0.0785+ 0.150∗∗ 0.229∗∗ 0.191∗∗
(0.0474) (0.0469) (0.0439) (0.0458)
Call dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 5395 5395 5375 5320
R2 0.075 0.071 0.078 0.096
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable indicated in the column: employment (’FTE’), fixed assets (’FA’), value
added (’VA’) and sales.
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4.D Appendix: productivity approach
This section explains in detail which controls for firm employment are used in the
productivity estimations. We also describe the controls we used for fixed assets in
the TFP results.
In the fixed effects specification, we use the following econometric model:
logLprodi,t = σD
subs
i,t + αi + ηt +
3∑
k=1
(ψFTE=ki,t ) + ρ · logFTEi,t + i,t, (4.8)
where Lprod stands for labor productivity and Dsubsi,t represents the subsidy dummy.
We keep the standard firm fixed effects αi and year dummies ηt, but in addition add
three dummies34 ψFTE=ki,t for a number of full time equivalents of respectively one, two
and three. The size dummies control for the fact that the very small firms generally
have a substantially higher productivity on average. We also add a general control
log(FTEi,t), allowing productivity to depend on firm size in terms of employment.
When allowing for a heterogeneous effect that depends on pre-subsidy size in
table 4.16, we use the following specification:
logLprodi,t = σD
subs
i,t +β logFTEi,−1·Dsubsi,t +αi+ηt+
3∑
k=1
(ψFTE=ki,t )+ρ·logFTEi,t+i,t,
(4.9)
where logFTEi,−1 stands for the logarithm of employment in terms of number of
full time equivalents in the year before the subsidy is awarded.
In the four year difference specification, taking the productivity growth from the
year before subsidy to three years after subsidy as a dependent variable in table 4.17,
we use the following econometric model:
∆4Lprodi = σD
subs
i + β logFTEi,−1 ·Dsubsi + ρ logFTEi,−1
+
3∑
k=1
(ψ
FTEi,−1=k
i,t + ∆4FTEi · ψFTEi,−1=ki,t ) + γ∆4FTEi + δsect + i. (4.10)
The subsidy dummy Dsubsi and the size interaction term logFTEi,−1 allow us to
estimate the heterogeneous effect. The term logFTEi,−1 needs to be included to
estimate the interaction effect β correctly. We add controls for the interaction
between cumulative four year growth in employment and original employment for a
original employment of one, two and three full time equivalents through the inclusion
of the terms ψ
FTEi,−1=k
i,−1 and ∆4FTEi ·ψFTEi,−1=ki,−1 . The variable four year employment
growth is also included separately (∆4FTEi).
For the TFP estimation, we included the logarithm of fixed assets in the fixed
34For simplicity, we only add three dummies in the main specification, but we also experimented
with adding four or five size dummies, and the results are very similar.
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effects estimation in table 4.18. In the four year difference specification in table 4.19,
we included the growth in fixed assets (∆4FAi) and the interaction between original
size in terms of employment and the change in fixed assets (logFTEi,−1 ·∆4FAi).
4.E Appendix: additional results
4.E.1 Fixed assets
Table 4.28: Fixed effects specification for total assets for firms with initial employment
lower than 9 - sample limited to applications increasingly closer to the cut off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all 1 sd 1/2 sd 1/3 sd 1/4 sd
Dsubs 0.287∗∗ 0.314∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.260∗∗ 0.213∗
(0.0527) (0.0585) (0.0710) (0.0822) (0.0950)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 31597 19541 9257 6101 4450
R2 0.250 0.242 0.229 0.211 0.197
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log fixed assets
b The columns refer to which firms are kept in the sample. The column title indicates how close
the firms need to be to the cut off to be kept in the sample.
Table 4.29: Fixed effects specification for total assets for firms with initial employment
higher than 9 - sample limited to applications increasingly closer to the cut off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all 1 sd 1/2 sd 1/3 sd 1/4 sd
Dsubs 0.0981∗∗ 0.0516 0.0423 0.0304 0.00907
(0.0355) (0.0405) (0.0461) (0.0519) (0.0574)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 29897 21003 11093 7737 5955
R2 0.168 0.185 0.227 0.219 0.223
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log fixed assets
b The columns refer to which firms are kept in the sample. The column title indicates how close
the firms need to be to the cut off to be kept in the sample.
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Table 4.30: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative four year fixed assets growth - sample
limited to firms with initial employment higher than 9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.0843 0.0830 0.0664 -0.0952 -0.00992
(0.105) (0.198) (0.237) (0.150) (0.280)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 2484 2484 2484 655 655
R2 0.031 0.056 0.062 0.066 0.139
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: cumulative growth in fixed assets 3 years after the subsidy allocation
relative to the year before the subsidy (year ’-1’)
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off.
4.E.2 Employment
Table 4.31: Fixed effects specification for employment including an interaction term
with initial employment - sample limited to applications increasingly closer to the
cut off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all 1 sd 1/2 sd 1/3 sd 1/4 sd
Dsubs 0.566∗∗ 0.534∗∗ 0.452∗∗ 0.449∗∗ 0.449∗∗
(0.0448) (0.0494) (0.0551) (0.0634) (0.0728)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.154∗∗ -0.152∗∗ -0.137∗∗ -0.142∗∗ -0.142∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0161) (0.0176) (0.0203) (0.0229)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 61548 40570 20359 13846 10411
R2 0.176 0.206 0.243 0.248 0.241
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log employment
b The columns refer to which firms are kept in the sample. The column title indicates how close
the firms need to be to the cut off to be kept in the sample.
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4.E.3 Sales
Table 4.32: Fixed effects specification for sales including an interaction term with
initial employment - sample limited to applications increasingly closer to the cut off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all 1 sd 1/2 sd 1/3 sd 1/4 sd
Dsubs 0.322∗∗ 0.325∗∗ 0.251∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 0.231∗∗
(0.0353) (0.0373) (0.0429) (0.0512) (0.0576)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0749∗∗ -0.0835∗∗ -0.0674∗∗ -0.0744∗∗ -0.0681∗∗
(0.0123) (0.0126) (0.0143) (0.0169) (0.0188)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 54563 35871 17943 12190 9190
R2 0.278 0.307 0.350 0.359 0.348
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log sales
b The columns refer to which firms are kept in the sample. The column title indicates how close
the firms need to be to the cut off to be kept in the sample.
Table 4.33: Fixed effects specification for sales for firms with initial employment
higher than 9 - sample limited to applications increasingly closer to the cut off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all 1 sd 1/2 sd 1/3 sd 1/4 sd
Dsubs 0.0892∗∗ 0.0716∗∗ 0.0405 0.00920 0.000666
(0.0222) (0.0241) (0.0270) (0.0307) (0.0321)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 27190 19086 10045 7012 5415
R2 0.267 0.300 0.374 0.375 0.383
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log sales
b The columns refer to which firms are kept in the sample. The column title indicates how close
the firms need to be to the cut off to be kept in the sample.
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Table 4.34: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative four year sales growth - sample
limited to firms with initial employment higher than 9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.0865∗∗ 0.0246 0.0199 0.0311 0.0320
(0.0269) (0.0480) (0.0583) (0.0383) (0.0683)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 2334 2334 2334 639 639
R2 0.064 0.080 0.089 0.059 0.115
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: cumulative growth in sales 3 years after the subsidy allocation relative to
the year before the subsidy (year ’-1’)
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off.
4.E.4 Productivity
Table 4.35: Fixed effects specification for corrected labor productivity including an
interaction term with initial employment - sample limited to applications increasingly
closer to the cut off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all 1 sd 1/2 sd 1/3 sd 1/4 sd
Dsubs 0.145∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.0953+
(0.0312) (0.0338) (0.0398) (0.0453) (0.0510)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0467∗∗ -0.0494∗∗ -0.0429∗∗ -0.0456∗∗ -0.0360∗
(0.00972) (0.0106) (0.0124) (0.0140) (0.0154)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 61321 40416 20295 13808 10386
R2 0.228 0.224 0.226 0.217 0.224
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log labor productivity, defined as value added per ’FTE+1’
b The columns refer to which firms are kept in the sample. The column title indicates how close
the firms need to be to the cut off to be kept in the sample.
c The regressions also control for different productivity according to firm size, see appendix 4.D.
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Table 4.36: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative corrected labor productivity growth -
interaction with initial log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.144∗∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.120∗ 0.0937+ 0.143∗
(0.0344) (0.0416) (0.0476) (0.0544) (0.0658)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0437∗∗ -0.0400∗∗ -0.0357∗∗ -0.0378∗ -0.0399∗
(0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0116) (0.0182) (0.0182)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 4828 4828 4828 1107 1107
R2 0.058 0.071 0.075 0.084 0.105
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: cumulative labor productivity growth, defined as value added per
’FTE+1’
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off.
c The regressions also control for different productivity growth according to firm size, see
appendix 4.D.
Table 4.37: Fixed effects specification for corrected TFP including an interaction
term with initial employment - sample limited to applications increasingly closer to
the cut off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all 1 sd 1/2 sd 1/3 sd 1/4 sd
Dsubs 0.104∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.0901∗∗ 0.0863∗ 0.0595
(0.0252) (0.0270) (0.0315) (0.0356) (0.0393)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0381∗∗ -0.0382∗∗ -0.0308∗∗ -0.0332∗∗ -0.0252∗
(0.00791) (0.00856) (0.00986) (0.0110) (0.0120)
log(FAi,t) 0.114
∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.121∗∗ 0.131∗∗
(0.00344) (0.00437) (0.00667) (0.00804) (0.00969)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 61272 40392 20287 13801 10380
R2 0.213 0.210 0.201 0.204 0.212
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log labor productivity, defined as value added per ’FTE+1’
b The columns refer to which firms are kept in the sample. The column title indicates how close
the firms need to be to the cut off to be kept in the sample.
c The regressions also control for different productivity according to firm size, see appendix 4.D.
d The coefficients can be interpreted as the effect on TFP because we control for log fixed assets.
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Table 4.38: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative corrected TFP growth - interaction
with initial log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.122∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.0973∗ 0.0793 0.126+
(0.0328) (0.0396) (0.0453) (0.0533) (0.0647)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0382∗∗ -0.0351∗∗ -0.0312∗∗ -0.0327+ -0.0338+
(0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0178) (0.0178)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 4828 4828 4828 1107 1107
R2 0.108 0.120 0.123 0.117 0.137
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log labor productivity, defined as value added per ’FTE+1’
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off.
c The regressions also control for different productivity growth according to firm size, see
appendix 4.D.
d The coefficients can be interpreted as the effect on TFP because we control for growth in fixed
assets, see appendix 4.D.
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4.E.5 Cash flow and CR
Table 4.39: Fixed effects specification for current ratio for firms with initial employ-
ment higher than 9 - sample limited to applications increasingly closer to the cut off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all 1 sd 1/2 sd 1/3 sd 1/4 sd
Dsubs 0.0928∗ 0.0914 0.125+ 0.100 0.0954
(0.0462) (0.0559) (0.0660) (0.0688) (0.0742)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 29907 21009 11095 7739 5956
R2 0.033 0.038 0.042 0.043 0.056
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: current ratio
b The columns refer to which firms are kept in the sample. The column title indicates how close
the firms need to be to the cut off to be kept in the sample.
Table 4.40: Effect of the subsidy on current ratio after receiving the subsidy - sample
limited to firms with initial employment higher than 9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.0679+ 0.0591 0.0160 0.0540 -0.00807
(0.0404) (0.0784) (0.0955) (0.0647) (0.120)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 2483 2483 2483 655 655
R2 0.014 0.038 0.050 0.063 0.106
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: difference in CR between 3 years after the subsidy is awarded and one
year before
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off.
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Table 4.41: Fixed effects specification for cash flow over total assets for firms with
initial employment higher than 9 - sample limited to applications increasingly closer
to the cut off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all 1 sd 1/2 sd 1/3 sd 1/4 sd
Dsubs -0.0228∗∗ -0.0202∗∗ -0.0172∗∗ -0.0137∗∗ -0.0133∗
(0.00356) (0.00408) (0.00469) (0.00509) (0.00538)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 29897 21003 11092 7737 5954
R2 0.046 0.049 0.053 0.054 0.060
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: the ratio of cash flow over total assets.
b The columns refer to which firms are kept in the sample. The column title indicates how close
the firms need to be to the cut off to be kept in the sample.
Table 4.42: Effect of the subsidy on cash flow over total assets after receiving the
subsidy - sample limited to firms with initial employment higher than 9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs -0.0189∗∗ 0.00631 0.0125 -0.00949 0.0221+
(0.00437) (0.00781) (0.00954) (0.00623) (0.0113)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 2484 2484 2484 655 655
R2 0.039 0.069 0.076 0.103 0.156
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: difference in cash flow over total assets between 3 years after the subsidy
is awarded and one year before
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off.
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4.E.6 Profits
Table 4.43: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative profits per initial FTE - sample
limited to firms with initial employment higher than 9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.539∗∗ 0.432∗ 0.278 0.380∗ 0.533∗
(0.0981) (0.186) (0.218) (0.150) (0.266)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 2376 2376 2376 633 633
R2 0.067 0.124 0.129 0.106 0.159
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log cumulative pre-tax profits per pre-subsidy FTE. The profits are
aggregated over 4 years, starting from the year the subsidy is award to 3 years after the
decision year of the subsidy.
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off.
Table 4.44: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative profits per initial total assets - sample
limited to firms with initial employment higher than 9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.151∗∗ 0.0864∗ 0.0270 0.0900∗ 0.0965
(0.0235) (0.0440) (0.0530) (0.0362) (0.0649)
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Call dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial control in score no yes no no no
2-sided poly control in score no no yes no no
Linear control in score no no no no yes
Observations 2376 2376 2376 633 633
R2 0.054 0.111 0.120 0.085 0.153
Robust (Huber–White) standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: log cumulative pre-tax profits over pre-subsidy fixed assets.
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off.
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